NATO AND COALITION WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN, 2001-2014 by Hanagan, Deborah Lynn
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 


















NATO AND COALITION WARFARE IN 
AFGHANISTAN, 2001-2014 
 
Deborah Lynn Hanagan 
 














Department of War Studies 
King’s College       August 2017 





This thesis analyzes the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Specifically, it analyzes 
multinational military adaptation and change at the operational level within the ISAF 
coalition which operated in the midst of a complex conflict that changed in character over 
time. NATO was not initially involved in military operations, but this changed slowly over 
time. First, it decided to take over ISAF in Kabul, and then it expanded ISAF, both 
geographically and operationally. ISAF then surged, followed by an organized withdrawal. 
Why did this happen and how did ISAF maintain coalition cohesion throughout the 
campaign in Afghanistan? Despite a multitude of forces that should have frayed coalition 
cohesion, such as intra-alliance friction over burden-sharing, operational inefficiencies 
related to national caveats, reluctance to commit forces, especially to engage in combat, and 
a widespread perception the war was a failure, the ISAF coalition did not fall apart and 
contributing nations did not abandon their partners. Instead, cohesion endured, the coalition 
increased in size and expanded what it did, and NATO members and partners stayed 
engaged for some thirteen years. This thesis proposes an analytical framework comprised of 
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The Puzzle.  
 In the annals of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) history, 2011 was a 
banner year for the Alliance because it was engaged in a wide range of military operations 
around the world. These included ground, naval, and air missions, such as the continuing 
peace support operations in Kosovo in the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).
1
 Maritime 
operations were encompassed in two different missions – Active Endeavour and Ocean 
Shield. Operation Active Endeavour had been launched in response to the Alliance’s Article 
5 declaration after the United States was attacked by al Qaeda on September 11
th
, 2001. This 
naval mission monitored shipping to detect, deter, and protect against terrorist-related 
activities in the Mediterranean Sea.
2
 Operation Ocean Shield was a counter-piracy mission 
operating off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden. Its surface vessels and maritime 
patrol aircraft deterred piracy activity and offered escort assistance. It also offered training 
to countries in the region to improve the indigenous capacity to fight piracy.
3
 The NATO 
Training Mission–Iraq (NTM-I) developed Iraqi Security Forces through training and 
mentoring activities and it contributed to establishing training structures and institutions.
4
 
The NATO-led intervention in Libya, called Operation Unified Protector, was undertaken 
under a United Nations (UN) mandate and with the encouragement and support of the 
                                                 
1
 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2011 (Brussels: NATO Public 
Diplomacy Division, 2012), 8.  The KFOR mission began under a UN Security Council mandate 
(1244) in June 1999 with a force of 50,000 troops. By the start of 2011, the force was 10,000 troops 
and it was reduced to 5,500 troops in March. 
2
 NATO, “Operation Active Endeavour,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm. The 
operation began in October 2001 and was conducted by a Task Force of surface vessels, submarines 
and maritime patrol aircraft. It was commanded and controlled by Allied Maritime Component 
Command Naples, Italy. The objective of the operation was to prevent another attack like the ones 
against the USS Cole in 2000 and the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002. The naval force gathered 
and processed intelligence information about suspect vessels. As of 2011, it had hailed over 100,000 
merchant vessels and boarded approximately 155 suspect ships. 
3
 Rasmussen, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2011, 9. Counter-piracy operations began in 
2008. Operation Ocean Shield was carried out in compliance with relevant UN Security Council 
Resolutions and in coordination with other key organizations, such as the European Union, the 
African Union and the United Nations. 
4
 Ibid. During its seven years of execution (August 2004-December 2011), NTM-I “trained over 
5,200 commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces and around 10,000 
Iraqi Police.”  
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League of Arab States. This operation was oriented on protecting Libyan civilians and it 
utilized air and naval assets to enforce a maritime arms embargo, to enforce a no-fly zone, 
and to conduct precision air and naval strikes against Muammar Qadhafi’s military forces.5 
Airborne surveillance over the Mediterranean Sea by the Alliance’s fleet of Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) airplanes supported both Operation Active 
Endeavour and Operation Unified Protector.
6
 These operations were dwarfed by the 
operations in Afghanistan. 
 The largest and most significant military activity in 2011, and the only mission in 
which all 28 of the allies participated, was the NATO-led International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. Its objective was to ensure the country would “never 
again be a base for global terrorism.” 7 Not only was the year significant because it was the 
apogee of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, but it was also the year the ISAF coalition 
reached its maximum size in terms of participating nations, 50, and number of troops 
deployed, over 130,000.
8
 Over the course of the year, ISAF, in partnership with Afghan 
security forces, engaged in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations against an 
insurgent coalition that included a reconstituted Taliban and associated groups, such as the 
Haqqani Network and al Qaeda. It engaged in a range of peace support operations that 
included stabilization and reconstruction activities through 28 Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRT). In addition, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), the 
coalition’s main effort, focused on developing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
by training and mentoring the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police 
(ANP).
9
 Finally, ISAF began transitioning full responsibility for security to Afghan forces 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., 7-8. 
6
 NATO, “NATO’s airborne surveillance: Eyes in the sky,” March 18, 2011, http://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natolive/news_71614.htm. NATO AWACS operations were not limited to the Mediterranean 
region. For seven months, from October 2001 to May 2002, seven NATO AWACS aircraft patrolled 
the airspace over the continental United States. 
7
 Rasmussen, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2011, 2. 
8
 All 28 members of the Alliance were in the coalition. “International Security Assistance Force,” 
ISAF Placemat, December 1, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/107995.htm. 
9
 Rasmussen, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2011, 4-6. Also, NATO, “International 




during the year. Tranche 1 of the transition began in March and it included Bamiyan 
province and the city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Tranche 2 began in November. In the relevant 
provinces, districts, and cities, ISAF maintained a presence but the troops no longer engaged 
in direct combat, instead they provided support to ANSF.
10
 
 This extensive range of global military activity undertaken in a wide variety of 
operational coalitions was unprecedented for a security organization created more than six 
decades before to defend against Soviet aggression, prevent the re-emergence of German 
revanchism, and keep the United States engaged in Europe. Furthermore, the wide range in 
forms of coalition warfare – precision combat strikes, peace support operations, 
humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, counter-insurgency, stabilization 
and reconstruction, and training – seemed to demonstrate that NATO was an adaptive 
organization capable of changing to meet the demands of a dynamic international security 
environment. NATO had evolved from being a static, defensive alliance focused on 
deterring conventional and nuclear war to a security organization that could respond to a 
wide range of challenges. It had expeditionary capabilities that could be deployed in discrete 
operational combined force packages, which were multinational coalitions, and it could 
engage in a wide range of military missions.  
 Of all NATO’s activities in 2011, the ISAF mission was the most ambitious (in 
reality it was trying to help create a resilient Afghan state) and the most extensive in terms 
of the multinational force contributions involved (ground, air, and naval troops and assets) 
and the range of operational missions. It could not only be argued that the NATO engaged 
in Afghanistan was almost unrecognizable from the Cold War NATO, but also that the 
ISAF operating in country was dramatically transformed from the ISAF that deployed in 
December 2001. More specifically, NATO was not initially involved in military operations 
in Afghanistan, but this changed slowly over time. First, it decided to take over ISAF in 
Kabul, and then it expanded ISAF, both geographically and operationally. ISAF then 
                                                 
10
 NATO, “Transition to Afghan lead: Inteqal,” December 2011, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/ 
assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20111210_111207-Backgrounder-Inteq-en.pdf. Also, NATO – news, “Mazar 
after transition,” November 18, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_81069.htm. 
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surged, followed by an organized withdrawal. Why did this happen and how did ISAF 
maintain coalition cohesion throughout the campaign in Afghanistan?  
 The fact that cohesion endured among the allies and partners in Afghanistan is a 
puzzle because there was a multitude of forces that should have frayed the coalition. They 
included: intra-alliance tensions and conflicts over burden-sharing; disagreements about 
what ISAF should do; concerns about U.S. unilateralism; reluctance to get involved in 
combat operations or to remain engaged over the long term; and operational inefficiencies 
from restrictive national caveats and resource, training, and doctrinal shortfalls that led to 
inconclusive tactical operations which produced a widespread perception the international 
effort was a failure. These problems were exacerbated by major miscalculations about the 
character of the conflict, under-estimations of Taliban resilience, and significant deficiencies 
among the Afghan partners, including corruption and human capital weaknesses. 
As the thesis delves into this puzzle, it will address related questions. For example, 
why did NATO get involved when the enemy did not threaten the survival of its members? 
How come the complexity of the conflict in Afghanistan did not fracture the coalition, 
especially when it was going badly? Why did the missions expand, particularly into the 
governance and economic domains when that is not what security alliances are traditionally 
for and why did this not undermine cohesion? Why did no NATO member defect from the 
coalition, especially considering the Alliance was otherwise globally engaged? Why did 
partner nations join and stay engaged when they had no formal power in Alliance decision-
making? 
The evidence of history suggests that alliances and coalitions can be fragile and they 
have often fractured under combat pressures or when members undergo national political or 
economic crises during the conflict. It can be argued that alliances, which result from formal 
treaties or agreements and have a long-term nature, should be more durable than coalitions, 
which are short-term in nature and result from ad hoc and temporary combinations in 
response to sudden or emerging threats. In addition, it seems logical to assume that when the 
stakes are high it is more likely allies and partners will stick together, especially in formal 
9 
 
alliances, than in cases when the stakes are lower, the situation is opaque, or goals and 
objectives are tenuous. However, history seems to indicate otherwise; alliances have often 
seemed to be as brittle as coalitions since political, social, economic, or battlefield 
conditions can fatally undermine the ties that should bind alliances strongly together. For 
example, in the 5
th
 century B.C. the existential threat posed by recurring Persian invasions 
did not deter constantly shifting alignments among the Greek city-states as they fought each 
other and against Persia.
11
 During the Thirty Years War, despite the invariably heavy costs 
imposed by war, a number of the protagonists in the Holy Roman Empire changed sides 
during the conflict due to religious, political, and combat pressures.
12
 The six coalitions 
formed against France during the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars were a 
constantly shifting kaleidoscope. The early coalitions in particular were “fragmented by 
divergent war aims and mutual suspicions” which led to uncoordinated operations, 
battlefield failures, and disintegration as allies sued for peace individually with France.
13
 In 
the last century, France went to great lengths to form alliances before the First and Second 
World Wars because it knew it could not survive German aggression alone, but even so 
struggled to convince potential allies equally threatened by Germany to enter into alliance. 
For example, it could not convince the USSR in August 1939 that alliance with France 
would offer both better long-term prospects than operating separately, or by letting it 
conclude a Soviet-German pact. And even in June 1940, rather than continuing the war from 
its territories and colonies overseas, in continued alliance with Britain, the French 
government decided to defect and surrender to Germany.
14
 The subsequent Anglo-American 
alliance was fraught with rivalries, prejudices, frictions, arguments, and disagreements from 
the political level to military operational and tactical levels. Some strategic disagreements 
                                                 
11
 Victor Davis Hanson, A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the 
Peloponnesian War (New York: Random House, 2005), 18-19, 291-293. 
12
 C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (New York: Review Books, 2005), 178, 191, 329, 348, 
501-505. 
13
 Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1980), 34-58. 
14
 Philip Nord, France 1940: Defending the Republic (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University 
Press, 2015), 118-132. 
10 
 
were so serious they “threatened the cohesion of the alliance.” However, they did not 
prevent an unprecedented degree of cooperation and the complete fusion and integration of 
allied strategy, planning efforts, and intelligence sharing, or the execution of unified 
operations which ultimately achieved victory.
15
 It seems even when allies share a view of 
the danger they face, as the UK and France and the U.S and UK did against Adolf Hitler’s 
Germany, a solid and enduring alliance is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. If this 
applies to cases of extreme danger, then one would expect an alliance or coalition facing 
lesser risk to fray even more easily. That this did not happen in the case studied here, makes 
it all the more interesting. 
As the introduction suggests, alliances and coalitions are not necessarily separate 
and distinct. Since the end of the Cold War, it seems NATO has developed into a formal 
alliance that can generate discrete multinational coalitions to deal with different security 
challenges. Its wide range of missions in 2011 demonstrates this point. However, the level 
of allied participation in them has varied widely and they face different levels of fraying 
forces. Afghanistan presented a particular challenge. In fact, given the negative historical 
experiences of alliances and coalitions, the low stakes involved in the war in Afghanistan, 
the inconclusive nature of the conflict against the Taliban, the fraying forces identified 
above, and the fact that today for many European countries war is considered an illegitimate 
means for resolving international differences, one could argue that the ISAF coalition 
should have fallen apart and that NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan should not have 
happened or that it should not have developed in the way that it did. However, the fact 
remains that somehow the Alliance became engaged and ISAF stayed together and 
maintained an unprecedented level of cohesion in a highly complex conflict, for an extended 
period of time, in a region far from Alliance territory. Furthermore, ISAF was able to 
accommodate an ever larger coalition and expand the forms of warfare it undertook. This 
                                                 
15
 Niall Barr, Eisenhower’s Armies: The American-British Alliance During World War II (New York: 
Pegasus Books, 2015), 1-5, 458-470. 
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thesis proposes an explanation based on concepts related to organizational learning and 
military adaptation. 
 Alliances and coalitions are generated and exist within the conditions of a given 
strategic environment. NATO and the ISAF coalition are no exception. Furthermore, 
dramatic shifts in the strategic environment can be the precipitating agents for change within 
military organizations, especially if they possess the organizational capacity to learn and 
adapt. The next section will briefly discuss two key aspects of the international 
environment, the post-Cold War security environment and the increasing institutionalization 
of the international system, which influenced Alliance developments and activities, before it 
examines the literature from which this thesis derives its analytical framework. 
Evolving International Environment. 
 The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s threw the Alliance into a 
period of strategic uncertainty. NATO leaders struggled to situate the organization in the 
dramatically changed international environment which included the emergence of new 
security threats. 
 Over the years, many scholars and policy experts have written about the post-Cold 
War security environment and the state and non-state threats that have emerged and could 
emerge.
16
 Attention initially focused on Europe because it was the center of U.S. foreign and 
security policy and it was “also the region . . . most directly and dramatically affected by the 
end of the Cold War.”17 A common subject in the early 1990s was the reunified Germany. 
Multiple arguments were made that Europe would likely return to its pre-1945 past when 
German power threatened its neighbors and European inter-state conflict and war was 
common.
18
 However, this concern disappeared over time as Germany remained deeply 
                                                 
16
 Colin Fleming effectively captured the debate on whether and how war, the nature of war, and 
warfare had changed after 1990. Colin M. Fleming, “New or Old Wars: Debating a Clausewitzian 
Future,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April 2009): 213-241. 
17
 Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., America’s Strategy in a Changing World: An 
International Security Reader (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), xiv. 
18
 The fears of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand 
and other policymakers were documented in: Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany 
Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
12 
 
integrated in Euro-Atlantic international institutions and German political leaders 
maintained peaceful foreign and security policies.
19
 Another common European security 
concern was Russia. For years, scholars and policy experts warned that Russia still 
maintained large conventional and nuclear forces and that it was not out of the question that 
an “over-armed” and dangerous Russia could emerge if the conditions were right.20 As the 
post-communist transition got underway in Central, Southeastern, and Eastern Europe, there 
were warnings of the potential for ethnic and border disputes, and the disruptive, large-scale 
migration flows that could result, if nationalism and militarism re-emerged.
21
 The legitimacy 
of this security concern seemed borne out by the conflict and violence that erupted with the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
 The non-state and transnational threats analyzed were diverse. Martin van Creveld 
argued the predominant form of war had become low intensity conflict, in which at least one 
side consisted of guerrillas, insurgents, or terrorists. Subsequent analysis of these non-state 
actors was extensive.
22
 A consistent concern was the negative implications of the spread of 
                                                                                                                                         
1997), xii, xiii, 2, 96; and Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet 
Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 439-440. Also Kenneth N. Waltz, “The 
Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993): 50, 
62-67; and Steven Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” International 
Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91): 7-9. 
19
 Mary Hampton argued that this was because NATO succeeded in its mission to forge a positive 
identity between Germany and the U.S. and with the Alliance. She maintains Germans have placed 
their trust in NATO and the transatlantic security relationship and that “Germans link their security to 
the United States through the Alliance.” Mary N. Hampton, “NATO, Germany, and the United 
States: Creating Positive Identity in Trans-Atlantia,” Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2-3 (Winter 
1998/1999): 237, 238, 263, 266. 
20
 Ted Hopf, “Managing Soviet Disintegration: A Demand for Behavioral Regimes,” in Lynn-Jones 
and  Miller, eds., America’s Strategy in a Changing World, 119, 123. Also, Colin Gray, “Do the 
Changes Within the Soviet Union Provide a Basis for Eased Soviet-American Relations? A Skeptical 
View,” in Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer, eds., Soviet-American Relations After the Cold War 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 61-75. More recently, Colin Gray has highlighted the 
concerns raised by a resurgent Russia and its alignment with China. Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody 
Century: Future Warfare (London: Phoenix, 2006), 49, 72, 179, 382-383. 
21
 Robert Jervis, “The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?” in Lynn-Jones and 
Miller, eds., America’s Strategy in a Changing World, 19-20; and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Down and 
Out in Warsaw and Budapest: Eastern Europe and East-West Migration,” in Lynn-Jones and Miller, 
eds., America’s Strategy in a Changing World, 240. Jack Snyder argued nationalist tendencies were 
likely to emerge in Eastern Europe and this could lead to conflict. Jack Snyder, “Averting Anarchy in 
the New Europe,” in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After, 
Prospects for Peace: An International Security Reader (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 111-112. 
22
 Martin van Creveld, On Future War (London: Brassey’s, 1991), 20, 29, 197. Other scholars 
contributed their analysis on the non-state actors (guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists), such as 
Richard H. Schultz, Jr. and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: The Warriors of 
13 
 
weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons), particularly to 
unstable, or rogue, states and terrorist groups.
23
 Crises in Kurdistan after Operation Desert 
Storm, Somalia, Rwanda, and the disintegrating Yugoslavia brought attention to 
humanitarian challenges.
24
 This generated a follow-on observation that weak, failing, and 
failed states posed security threats because of the possibility that violence and instability 
could spread to surrounding states or because they possessed ungoverned spaces which 
could be exploited by guerrillas, insurgents, and transnational terrorist groups.
25
 Finally, 
even though terrorism had been recognized as a security threat for decades, the al Qaeda 
attacks of September 11
th
, 2001 propelled this threat to the top of policymakers’ security 
agenda and academic analysis.
26
 The post-Cold War security environment engendered a 
diverse array of dangers. 
 This dynamic international security environment presented the NATO Alliance the 
opportunity to focus on and respond to different threats. In a number of areas, the allies 
developed the political will to initiate military changes and undertake new activities, 
                                                                                                                                         
Contemporary Combat (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). Daniel Marston and Carter 
Malkasian, eds., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Long Island City, NY: Osprey Publishing, 
2010). David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of the Big One 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to 
Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). 
23
 Robert J. Art, “A Defensible Defense: America’s Grand Strategy After the Cold War,” in Lynn-
Jones and Miller, eds., America’s Strategy in a Changing World, 72, 74; and Paul Kennedy, 
“American Grand Strategy, Today and Tomorrow: Learning from European Experience,” in Paul 
Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 180; 
and Nathan E. Busch, No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation (Lexington: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 2004); and Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner, eds., 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy 
(Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2009). 
24
 The Aspen Strategy Group, The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era 
(Queenstown, MD: The Aspen Institute, 1995), xii, 3. 
25
 Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 3 (May/June 2010): 2; and Angel Rabasa, Ungoverned Territories 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2008); and Robert Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Stewart Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats: 
Fact or Fiction?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring 2006): 27-53. 
26
 Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey, John R. Schindler and Jim Lacey, The Terrorist Perspectives 
Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 2008); and Daniel Philpott, “The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in 
International Relations,” World Politics, Vol. 55 (October 2002): 66-95; and Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The 
Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Peter Neumann and 
M.L.R. Smith, The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works and Why It Fails (New York: Routledge, 
2007); and Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, eds., The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al 
Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). 
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although it was frequently difficult and incremental. Organizationally, NATO seemed to 
adapt to the post-Cold War security environment by making successive changes in its 
strategic concepts, shifting its mission focus, and updating doctrine, command structures, 
and equipment, as it also incorporated new members. These changes played a role in giving 
the Alliance the capacity to undertake new forms of warfare and laid foundations that would 
later prove relevant to Afghanistan. In fundamental areas NATO did not change. For 
example, members maintained consensus that the Alliance’s first priority was collective 
defense so the Article 5 commitment
27
 remained sacrosanct, even though NATO did not 
specifically identify against whom the Alliance defended after 1990. On the other hand, 
over the last 25 years the Alliance undertook what could be considered radically new 
operations to deal with the threats posed by ethnic conflict and civil war in the Balkans and 
Libya, insurgency in the Balkans and Afghanistan, failed states in the Balkans and 
Afghanistan, and terrorism and piracy in the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and 
Afghanistan. In fact, Afghanistan seemed to represent a synthesis of contemporary threats 
and challenges for it encompassed: a rogue state that was also a failed state, a transnational 
terrorist group and insurgents, ethnic conflict, ungoverned spaces, and a humanitarian 
catastrophe. Operations in Afghanistan were complicated by its remote geographic location 
and cultural context. Given the diverse and diffuse challenges associated with Afghanistan 
and the fact the Alliance had little previous experience in dealing with them, it is surprising 
the allies generated the political will to get involved by taking over ISAF. Even more 
surprising is the subsequent capacity of the coalition to adapt and change in multiple ways 
as the conflict escalated. It not only sustained cohesion as the number of contributing 
                                                 
27
 Article 5 is one of 14 articles in the North Atlantic Treaty. It states “The Parties agree that an 
armed attacked against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force . . .” In effect, it is a mutual defense guarantee that promises that an attack on one 
will be treated as an attack on all and as such all members will rally together, in some way, to deal 
with the attack. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” Washington, D.C., 
4 April 1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. 
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nations increased, but it also expanded its range of operational missions, or coalition 
warfare. 
 Evolutions in warfare can be considered a logical result of changes in the character 
of war, especially when the combatants are self-reflective and capable of learning. This 
thesis analyzes ISAF and coalition warfare in Afghanistan from a Clausewitzian 
perspective. According to Carl von Clausewitz, the essence of war is the violent clash of 
opposing wills. War therefore involves the use of force, fighting (or the threat of it), in a 
contestation between opposing sides. Furthermore, the interaction is reciprocal. Each side 
reacts to the other or tries to pre-empt the other. War is not an independent phenomenon. It 




 War is also a dynamic, complex, and diverse phenomenon, and although over the 
course of human history there have been many kinds of wars, they all share common 
elements. As Clausewitz argued, war has objective and subjective characteristics. The 
objective characteristics are the forces identified in the trinity: the force of hostility, the play 
of probability and chance (this includes the elements of danger, physical exertion, friction, 
and uncertainty), and the guiding influence of purpose. These three forces are universal. 
They are the principal elements, or the intrinsic forces, that shape the nature of war. They 
influence the form and the course of war, or how it unfolds, over time.
29
 While they are 
present in all wars, they are also constantly in flux; they vary constantly in intensity and 
relative importance “from one war to the next, and or even multiple times within the same 
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war.”30 They also interact with, and influence, each other. The subjective characteristics of 
war are the means of a given war. They are the social and political context (which includes 
culture, society, polity, technology, and armed forces) of the particular time and place, and 
as such they also influence the form and course of war. The subjective characteristics can 
also change over time (for example, new weapons can be developed). The objective and 
subjective characteristics are not separate; they can interact with and influence each other.
31
 
This means that war “is more than a simple chameleon.”32 A given war can change in kind, 
or character, due to changes in the intrinsic forces and changes in means. As the scholar 
Antulio Echevarria observed, “War can vary in degree so much so that, for all practical 
purposes, the sum of those variations would amount to changes in kind: we may be involved 
in a war of minimal violence in one moment, and a war of rapidly escalating violence in the 
next . . .”33 As a consequence, how war is fought and how military force is employed 
(warfare) can also change. This occurred in Afghanistan. Over time, NATO’s ISAF changed 
what it did in Afghanistan. In part, this was due to a recognition that the character of the 
conflict changed, but it also resulted from organizational learning. As a consequence, ISAF 
ended up undertaking a wide range of unexpected missions all of which were oriented on 
achieving an overarching objective that never changed: to keep Afghanistan from reverting 
back to becoming a safe haven for transnational Islamic terrorism. 
 NATO’s continued existence after the Cold War and its efforts to adjust to changing 
security challenges also reflected another phenomenon of the contemporary international 
environment – the increasing institutionalization of the international system. State action, 
even when waging war, has increasingly involved participation in, coordination with, or 
consideration of, multilateral institutions, and the problem of Islamic terrorism and the war 
in Afghanistan was no different. After 1945, the United States and its allies purposefully 
created an international order founded on a diverse array of international political, 
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economic, and security institutions to promote and sustain global peace and stability. The 
term “international institution” encompassed formal international organizations, regimes, 
and conventions, such as the UN and NATO, the Bretton Woods monetary and trade 
regimes, and the Geneva Conventions. The institutions were intended to help states 
cooperate in advancing common interests and solving problems. U.S. encouragement of, 
and international receptiveness to, increasing interdependence subsequently led to a virtual 
explosion in multilateral institutions as states created new ones, or reformed or expanded 
existing ones. 
 A number of scholars have analyzed this increasing institutionalization. G. John 
Ikenberry focused on how it came about and how it persisted. He argued the United States, 
with its allies, constructed two international orders after 1945: the Western order and the 
containment order. NATO was anchored in both of them. The Western order was 
constitutional and was founded on “a dense set of new security, economic, and political 
institutions.” The containment order was based on balance of power principles. Over time, 
the Western order expanded and became so firmly rooted that, despite the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the disappearance of the state threat that underpinned the construction of 
NATO, and the end of the containment order, the Alliance endured.
34
 In fact, almost all of 
the former communist states joined the Western order, as well as NATO. 
 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye analyzed how increasing institutionalization 
influenced inter-state relations. They argued states have become increasingly mutually 
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dependent due to modern developments that include technological changes, the information 
revolution, and economic globalization. Together with the growing network of international 
institutions states developed “complex networks of relationships” with each other and thus 
complex interdependence. This unique international system has expanded beyond the 
industrial democracies and changed traditional power politics. Furthermore, international 
organizations have a more consequential role because they have become arenas for political 
bargaining and coalition formation to deal with and address multiple linked issues.
35
 NATO 
seemed to assume this role for Afghanistan as its ISAF coalition gathered together a diverse 
group of allies and partners and coordinated its activities with multiple international political 
and economic organizations. 
 The endurance and activities of NATO makes sense in an international system that 
has been increasingly institutionalized and firmly rooted. In addition, it can be argued 
NATO’s eventual involvement in the ISAF mission was an understandable response to the 
contemporary security environment. Individual nations do not have the capacity to deal with 
complex and transnational threats on their own and so multilateral security organizations 
like NATO can be useful instruments for states as they respond when the political will for 
collective action converges among the members and when they are learning organizations 
capable of military adaptation. This thesis proposes that NATO’s ISAF coalition was 
likewise an organization capable of learning and adaptation and the proposed analytical 
framework will identify the drivers and influences that shaped NATO’s initial lack of 
involvement, then its increasing engagement, and the subsequent changes in ISAF’s 
structural form and its operational activities. The framework is derived from the social 
science scholarship that has studied alliances and security organizations: realism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, collective action theory, and the strategic studies research that focuses on 
military organizations, change, and adaptation. While none of the current scholarship is 
sufficient within itself for explaining NATO’s evolving coalition warfare in Afghanistan or 
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 Realist literature analyzes NATO as an alliance operating within the logic of 
balance of power theory. It generally argues that alliances are security institutions 
established to respond to an identified powerful state and thus they are a manifestation of 
balancing. In balance of power theory, the key rule of the game for states in the international 
system is balancing behavior. Order is achieved in the international system when there is an 
equilibrium of power among the great powers (the most dominant states in the system), and 
order is then maintained through continued balancing behavior. Balancing is essentially a 
process that aims to establish and maintain a given order by threatening potential 
transgressors with unacceptable costs if they challenge the order. Balance of power theory 
does not assume peace will result; war may be necessary to maintain the balance. Not only 
will strong states balance against each other, but weaker states will either flock together 
(ally together) to balance against stronger states, or they will bandwagon (ally) with stronger 
states to ensure their survival. Since the relative power of states is constantly changing, 
realists argue that alliances are also fluid and flexible. States avoid entangling alliances and 
other international institutions, and they constantly reassess with whom they should align in 
order to ensure their security and maintain international order.
36
 Stephen Walt proposed a 
variation on balance of power theory: he argued that states balance against threat, not power. 
European countries had allied with the United States in the Cold War due to the greater 
threat posed by the Soviet Union.
37
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 Many realists also assume that the dominant power is the driving force in the 
alliance and it will create an institution that serves its interests; other members have no 
choice but to accept the preferences of the dominant state and do what it wants. They follow 
the lead of the dominant state, even if it engages in coercive leadership, because they accept 
the legitimacy of the existing order and they benefit from the public goods provided by the 
dominant power. Some scholars also conclude that security institutions can endure and 
evolve if the dominant state wants them to, even with a change in the international 
distribution of power and threat environment, since it is a mechanism to advance its 
interests.
38
 Other realists argue that alliances are difficult to establish and will not endure 
over the long term because the members remain concerned about relative gains (since 
today’s allies could be tomorrow’s enemies) and they fear cheating. They never escape 
uncertainty about the intentions and commitments of the others, particularly the fear of 
abandonment or entrapment by allies in a crisis.
39
 This makes alliance cooperation difficult, 
since it takes time to coordinate the efforts of the various allies and there can be 
disagreement about what needs to be done. They also “usually disagree” on the distribution 
of alliance burdens and members will attempt to free-ride.
40
 That is, members of the alliance 
can receive security without investing in military capabilities or participating in military 
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action in the event of a war. Furthermore, with the disappearance of an identified opponent, 
the alliance will disintegrate, although the decline may be slow if the institution is highly 
bureaucratized.  
Many realists argue that the creation and/or endurance of security institutions that 
are not oriented toward a particular powerful state are not possible, will not endure, and will 
not be able to act. As such, a number of scholars predicted NATO would disintegrate due to 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, including John Mearsheimer, 
Richard Betts, and Stephen Walt.
41
 Others argued that if it endured, it would nonetheless 
become irrelevant: Seth Jones and Sean Kay.
42
 
 Others scholars were less pessimistic and applied realist premises to their analysis 
of NATO in Afghanistan. Galia Press-Barnathan argued the European allies used NATO-
ISAF in 2003 to serve two functions: restrain U.S. policy and actions in Afghanistan and 
implement a division-of-labor strategy to execute long-term state-building in the country. 
She argued this solved the European “alliance security dilemma” which related to allied 
concerns about either entrapment or abandonment by the United States.
43
 Thomas Mowle 
and David Sacko argued that in a unipolar world the United States does not need alliances. 
This is why OEF was a U.S. coalition rather than a NATO coalition (the United States did 
not want to be constrained by allies). They explained European support for operations in 
Afghanistan as due to bandwagoning behavior with the most powerful state in the 
international system.
44
 M. J. Williams examined the failures of peacebuilding in 
Afghanistan. He argued NATO and other international institutions were created to reduce 
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the likelihood of war by maintaining the balance of power, they have not adapted well 
enough to a security environment where the lack of power is a concern of states and where 
state-building is increasingly required, and so it is not surprising that NATO (and the rest of 
the international community) has been unsuccessful.
45
 Sten Rynning argued NATO “lost its 
balance” in Afghanistan because it focused too much on liberal convictions rather than on 
national interests. This led to near mission failure in 2007-2008, but it managed to change 
course and “step back from the brink.” He concluded the Alliance needed to rebalance – 
ensure the proper mix of liberal values and interests – because its true purpose is to sustain 
the European regional order.
46
 Péter Marton and Nik Hynek analyzed burden-sharing in 
ISAF between 2006 and 2011. They argued a country’s level of troop contribution was 
related to the intensity of its threat perception and its relative need to bandwagon with 
NATO for security reasons.
47
 More recently, Patricia Weitsman argued that the problems 
associated with complex command structures, the lack of unity of command, differing 
national caveats, and disparities in troop levels and casualty rates “dramatically 
undermined” cohesion in OEF and ISAF. However, she defines cohesion as “the ability of 
states to agree on goals and strategies to attain those goals” and she does not relate her 
definition to the problems she identifies.
48
 In a context of decreasing cohesion, she 
otherwise does not address how it was then possible for ISAF to expand to 50 nations. 
 Thus far, no realist has provided a general explanation for how and why ISAF’s 
missions evolved and expanded over the course of more than a decade despite a large 
imbalance in the distribution of costs and burdens, and what could be called shirking 
behavior. They also have not explained why no ally abandoned NATO’s commitment to 
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Afghanistan - especially when its involvement was not predicated on the balancing logic or 
the threat posed by an aggressive state - or why so many allies and partners stayed engaged 
for so long. Realists struggle to explain NATO and ISAF’s adaptation to contemporary, 
especially non-state, security threats. However, realist scholarship highlights what this thesis 
terms “fraying forces,” or the forces that undermine coalition cohesion: ally and partner 
fears about cheating and free-riding behavior, uncertainty about the intentions and 
commitments of others, fear of abandonment in a crisis or entrapment in another state’s war, 
disagreements over burden-sharing, and disagreements on what needs to be done or how to 
do it. 
Neoliberal Institutionalism. 
 The neoliberal institutionalism literature focuses on the institutional aspects of 
NATO. In general, institutional theorists argue that states create international institutions 
when their interests converge and when they think they can benefit from cooperation. 
International institutions are defined as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and 
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.” They 
can take various forms: formal intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations, 
international regimes, or conventions.
49
 Some theorists assume international institutions will 
do what they are created to do, but others do not. This is related to the fact that they are not 
autonomous.
50
 A number of scholars have argued international institutions are not static; 
they can change and evolve for a number of reasons (power shift, threat shift, norm shift, or 
organizational learning) – although change is often difficult and slow.51 Various scholars 
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have analyzed the factors driving institutional effectiveness and why international 
institutions persist, despite changes in power and/or security threats.
52
 
 Robert Keohane has focused extensively on international institutions and regimes, 
studying their formation, their evolution and persistence, and the mechanisms by which they 
facilitate cooperation among states. He acknowledged the role of international structure and 
the distribution of power in their creation and he agreed that relative power relationships can 
be important determinants of the characteristics and actions of specific institutions (although 
he also argued that collective action and cooperation are possible in the absence of a 
dominant state). The preferences of the more powerful states will tend to have more weight, 
although weaker states (which are more constrained) still retain their ability to choose 
whether they will join an institution or not, whether they will remain in the institution, and 
whether they will honor their commitments. He argued that international institutions are not 
supranational enforcers of their rules and that rules are often broken or bent, but he 
maintained the mechanisms of reciprocity and information provision increase the probability 
states will obey the rules and honor their commitments. He has explained the persistence of 
international institutions, despite changes in international conditions, as due to the value 
they acquire relative to the functions they serve. Persistence is also tied to sunk costs. It is 
easier to maintain and modify an existing institution than to disband it and build a new one, 
given the difficulty of constructing an institution in the first place. He also agreed with 
Mancur Olson’s collective action logic - he argued that international institutions with 
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 Institutional analysis of NATO in the post-Cold War era has been extensive. 
Scholars examined its new missions, new strategic concept, and military operations in the 
Balkans.
54
 They analyzed how its institutional assets, such as political consultation 
mechanisms, the integrated command structure, and the bureaucracy itself, enabled 
adaptation to the changed security environment.
55
 Given its endurance and expansion in 
activity, Keohane, Celeste Wallander, and Helga Haftendorn proposed that NATO had 
changed from being an alliance to a security management institution.
56
  
 Scholarship on NATO in Afghanistan includes Sarah Kreps’ analysis of the 
sustainment of troop contributions in Afghanistan despite a lack of public support. She 
argued it was due to elite consensus and the systemic pressures of the formal alliance which 
were the high cost of defection and the desire not to forgo future benefits.
57
 Sean Kay and 
Sahar Khan identified institutional factors that made the execution of counter-insurgency 
difficult for NATO in 2006: lack of force generation mechanism, no way to guarantee 
members would deliver the forces they promised, national caveats, and no Alliance counter-
insurgency doctrine.
58
 Joshua W. Walker noted changes in NATO roles and missions after 
9/11 and argued the Alliance’s success in Afghanistan was crucial for its organizational 
survival.
59
 Alexandra Gheciu argued NATO’s change in identity and its evolution into an 
organization that does peace-building has led to contestation and competition with other 
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international organizations which jeopardizes the prospects for success in Afghanistan.
60
 
Andrew T. Wolff argued NATO operations in Afghanistan have led to internal institutional 
instability and political tensions because there is an intrinsic conflict between its two main 
missions: warfare and state-building.
61
 Finally, Anand Menon and Jennifer Welsh argued 
organizational adaptation can lead to intra-institutional conflict. They asserted peace 
operations in Afghanistan have given rise to distributional conflicts and fights over burden-
sharing and this “could significantly reduce the likelihood the alliance members would agree 
to expansive out-of-area operations in the future.”62 
 In general, institutional scholars have made a number of relevant arguments about 
NATO’s enduring value to states as a mechanism to solve problems, they have analyzed its 
persistence and adaptability, and they have highlighted potential obstacles to collective 
action. In general, the literature focuses internally, on interaction among the members. It 
explains how information sharing and reciprocity reduce uncertainty about the intentions 
and behaviors of the members. Furthermore, while they highlight the political tensions and 
internal conflicts over burden-sharing generated by operations in Afghanistan, they do not 
examine why this did not lead to defection. Finally, no one has focused on ISAF operations 
in Afghanistan over the entire time of the Alliance’s involvement or analyzed its wide range 
in coalition warfare or proposed an explanation for how and why it evolved over time. 
Collective Action Theory. 
 As indicated earlier, some realist and institutional theorizing incorporated the 
insights of collective action theory. Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action asserts that 
although all the members are interested in the collective benefit provided by their 
organization, they have no common interest in paying the cost of the benefit. Each member 
would prefer that the others pay the cost (and thus free-ride). Additionally, as most 
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organizations have limited (or no) mechanisms to punish free-riders, members are ordinarily 
able to receive the collective benefits whether they pay part of the cost or not. Olson argued 
that in general once a member’s marginal costs exceed its share of the benefits derived from 
the organization, it will stop contributing. As a result, the group optimum is never reached in 
the provision of the public good provided by the organization and the distribution of the 
burden will be highly arbitrary. He argued that as organizations grow in membership the 
free-riding problem increases and organizational effectiveness declines. However, Olson 
also argued that the free-rider and collective action problem can be overcome if there are 
members who calculate they are better off if the collective good is provided, even if they 
have to pay the entire cost of providing it themselves.
63
 In other words, he recognized that 
state preferences can vary, and that a state can have a high interest in the collective good 
provided by an organization. If so, there is the possibility that some members will calculate 
their gain from the provision of the collective good is so significant that they will decide to 
pay a disproportionate share of the cost. Furthermore, it is more likely the more powerful 
states in the organization will volunteer to pay the disproportionate cost since they have 
greater capabilities and contribute more to the organization.  
 In the case of NATO, the public good provided by the organization is security. By 
Olson’s logic, the organization should have become less likely and less effective at 
providing security outcomes the more members it gained. He also implied that an 
imbalanced and highly arbitrary distribution of costs and burdens would inhibit security 
provision. Additionally, for Olson, NATO’s optimal provision of security depends on one, 
or a few, of its members deciding to pay a disproportionate share of the costs and bearing a 
disproportionate share of the burdens. While Olson provides insights about how 
organizations, especially large ones, can become increasingly inefficient, his logic cannot 
account for NATO’s extensive military activities in Afghanistan, or how and why ISAF 
changed what it did over the years. It also does not take into account the fact that 
organizations can engage in a wide range of activity and it may not be useful or necessary 
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for all members to participate equally, especially in a security environment that has a wide 
range of state, non-state, and transnational threats. Thus for an organization like NATO, 
security goods could be effectively delivered without 100 percent or equal participation; 
free-riding does not necessarily pose a problem. Olson’s logic cannot account for the fact 
that all the members of the Alliance stayed engaged in Afghanistan – even as its 
membership grew from 19 in 2001 to 28 in 2009 – or the fact that non-NATO partners also 
chose to participate in Afghanistan and also stayed engaged. 
 A number of the scholars cited above have been grouped together and identified as 
“alliance theorists” due to their specific interest in and study of alliances: Walt, Weitsman, 
Olson, and Rynning (other scholars included in the alliance scholarship grouping are Glenn 
Snyder, Bruce Russett, and Ole Hosti, but they have not studied NATO in Afghanistan). 
These scholars represent the perspectives of different schools of thought in political science. 
In general, according to Mark Webber, their scholarship focuses primarily on alliance 
formation and disintegration, and much of it predates NATO or does not extend past the 
Cold War. It is also static. It may describe “at what point of development an alliance may be 
at but not how it got there or where it might be going.” Additionally, “the issue of long-term 
change is only addressed indirectly or incompletely.”64 
Military Organizations, Change, and Adaptation. 
 According to Theo Farrell, scholarship dedicated to analyzing change in military 
organizations, in times of war and peace, emerged in the 1980s and has since become a rich 
field of research.
65
 The scholarship primarily analyzes change, innovation, and adaptation in 
specific Western national defense establishments: ground, air, and naval forces. Williamson 
Murray studied the American, British, French, and German militaries during the First and 
Second World Wars, as well as the Israel Defense Forces in the Yom Kippur War. While 
noting that adaptation occurred under combat pressures, he highlighted the factors that made 
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it difficult: bureaucratic resistance, human failings, and the nature of war itself (friction, 
chance, enemy actions, and physical, psychological, and intellectual challenges).
66
 Barry 
Posen analyzed innovation in the British, French, and German militaries during the interwar 
period. He argued military organizations innovate after failure (military defeat) and they 
innovate when civilians intervene.
67
 Stephen Rosen analyzed the American and British 
militaries during and after the First and Second World Wars and he argued the process of 
military innovation, i.e., major changes in the way militaries fight, is different during 
peacetime and wartime. In wartime, it involves “new organizational tasks and concepts of 
operation,” and it results after the strategic measures of effectiveness are redefined, which 
allows relevant organizational learning and thus innovation.
68
 Deborah Avant expanded the 
types of wars analyzed by examining “low-tech” or peripheral wars: the U.S. army in 
Vietnam and the British army in Malaya and the Boer War. She argued that the structure of 
civilian political institutions (parliamentary vs. presidential systems) and the way civilian 
leaders chose to set up and oversee the military influenced the respective army’s ability to 
adapt.
69
 As the new millennium dawned, Farrell and Terry Terriff observed major military 
changes occurring around the world and they argued the sources for it were cultural norms, 
politics and strategy, and new technology. They defined major military change as the 
adoption of new military goals, new strategies, and new military organizational structures. 
Furthermore, they argued there are three pathways for change: innovation, adaptation, and 
emulation.
70
 More recently, a number of scholars collaborated in an effort to analyze the 
military transformation efforts of six NATO members (Britain, France, Germany, Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Poland) as they endeavored in the early 2000s to close the “transformation 
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gap” with the United States. In the volume, the concept of transformation was broken down 
into technological, doctrinal, and organizational innovations in the various nations’ armed 
forces.
71
 Finally, James Russell and Chad Serena analyzed the U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. They both argued that an operational imperative, 
the emergence of the Iraqi insurgency, was the main driver for adaptation and innovation, 
and more importantly the military change process was not directed from above (from either 
higher level military headquarters or civilian authorities), but rather occurred at the tactical 
level (in battalions and brigades) as the conflict degenerated. Russell argued it was an ad 
hoc and “iterative process of organically generated tactical adaptation and innovation that 
unfolded over time in a distinctive progression.” They both observed that this process 
occurred before the new American counter-insurgency doctrine was published and it 
resulted in the creation of new organizational structures, new missions and new ways of 
fighting, new operating procedures, and new training and educational programs.
72
 
 Terriff expanded analysis of military adaptation to NATO in his evaluation of the 
Alliance’s strategic-level efforts to transform itself to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 
security environment and to close the capabilities gap that had emerged between the United 
States and its allies. The transformation involved the development of new strategic concepts, 
new doctrine, new military capabilities to undertake new missions, new exercise and 
training initiatives, and new organizations to conduct expeditionary operations (the NATO 
Response Force) and to manage the transformation effort (Allied Command Transformation 
or ACT). He concluded that after ten years of effort, 2002-2012, progress had been limited 
because the member states had different understandings of what transformation entailed, the 
ACT lacked the authority to compel military policy or transformation efforts at the national 
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level within member nations, and the 2008-2009 financial crisis led to austerity conditions 
and reduced defense budgets across the continent.
73
  
Analysis of military adaptation in Afghanistan includes Farrell’s study of the British 
in Helmand Province, 2006-2009. He argued that operational challenges generated bottom-
up efforts by the successive rotations of British task forces to develop a winning strategy 
against the Taliban. The forces adapted from relying heavily on combat power to a 
population-centric approach that relied on influence operations and non-kinetic activities.
74
 
In the book Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, Farrell proposes two drivers (operational 
challenges and new technologies) that interact with four shapers (domestic politics, alliance 
politics, strategic culture, and civil-military relations) which he and a number of fellow 
scholars use to explain strategic and operational adaptation by the armies of the UK, U.S., 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands over the course of their involvement in 
Afghanistan.
75
 Farrell and Rynning examined the effect of military adaptation in 
Afghanistan on NATO’s transformation efforts. They argued NATO-ISAF operations have 
led to a divergence in member state transformation efforts, which has generated a gap in 




Scholars have proposed a wide variety of explanations for military change, 
innovation, and adaptation, or the lack thereof, during peacetime and war but the scholarship 
primarily focuses on the national defense establishments (ground, air, and naval forces) of 
individual nations. Adam Grissom also observed that the military change and innovation 
literature primarily provides top-down accounts of military change. Innovation occurs 
because senior civilian or military leaders propel change in bureaucratic organizations that 
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are resistant to it. However, Grissom observed there is empirical evidence that change can 
occur from the bottom-up,
77
 which the analysis by Russell, Serena, and Farrell mentioned 
above confirms. Furthermore, while scholars do not agree on the sources of change, they 
have observed that military change can result in new strategy, new organizational structures, 
new missions and new ways of fighting, new doctrine and operating procedures, and new 
exercise, training, and educational programs. Unfortunately, there is almost no analysis of 
military adaptation in the course of multinational coalition operations which is the central 
focus of this thesis. 
Research Question and Analytical Framework. 
 As stated earlier, the question under examination in this thesis pertains to NATO, 
ISAF, and Afghanistan: NATO was not initially involved in military operations in 
Afghanistan, but this changed slowly over time. First, it decided to take over ISAF in Kabul, 
and then it expanded ISAF, both geographically and operationally. ISAF then surged, 
followed by an organized withdrawal. Why did this happen and how did ISAF maintain 
coalition cohesion throughout the campaign in Afghanistan? 
 The thesis’ main focus is at the operational level. For this thesis, the operational 
level entails command and control structures that integrate multinational military 
contributions and manage, direct, and coordinate military activities in a specific geographic 
area, or theatre of operations. In addition, operational level commanders and their staff 
translate strategic-level direction into campaigns and major operations (this is known as 
operational art).The operational level links higher-level direction and objectives to tactical 
activities. In Afghanistan, ISAF was the operational level headquarters that provided goals, 
objectives, and plans which were meant to orient the tactical level activities of battle groups, 
PRTs, and embedded trainers.
78
 The thesis analyzes the decision process in the lead up to 
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NATO taking over the ISAF mission and then the organizational changes that occurred 
within the coalition over time, specifically, the changes in ISAF’s organizational structure 
and the extensive changes and expansion in ISAF’s actual operations. It can be argued that 
ISAF underwent a dramatic transformation, both structurally and operationally, over the 
time of its existence. This helped sustain the members’ political commitment and enabled 
the coalition to stay the course in the face of adverse and unexpected conditions, as well as 
overcome the fraying forces that undermined cohesion. Since ISAF was not an autonomous 
entity, its examination requires two levels of analysis – the strategic level at NATO and the 
operational level at ISAF. The levels were inextricably linked. Political authorities in the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided whether and when to commit the Alliance in 
Afghanistan. The NAC also issued political direction to ISAF. The military authorities at 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Joint Force Command (JFC) 
Brunssum issued strategic and operational direction. While ISAF had wide latitude in 
translating the higher level direction into plans and operations, the NATO political and 
military authorities retained final approval authority over ISAF’s successive campaign 
plans. In addition, the Alliance’s various structural elements, such as training facilities, 
educational programs, and force generation processes, supported the coalition’s activities. 
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Analyzing the ISAF coalition, therefore, requires maintaining an eye on relevant strategic-
level developments in NATO. 
 Since NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan and ISAF’s transformation was 
essentially a case of multinational military adaptation, this thesis draws on concepts and 
insights from the literature described above to develop an analytical framework that 
identifies the main drivers and influences which shaped NATO’s involvement, ISAF’s 
adaptation to the war over time, and the sustainment of cohesion as the conflict changed. 
The drivers are political will and organizational capacity. 
 Political Will. As the international institutions literature observes, security 
organizations require effort on the part of the member states for action to occur because they 
are not autonomous. In this case, political will manifests as national policy that is related to 
NATO. Political will is expressed in public statements and the subsequent activation of 
Alliance decision forums, persuasion efforts with other members to achieve consensus on an 
organizational policy or action, and physical contributions, such as defense spending, 
equipment acquisition, and providing military forces through the force generation process 
for the activation and sustainment of operational missions. Political will must also converge 
among the members in order for Alliance action to occur. In effect, the convergence of 
political will generates a decision for operational action and its subsequent sustainment over 
time. 
 The national policy positions (political will) of the members of NATO can vary 
widely and they can shift over time as strategic, or domestic, conditions change. Political 
will is therefore shaped, or influenced, by alliance politics and domestic politics. Alliance 
politics has to do with multilateral deliberation, compromise, and constraints since each 
member can have different priorities and interests. Working with and depending on allies 
can slow down decision-making, narrow the range of potential actions, and slow the process 
of adaptation because of the fears identified by realists: burden-sharing concerns, and fears 
of entrapment or abandonment. In addition, allies may be trying to achieve different agendas 
within the Alliance. The aspirant countries and new members of NATO may have different 
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reasons for supporting Alliance action than the long-standing members. For example, 
Germany prefers multilateral frameworks for the use of force, so NATO’s credibility and 
survival are important to it as a means to constrain U.S. unilateralism. The aspirants and 
new members want international protection in the event of Russian aggression so they also 
want NATO to succeed and endure, but for their own survival. 
 The tug and pull of domestic politics also influences political will and member state 
decisions about NATO’s operational activities and the level of their contributions to them. 
Decisions to employ military force are especially contentious for many European countries 
for reasons of history. Scholars like John Mueller and James Sheehan have documented the 
rise of war aversion in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars such that war is no 
longer perceived as a legitimate instrument of policy in many European societies.
79
 This 
means national policy-makers have to consider the level of public support they may or may 
not have for a military mission. It also influences what policy-makers will commit to an 
operation and how they will describe their contribution. For example, some countries may 
only commit forces for humanitarian or stabilization operations, and they may emphasize 
the peace-building aspects of the mission over the more kinetic activities. National 
parliaments may also play a constraining or supporting role, such as approving resources or 
introducing strict national caveats, depending on their oversight authority. Finally, financial 
conditions can greatly influence the degree of a nation’s contribution. The global financial 
crisis in 2008-2009 and subsequent austerity budgets in many European countries imposed 
constraints on the resources available for military operations. 
 Organizational capacity. Organizational capacity provides the ability for a 
multinational coalition to act once a decision is made and then adjust as necessary. This 
driver is deduced from the military adaptation literature and has both concrete and abstract 
attributes. The concrete attributes are primarily structural and they include: strategy and 
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planning documents; decision and planning bodies; military resources (compatible forces, 
military budgets, and/or equipment acquisition plans); unified or compatible doctrine and 
operating procedures; combined education, training, and exercises; and deployable 
elements.  
The concrete attributes are related to each other. At NATO, the permanent decision 
body is the NAC and it is meant to enable consultation and decision-making in the event of 
a crisis, or the emergence of a new threat. NAC decisions can activate planning activities, 
strategy development, and force generation processes which build the specific force 
packages needed for a given operation. The Alliance’s published strategy document 
identifies the purpose and roles of the organization. It articulates the organization’s missions 
and the forms of coalition warfare it will undertake to deal with the threats and challenges 
facing its members. Strategy influences doctrine, planning activities, force structure 
(numbers and types of troops and equipment needed), military budgets, and equipment 
acquisition plans. Regularized Alliance staff planning, educational programs, the execution 
of periodic training and exercise programs, and the encouragement of national 
modernization programs are intended to produce compatible and interoperable military 
forces. They also build trust among the members and can lessen free-riding behavior in the 
event the organization deploys forces. Finally, the organization’s deployable elements can 
become the command and control (C2) structures in operational theaters. Member state 
force contributions fall in under, and integrate into, these C2 structures. In general, NATO’s 
structural elements would support the operational activities of multinational coalitions like 
ISAF and when learning occurs in conflict they could generate strategic-level changes and 
adaptations that support operational-level actions and changes. 
 Structural attributes in coalitions like ISAF would include decision and planning 
bodies embedded in both the headquarters and subordinate commands. Their primary 
purpose would be to prepare for, plan, conduct, and evaluate operations. They would 
publish campaign plans that identify the coalition’s operational missions and the objectives 
it was trying to achieve. The plans could also be revised if the coalition assesses its activities 
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are not having the desired operational effect. That is, campaign plans can change if the 
coalition has the capacity to learn and subsequently adjust what it is doing. Coalitions like 
ISAF could also establish common operating procedures and incorporate training programs 
and exercises to prepare for operational missions and to build trust and increase 
interoperability; these would contribute to building operational cohesion. 
  The abstract attributes of organizational capacity are strategic culture, the ability to 
learn, and experience operating together; they are linked to the concrete attributes. Strategic 
culture refers to beliefs about the use of force and frames how the organization sees the 
world and sees itself. As such, the beliefs, or norms, the organization and its members share 
prescribe when and how military force can be used.
80
 For NATO, they also prescribe the 
Alliance’s geographic range of action. They are physically expressed, or articulated, in the 
organization’s strategy documents and campaign plans. Strategic culture is not static, it can 
change as the strategic environment shifts and as members’ conceptions about what 
constitutes the legitimate use of force evolve, but it can be difficult. NATO’s strategic 
culture during the Cold War encompassed a defensive strategic concept oriented on 
deterring conventional or nuclear war. Geographically, Alliance activity would occur only 
within the territory of the member nations. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of new security threats opened a debate on NATO’s purpose and whether it 
should operate out-of-area. This debate is ongoing, even as the Alliance’s strategic culture 
evolved and NATO undertook a wide range of new missions (peace support, stabilization, 
and humanitarian) and incrementally shifted from operations on the periphery of member 
territory to global operations. 
Military and security organizations operate in a dynamic environment. To retain 
their value for their members, they must have the ability to learn and to recognize when they 
are in a new situation or when they face unprecedented problems. Organizational learning 
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requires a level of self-reflection and open-mindedness since it requires members to 
acknowledge their beliefs about the appropriate way to resolve a problem or achieve an 
objective are wrong. Learning during conflict may also be incremental due to the reciprocal 
nature of war. Learning is a cyclical process and this thesis relies on a definition proposed 
by Richard Downie who argued learning is “a process by which an organization uses new 
knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional norms, 
doctrine and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in performance and 
maximize future successes.”81 For NATO and coalitions like ISAF, learning could occur as 
the Alliance and coalition recognize the character of the conflict has changed or that 
operational activities are not achieving the desired operational effect and so could result in 
new or adapted plans and activities, and as such would be reflected in: revised strategies and 
campaign plans; organizational structures; resources; operational missions, operating 
procedures, and ways of fighting; doctrine; and education, training, and exercise programs. 
 Experience operating together in multinational missions can increase a coalition’s 
effectiveness since the member states’ military forces are more likely to become 
interoperable over time. This is because they establish common operational procedures, they 
overcome language barriers, and they develop a measure of trust in each other. In addition, 
successful action by an organization (demonstrated capacity) can generate more impetus for 
its use in other situations. For example, NATO seemed to demonstrate in the 1990s it had 
the combat power and expertise to deal with the conflicts in the Balkans, particularly the 
challenges associated with complex peace operations. This prior experience was a factor in 
the Alliance’s deliberations about whether and how to get involved in Afghanistan. 
 The two drivers identified above are linked. Political will is critical initially since 
this driver dictates operational action. Political will can be weak but it can be sustained by 
organizational capacity. Organizational capacity can either enhance or undermine political 
will and thus coalition cohesion depending on whether it facilitates or hinders change and 
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adaptation. If the operational coalition can learn (recognize that the character of the conflict 
has changed or identify that its campaign plan is not achieving the objectives) and 
subsequently has the capacity to adapt in such areas as organizational structures, operating 
procedures, or military missions it is more likely to sustain political will and thus cohesion 
in the face of potentially destructive fraying forces. ISAF’s case represents a bottom-up 
situation. The multinational operational adaptations helped sustain strategic-level political 
will and commitment at both the national and NATO levels. As such, ISAF’s capacity to 
adapt generated and sustained cohesion which ensured the coalition did not fracture under 
the pressure of the multiple fraying forces. 
Methodology and Research Sources. 
 This thesis employs a case study methodology to analyze a recent historical event. 
While it uses an inductive approach to explain incremental changes at the ISAF operational 
level and the endurance of cohesion in Afghanistan, the proposed analytical framework may 
be generalizable to other security organizations engaged in coalition warfare. This thesis 
also takes an evolutionary approach in its analysis of NATO’s ISAF and coalition warfare in 
Afghanistan. Taking into consideration the passage of time is important because individuals, 
states, and organizations “not only accumulate experience but also learn from it . . . and . . . 
such learning can bring about new ways of doing things.”82 In effect, policies, actions, and 
structures evolve incrementally as the strategic context changes and learning occurs. The 
evolution is cyclical, not linear, because historical processes do not only move in one 
direction, in consonance with the flow of time. Historical processes are not irreversible and 
so this thesis does not have a teleological perspective – i.e., positive progress is not 
inevitable. While time moves forward, historical processes can move either forward or 
backward – either progress or regression can occur even as the security context evolves.83  
                                                 
82
 John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” in Lynn-Jones 
and Miller, eds., The Cold War and After, 334-335. This thesis uses the evolutionary approach as 
described by John Lewis Gaddis. 
83
 The concepts related to linear and cyclical evolution are based on the arguments of John Lewis 
Gaddis. Ibid., 364. 
40 
 
 Research for this case relies mostly on a variety of English language sources. To the 
extent possible, it incorporates information from primary resources: archival material and 
memoirs; articles and speeches by key individuals; oral histories and official papers; and 
NATO and other official military documents. It also draws on more than 60 interviews with 
individuals who served at various levels in NATO and in Afghanistan. However, the 
memories of individuals, even key leaders, can be faulty, therefore some triangulation with 
other sources, such as media and newspapers reports and a range of secondary sources, was 
necessary to piece together an accurate recounting of what happened. The official website of 
“NATO in Afghanistan,” as well as separate ISAF and NTM-A websites provided a wealth 
of information. The NATO Review journal was also used as a source since key political or 
military officials often published articles or granted interviews for it. 
 NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan and ISAF’s expanding operations developed 
incrementally over time. Furthermore, developments in NATO during the years before 2001 
laid foundations that influenced NATO’s decisions after the September 11th terrorist attacks 
and ISAF’s adaptations. Chapter 2 will therefore briefly cover key developments in political 
will and organizational capacity in NATO during the Cold War and the decade after it. The 
subsequent three chapters will break down NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan into three 
time periods. They will also cover developments in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF). Chapter 3 will cover September 2001 to July 2003 when NATO was 
absent from Afghanistan, but OEF began and expanded operationally. Chapter 4 will cover 
August 2003 to September 2008 when the Alliance took over several on-going operational 
missions (ISAF and the PRTs) and expanded them. Chapter 5 will cover October 2008 to 
December 2014 when NATO established the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and NTM-A, 
merged ISAF and OEF, accompanied the U.S. surge, began the transition of security 
responsibilities to Afghan security forces, and ended the ISAF mission. Each of these 
chapters will cover developments in coalition warfare as they summarize major 
developments in the ebb and flow of the war, and they will analyze the shifts in political will 
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and organizational capacity that generated and sustained coalition cohesion. Chapter 6, the 
conclusion, will summarize the findings and implications of the thesis. 
Expected Contribution. 
 The thesis’ original contribution to the body of academic knowledge is a new 
application of concepts related to organizational learning and military adaptation. As noted 
above, the current literature focuses overwhelmingly at the national level on military 
innovation and adaptation in the defense establishments (ground, naval, and air forces) of 
individual nations, both in peacetime and war. This thesis widens the analysis from the 
national to the multinational. It also analyzes multinational military adaptation and change 
at the operational level, the ISAF coalition, which operated in the midst of a complex 
conflict that changed in character over time. 
 The thesis makes two additional contributions. Namely, it “tells the story” of NATO 
and ISAF in Afghanistan from start to finish, 2001-2014. Specifically, it recounts the key 
strategic changes at the NATO level that were relevant to Afghanistan and the operational 
developments and adaptations within the multinational ISAF coalition as the conflict 
changed. It is necessary to recount in some detail what happened in order to explain the 
paradox of enduring cohesion, even as the Alliance and coalition expanded their activities, 
which derived from the interplay of political will and organizational capacity. As such, this 
thesis provides much more granularity than previous scholarship, most of which 
concentrates on the individual nations which participated in Afghanistan, as it recounts 
operational developments within the multinational coalition. Finally, it begins to fill the gap 
in the alliance scholarship noted by Mark Webber earlier, namely it proposes an explanation 
for alliance development and long term change. 
The activity of multinational alliances and coalitions is an area needing more 
scholarly research. With the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has 
become more complex with states having to deal with non-state and transnational actors as 
well as state challengers. Consequently, security organizations have not disappeared. Instead 
there are more of them, such as the military dimensions of the European Union (EU) and the 
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African Union (AU), and their range of operational missions has increased. Furthermore, 
their multilateral cooperation and collective actions have not been tied to preserving their 
members’ survival in the international system. They are not primarily collective security or 
collective defense organizations. For example, today NATO is a hybrid organization. It 
retains its collective defense mission, but it has added a wide range of non-conventional, 
humanitarian, and state-building missions to its repertoire in order to perform security 
management missions. This phenomenon has spread to the EU and AU, both of which have 
focused only on security management missions (humanitarian, peace support, and 
stabilization operations), and both of which have on-going multinational missions whose 
mandates include security sector reform activities and supporting the development of 
democratic institutions, good governance, rule of law, and human rights in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Sahel region, Somalia, and Ukraine.
84
 Furthermore, these organizations have surprisingly 
been able to sustain operational cohesion in less threatening environments.   
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SETTING THE STAGE 
 To explain NATO’s involvement in coalition warfare in Afghanistan at the dawn of 
the 21
st
 century, it is necessary to look back in time, particularly at the 1990s. Not only did 
NATO undergo incremental changes and adaptations in political will and organizational 
capacity after the September 11
th
, 2001 terrorist attacks, but it seems this has been NATO’s 
character since its foundation.
1
 More importantly, this thesis proposes that the changes it 
underwent in the 1990s, which led to NATO actually undertaking military action for the 
first time in its history, as well as shifts in the types of activities it was prepared to 
undertake, laid important foundations. In effect, the changes undergone in the 1990s ensured 
NATO was capable of acting in Afghanistan in the first place, as well as its subsequent 
ability to adapt. 
 While NATO is a military alliance, it is like no other alliance in history. It initially 
appeared somewhat similar to other military alliances since the North Atlantic Treaty 
codified a formal agreement for the allies to come to each other’s aid in the event of an 
attack but it quickly evolved into something very different from the coalitions and alliances 
formed against such states as Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, Germany in the First 
and Second World Wars, and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991. NATO adapted into a 
permanent, highly developed, formalized, and bureaucratic organization with enduring 
habits of political consultation and multiple connections among the members that became 
increasingly institutionalized over time as it responded to changes in the strategic 
environment. Furthermore, the Alliance has both a political and military purpose and vision. 
 Formally founded in April 1949, NATO was created in an era of institutional 
innovation. National leaders among the allied nations, particularly in the United States and 
                                                 
1
 In his analysis of NATO’s first five years, Secretary General Lord Ismay stated, “The statesmen 
who negotiated the Treaty . . . did not attempt, at the outset, to draw up a blueprint of the international 
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be evolved step by step in the light of practical experience.” He also emphasized, “Let it not be 
thought for a moment that the present arrangements are final: on the contrary they can, and will, be 
improved as time goes on and further experience is gained.” Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five 
Years, 1949-1954, “Introduction,” http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/intro.htm. 
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United Kingdom, had faith in the ability of international institutions to facilitate 
international cooperation and support national prosperity and international peace and 
stability. They also believed that rebuilding international order required mutually supporting 
political, economic, and military lines of effort. Therefore, NATO was just one element in 
an international mosaic that included programs such as the European Recovery Program 
(also known as the Marshall Plan) and the creation of the United Nations, the Bretton 
Woods economic institutions, and the European Community (EC). 
 However, the NATO of the early days of the Cold War looked nothing like NATO 
at the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the NATO of 1989 was substantially different from 
the NATO that became involved in Afghanistan. This chapter will briefly summarize the 
initial developments in NATO, to highlight its evolving character during the first few 
decades of its existence. It will then document in more depth the incremental changes and 
adaptations in political will and organizational capacity during the 1990s that resulted in 
new activities and an expanded operational focus. 
The Genesis of NATO. 
 After Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich was defeated and the war ended in Europe in May 
1945, there was no allied plan for a continuing military alliance. As a consequence, the 
United States ended the Lend-Lease program
2
 and the allies executed rapid troop draw-
downs and demobilizations. Within a year of Germany’s surrender, American armed forces 
deployed on the Continent decreased from 3,100,000 to 391,000, British forces decreased 
from 1,321,000 to 488,000, and Canadian forces decreased from 299,000 to zero.
3
 
 However, a number of negative political, economic, and military developments 
between 1945 and 1948 brought Europe to “the brink of collapse.”4 They included the need 
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to deal with tens of millions of refugees and displaced persons,
5
 which was exacerbated by 
severe food shortages, and a dollar crisis that undermined the effort to rebuild nations 
devastated by war. Soviet subversion of politics in occupied Eastern Europe
6
 was followed 
by what the West perceived as aggressive Soviet behavior: the Prague coup d’état, 
Communist influence in the Italian elections, pressure on Norway to conclude a non-
aggression pact,
7
 and the Berlin blockade. This significant shift in the strategic environment 
led to the creation of the Marshall Plan, the provision of new U.S. grants and loans, and 
negotiations among the Western allies to create a new security pact. West European leaders 
not only felt militarily, socially, and politically threatened by the Soviet Union, they feared 
for the very survival of their nations given their ongoing economic difficulties and so they 
concluded the only way to stop Soviet expansion and ensure their nations’ political stability 
was an alliance that guaranteed U.S. assistance.
8
 
 After months of negotiation complicated by U.S. Senate concerns about 
constitutional obstacles to automatic military commitments, the North Atlantic Treaty was 




 The initial members were ten European 
countries,
10
 Canada, and the United States. The Treaty was more than a military pact. It 
established a community of nations that shared “principles of democracy, individual liberty 
and the rule of law” and it identified a broad aspiration to safeguard the community’s 
“freedom, common heritage and civilisation.” To do this, the various articles of the Treaty 
articulated military, economic, political, and social objectives.
11
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 Despite its unique character and vision, there was initially little structural substance 
to the Alliance (its organizational capacity was limited). Article 9 called for the 
establishment of a Council with representatives from every member nation which should 
meet “promptly at any time” to consider matters related to the Treaty,12 but it did not specify 
that the Council had to be a permanently standing body and so its initial operating principle 
was periodic meetings in various locations. Article 9 gave the Council the authority to set up 
subsidiary bodies as needed, but it also specifically mentioned the requirement for the 
creation of a defense committee.
13
 The wording of the Treaty thus instituted flexibility and 
the potential for a permanently operating organization. 
 The first formal meeting of what came to be known as the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) occurred in Washington, D.C. on September 17
th
, 1949. At the meeting, the Council 
agreed that it would normally be composed of foreign ministers, one of which would sit as 
Chairman, and they would meet annually in ordinary session and at other times as 
necessary. The Council also established the Defense Committee, composed of national 
defense ministers, which would meet in ordinary session annually or as needed. It also 
recommended the Defense Committee consider the establishment of a Military Committee 
(composed of chiefs of staff), a subordinate Standing Group which would operate on a 
continuing basis in Washington, D.C., and five Regional Planning Groups.
14
 The Defense 
Committee subsequently established all of the recommended military bodies.
15
 
 The overwhelming threat posed by the Soviet Union shaped the development of 
NATO’s strategic culture as a defensive alliance and meant the allies initially focused on the 
                                                                                                                                         
attack.” Article 5 essentially states that an armed attack against any member would be considered an 
attack on all members and as such they would assist the attacked member and take “such action as 
[they] deem necessary, including the use of armed force.” Article 2 commits the members to “the 
further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free 
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Treaty’s military purpose.16 The Council approved NATO’s first strategic concept, Forward 
Defense, in strategy document DC (Defense Committee) 6/1, at its third session in January 
1950. The Regional Planning Groups subsequently developed detailed defensive plans that 
were consolidated by the Standing Group into the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Medium Term Plan,” in the spring of 1950.17 While the Plan’s goals were ambitious - to 
have an extensive array of air, ground, and naval forces ready to deter and, if necessary, to 
defeat a Soviet attack as far east as possible by 1954
18
 - the implementation of the plan was 
slow and uncoordinated. Member nations did not meet their force goals and they did not 




 The slow pace of NATO meetings and planning changed when the strategic 
environment abruptly shifted in 1950: after announcing the establishment of the communist 
German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union tested an atomic weapon; Mao Tse-tung 
established the communist People’s Republic of China; and then North Korea invaded the 
South.
20
  As a consequence, the United States decided to significantly increase military aid 
to help the allies build up their military forces, and to deploy additional U.S. ground forces 
and thousands of nuclear weapons onto West European soil.
21
 The events led to the 
promulgation of a new strategy and strategic concept – Forward Defense and Massive 
Retaliation.
22
 They also led to a shift in political will as the allies agreed to make major 
political and military organizational changes. These changes meant the Alliance acquired 
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permanent consultation, decision, planning, and command capabilities and arguably gave it 
the capacity to engage in both conventional and nuclear warfare. 
 The military changes were implemented first. The NAC approved the creation of a 
permanent, integrated military command structure in September 1950. It included two major 
military commands and two special planning and coordination agencies subordinate to the 
Military Committee. The two new strategic military commands were: Allied Command 
Europe (ACE), commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and 
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic (SACLANT). The SACEUR was supported by a new headquarters, the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) located near Paris in April 1951, and he had 
four subordinate commands, each with permanently operating headquarters: Allied Forces 
Northern Europe, Central Europe, Southern Europe, and the Mediterranean. The 
SACLANT’s headquarters was located in Norfolk, Virginia in 1952. Four of the five 
original Regional Planning Groups were abolished since their work was undertaken by the 
new military commands; this left only the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group. A second 
special agency was also created, the Channel Committee, which was responsible for all 
planning related to the English Channel and adjoining coastal waters.
23
 
 Member nations designated the national forces they “assigned” to the various 
NATO military commands in any given year. During peacetime these forces remained under 
national authority.
24
 In the event of war, they would shift to Alliance control and NATO 
defense plans identified the missions these national forces would perform, but the allies did 
not envisage integrating the forces into multinational combat formations. Instead, the 
forward defense plans were based on a so-called “layer-cake” strategy in which “national 
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 The NAC approved the political changes at its conference in Lisbon in February 
1952. The allies created the Secretary General position and an International Staff to support 
it. They also decided to have the Council operate in “permanent session” through their 
permanent representatives.
26
 The Secretary General reported directly to the NAC. He was 
responsible for setting the Council agenda, organizing its work, chairing the meetings of the 
permanent representatives, and supervising the work of the International Staff. The first 
Secretary General, Lord Hastings Ismay, and his staff were located in Paris along with the 
permanent representatives.
27
 With these political and military changes, NATO became a 
permanently operating organization with consultation, decision, and planning bodies that 
facilitated more rapid decision-making and coordinated military action. The allies signaled 
the importance they gave to NATO’s purpose when Heads of State and Government began 
chairing NAC meetings in 1957.
28
  
 A second period of major organizational and strategy changes occurred in 1966 
when French President Charles de Gaulle took France out of the integrated military 
command structure and ordered the removal of all NATO military forces from French 
territory. Within the next year, SHAPE moved from Rocquencourt, France to Mons, 
Belgium. The Allied Forces Central Europe headquarters moved from Fontainebleau, 
France to Brunssum, Netherlands, and all U.S. military installations, to include European 
Command (EUCOM) and its subordinate army and air force units, moved out of France to 
other bases, primarily in West Germany.
29
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 Even though President de Gaulle did not order the removal of the Alliance’s 
political structure, under U.S. pressure, the office of the Secretary General and his 
International Staff were moved to a new NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium in 1967. 
The Defense Planning Committee (DPC), which had been established in 1963 to oversee 
NATO force planning, was reorganized and placed under the Secretary General in 
Brussels.
30
 The DPC became the forum for all decisions related to military affairs and 
defense planning and thus it became “the NAC when it was meeting without France on 
defence issues.”31 In addition, the old Standing Group was replaced by an International 
Military Staff and both it and the Military Committee moved from Washington, D.C. to the 
new NATO headquarters.
32
 With these changes, the key political and military bodies were 
closely co-located geographically in Belgium, facilitating planning and coordination. 
 With the change in France’s position in the Alliance, the DPC was able to instruct 
the Military Committee to move forward with reviewing and revising the strategic concept. 
The DPC approved a new strategic concept, Forward Defense and Flexible Response, in 
December 1967. This strategic concept, with its supporting planning document, “Measures 
to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area,” remained in effect 
until after the end of the Cold War.
33
 
 There were a number of other organizational changes in the 1960s and 1970s, such 
as the creation of a small multinational operational force called the ACE Mobile Force 
(AMF) in 1960. This was a rapid reaction force that integrated air and land forces and which 
could deploy to any threatened area of Allied Command Europe.
34
 The Alliance established 
the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) in 1967.
35
 Consultation and 
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coordination of nuclear issues was institutionalized in the Nuclear Defense Affairs 
Committee (NDAC) and the Nuclear Planning Group in 1966.
36
 In response to an expansion 
of Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean, the allies created the Maritime Air Force 
Mediterranean command in Naples. They also incorporated the Mediterranean Command, 
which had been located in Malta, into Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples and re-
designated the command as Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH).
37
  
 The Alliance also established a wide variety of new programs, procedures, and 
processes to improve its capacity to plan for and conduct operations. It created an 
institutionalized mechanism for identifying and tracking force contributions when it began 
Annual Program Reviews in 1952.
38
 It utilized the strategic concept, the published 
strategies, the Annual Program Review, formal defense planning documents, and relevant 
financial and economic committees to set national goals for types and numbers of military 
forces that would be made available to the Alliance, to set targets for national defense 
budgets, and to encourage national acquisition of compatible equipment. The creation of the 
Military Agency for Standardization in January 1951 gave the allies the ability to 
standardize equipment, logistics, and operational and administrative practices.
39
 When 
agreements were reached they were documented in Standardization Agreements 
(STANAGs). This agency was essential for improving the interoperability of the various 
national militaries. Interoperability was also developed through education and multinational 
training exercises. The NATO Defense College, established in 1951, focused on expanding 
the knowledge of senior officials, occupying key posts in the Alliance or national 
administrations, in areas related to allied politico-military concepts and issues. It was 
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originally located in Paris, but moved to Rome in 1966.
40
 The NATO (SHAPE) School was 
established in 1953 in Oberammergau, Germany. It trained civilian and military personnel 
serving in the Alliance. It had an operational orientation and initially offered two courses on 
conventional and nuclear weapons. Its charter was updated in 1975, and since then it has 
offered over 100 different courses on “current and developing NATO operations, strategy, 
policy, doctrine and procedures.”41 The first combined training maneuvers were held in the 
fall of 1951.
42
 The exercise program expanded rapidly and in 1953 there were 
approximately 100 training exercises held throughout the NATO area. They ranged from 
command post exercises at SHAPE headquarters to multinational maneuvers by air, land, 
and sea forces.
43
 This robust spectrum of training exercises continued over the succeeding 
decades. 
 All of the organizational changes were oriented on strengthening the Alliance’s 
deterrence and defensive capabilities, but at the same time, the Alliance expanded its 
strategic approach. When the Flexible Response strategic concept was adopted in 1967, the 
NAC also adopted the recommendation of the Harmel Report “which called for the 
encouragement of détente” with the Soviet Union. This was mainly due to a divergence in 
member threat perceptions as tensions relaxed and relations normalized between Western 
and Eastern Europe/USSR.
44
 NATO accommodated this divergence by balancing defense 
with détente. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the Alliance endeavored to normalize 
relations with the Warsaw Pact countries via political dialogue focused on confidence 
building measures as well as arms control, disarmament, and balanced force reductions.
45
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 Overall, the Alliance seemed to demonstrate it was a learning organization. It 
proceeded deliberately in creating relevant political and military structures as the strategic 
environment changed and it was flexible enough to reform or disband subsidiary bodies 
when it needed to do so. NATO’s character was constant evolution – via new organizational 
bodies and new strategies – as it sought to create a credible and interoperable military 
capability. The efforts were not always successful and members did not always fulfill their 
commitments. However, the transparency involved in processes like the Annual Program 
Review allowed the organization and its members to identify “deficiencies in equipment, 
units below the required standard, bottlenecks in production and other weaknesses” so that 
remedies could be sought.
46
 The ability to adapt meant the organization retained its value for 
its members which influenced their national will to maintain their political and military 
commitments. This commitment was tested by periodic domestic political opposition,
47
 and 
periodic crises but the deft diplomatic skills of successive Secretaries General
48
 helped the 
organization to weather difficult periods such as the Suez Canal crisis, the French 
withdrawal from the integrated military command structure, the Greek-Turkish conflicts 
over Cyprus, and disagreements over burden-sharing and nuclear policy. Shared interests 
and the consultation, decision, and planning bodies assisted the Alliance in sustaining 
cohesion during the Cold War. 
 The Alliance’s one consistent attribute during the Cold War was its strategic culture 
which identified a clear adversary and against which it was prepared to conduct defensive 
conventional and nuclear operations. Thanks to enduring member commitment and a 
credible deterrent threat, NATO was never called to use military force during its first four 
decades. This changed after 1989. Fortunately, the long-standing habits of consultation and 
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cooperation, the solid organizational capacities reflected in the military command structures 
and the planning bodies, and the cultural familiarity developed through education, training, 
and exercise programs, gave the Alliance the ability to survive and adapt in the post-Cold 
War environment. Its responses to the challenges of the 1990s also laid the foundations for 
its involvement in Afghanistan. 
New Strategic Security Environment. 
 To the surprise of political and military leaders, policy experts, and scholars, the 
Cold War ended in an unexpectedly peaceful way. Furthermore, between 1988 and 1991, a 
cascading series of events completely changed the landscape of Europe. The initial impetus 
for what developed into sweeping strategic changes was economic crisis in the Soviet Union 
and Warsaw Pact countries. President Mikhail Gorbachev’s actions to revitalize the Soviet 
Union
49
 had unintended consequences which spiraled out of his control, particularly when 




 NATO leaders recognized Gorbachev was a different kind of Soviet leader and that 
his domestic and foreign policy initiatives created an unprecedented strategic opportunity. 
For example, he withdrew military forces from Afghanistan, took a dramatic step in arms 
control negotiations by signing the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 
December 1987, and unilaterally reduced the size of the Soviet armed forces by half a 
million men. His cuts in defense expenditures were part of a broader effort to overhaul the 
Soviet Union’s moribund economy.51 But even as late as the spring of 1989, when the 
communist world in Europe was on the cusp of dramatic change, NATO leaders were 
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hedging their bets, calculating that Gorbachev’s reforms would be limited, that the USSR 
would retain substantial conventional and nuclear capabilities, and that therefore the bipolar 
nuclear stand-off would continue.
52
 They could not conceive that Gorbachev’s initiatives 
would lead to political changes throughout Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe which 
would subsequently overturn the security environment.  
 They miscalculated. Europe’s political landscape transformed in 1989 as Poland, 
Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania successively adopted 
political pluralism either as a result of democratic elections, the collapse of the communist 
regime, or an outright coup d’état. The result was a wholesale rejection of communism and 
the movement toward market economies.
53
 These events were accompanied by extensive 
migration to the West when Hungary opened its borders in September. The opening of the 
East German border and the Berlin Wall followed in November – at which point the Iron 
Curtain effectively dissolved.
54
 The longstanding goal of German reunification was then 
achieved in under a year, on October 3, 1990.
55
 The Soviet Union itself began to disintegrate 
in March 1990 when Lithuania declared its independence. The other Baltic countries 
followed with their own independence declarations in 1991. That year, almost every other 
Soviet republic declared its sovereignty from Moscow. At the end of 1991, the Soviet Union 
itself dissolved when Gorbachev stepped down (having survived a coup attempt the 
previous August).
56
 These events were paralleled by a security development: the Warsaw 
Pact military alliance disintegrated in 1991. Its military structures were dissolved in March 
and its political structure was officially disbanded in July.
57
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 By 1992, the guiding impetus for the existence of NATO had disappeared. Although 
the Alliance was not a player in the momentous political events between 1989 and 1991, it 
had not remained static. It constantly evaluated the security implications of the changing 
landscape. These included fears of the rise of nationalism and the re-emergence of conflict 
in the transitioning and newly independent countries due to ethnic grievances or border 
disagreements. There were fears of either political instability or internal crisis within the 
USSR or the USSR’s revitalization.58 There were also concerns over nuclear weapon 
proliferation within the area of the Soviet Union.
59
 As a consequence, the Alliance held five 
summit conferences between May 1988 and November 1991 as it grappled with its purpose 
and role going forward. Its strategic culture began to change as it incrementally changed its 
strategy and force posture, undertook new actions, and created new institutions.  
 The May 1988 Brussels Summit recognized Gorbachev’s policy changes, but it 
maintained the status quo because of the “steady growth of Soviet military capabilities.” The 
allies reaffirmed the strategy of deterrence and defense, as well as the détente and arms 
control policies.
60
 The May 1989 Summit in Brussels once again reaffirmed the military 
strategy, but the allies advanced arms control efforts by proposing significant reductions in 
conventional forces via the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Additionally, the 
allies expressed their intent to expand the Alliance’s political dimension in order to help 
shape the political developments in the East, to establish more cooperative relations between 
West and East, and “to shape a new political order of peace in Europe.”61 This coincided 
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with President George H.W. Bush’s speech that month on NATO’s “new mission” to 
achieve the vision of a Europe “whole and free.”62 However, the underlying context of both 
Summit Declarations was the continuing Cold War and a perception of “us versus them.” 
NATO’s strategic culture endured as an alliance balanced against the Warsaw Pact. This 
context changed by the end of the year. 
 President Bush and President Gorbachev announced the end of the Cold War after 
their summit in Malta, on December 3, 1989. It was their first face-to-face meeting, they 
stated they had no intention of fighting each other, and they agreed to undertake big 
reductions in military forces.
63
 The subsequent communiqué issued by the Secretary General 
after the December 4
th
 NAC meeting announced that Europe was on the threshold of a new 
era. It no longer referred to two opposing alliances, but rather stated that NATO would seize 
the opportunity to facilitate and promote democratic reform in the East and thus fulfill the 
vision of an undivided Europe. While it again affirmed the deterrence and defense strategy, 
it justified the strategy as a “guarantor for peace” in an environment of “change and 
uncertainty.”64 
 The NATO Summit in London in July 1990 marked a major shift in the Alliance’s 
military strategy, force posture, and military structure. Because East and West were no 
longer adversaries, the allies agreed to move away from Forward Defense, where 
appropriate, and modify Flexible Response in order to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear 
weapons. The allies also agreed to reduce the readiness levels of active forces and scale 
back training and exercises. They decided to restructure the active forces, to field smaller, 
more mobile, but also multinational forces that could be moved to crisis regions within 
NATO territory.
65
 These decisions moved the multinational integration of the military 
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structure from major headquarters down into operational units far beyond what the AMF 
had done and they replaced the Cold War static, linear defense plans. These changes laid the 
foundations for an organizational capacity (deployable, multinational units) that would 
prove useful in the Balkans and Afghanistan. 
 The decision to build more mobile and versatile forces reflected the new security 
concerns: instability from political transition, or ethnic and territorial disputes. At the time, 
they were not intended to deploy out-of-area because some member nations still insisted that 
NATO forces should be used only within NATO territory. The out-of-area issue had been a 
longstanding one.
66
 In the 1950s, Council representatives agreed the Alliance faced a global 
threat and there were no geographic limits to the political and security issues on which the 
NAC could consult, but there was a difference between consultation and responsibility.
67
 
The United States was initially adamant that NATO’s military forces were to be used only 
on Treaty territory. France shared the U.S. view and was scrupulous in its interpretation of 
the Treaty and military responsibilities.
68
 In addition, in the early days of the Alliance, 
several European allies were engaged in military operations outside their national borders 
and they were “loath to get involved in” each other’s wars. Some national positions changed 
over time and by 1990 both the American and British governments were calling for an out-




 The debate had a real-world impact in August 1990 when Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein invaded Kuwait. The United States led the creation of an ad hoc multinational 
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coalition, under UN mandate, because NATO was not allowed to operate outside member 
territory, “essentially due to French objections.”70 However, the Alliance played a 
supporting role. It sent AWACS aircraft to Turkey to monitor the border region (Operation 
Anchor Guard).
71
 Council representatives gave their political support to the U.S.-led 
coalition and warned Iraq not to violate Turkey’s territorial integrity. The allies logistically 
supported the deployment and transit of U.S. and European forces. They deployed the air 
component of the AMF and air defense assets, including Patriot batteries, to Turkey 
(Operation Ace Guard). Additionally, twelve members contributed ground, air, and naval 
forces to the coalition.
72
 In effect, NATO took a very small step toward conducting 
conventional military operations out-of-area. 
 The next NATO summit in Rome in November 1991 continued the Alliance’s 
organizational adaptation and the allies unveiled a new strategic concept: Dialogue, 
Cooperation, and Defense. The concept built on the 1990 London Declaration, integrated 
the political and military elements of Alliance policy, and took a broad approach to security 
promotion in the new European landscape.
73
 It was used by defense planners to transform 
the Alliance’s force posture and military structure which acknowledged the deep cuts in 
national defense budgets and the steep reductions in standing forces that were ongoing, such 
as the U.S. decision to reduce its forces in Europe from 250,000 to 100,000.
74
 NATO 




 The allies created a virtue out of necessity. In a security environment where military 
challenges could range from conventional conflict with a resurgent Russia, to the spillover 
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of smaller scale civil conflicts, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and humanitarian crises, 
NATO adopted a multi-directional force posture that emphasized mobility and flexibility 
from a smaller pool of multinational military forces which maintained various levels of 
readiness. The forces would be trained and prepared to conduct a variety of missions, some 
of which were new, ranging from collective defense, to crisis management, peacekeeping, 
and humanitarian assistance.
76
 The military command structure was also adapted. The 
Channel Command was abolished and the size of the major (ACE and ACLANT) and 
subordinate command headquarters were reduced and streamlined.
77
 The allies were not just 
oriented on reductions. In April 1992, NATO replaced its Naval On-Call Force for the 
Mediterranean with the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) as a 
response to instabilities in the Alliance’s southern region.78 These posture, force structure, 
and mission changes ultimately laid the foundations for wide-ranging military operations in 
the subsequent decades. 
 As noted previously, NATO has always been more than a military security pact. It 
has a political and social vision, as well as military and non-military objectives. However, 
the non-military side of NATO was relatively invisible during the Cold War. This non-
military side became much more visible after 1989. In effect, the end of the Cold War, the 
transformation of the European political landscape, and the new security challenges 
provided an opening for the Alliance. Member nations maintained their overall goal of 
preserving stability and peace on the continent, but the Alliance changed what it did to 
achieve this goal in response to the changed security environment. In particular, NATO’s 
political dimension expanded as it endeavored to achieve an ambitious political and social 
vision of a Europe whole and free. Ultimately, NATO actions followed two broad tracks in 
the 1990s in response to two distinct security challenges: the post-communist transition and 
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war in the Balkans. Both of the tracks were oriented on achieving security and fulfilling the 
vision. Both tracks also converged. 
NATO’s Response to Transitioning Post-Communist Countries. 
 NATO’s relationship with the transitioning post-communist countries evolved over 
time and to an extent it was a result of pressure from the East. The leaders of the 
democratizing countries instituted foreign policies in 1990 that emphasized a “return to 
Europe.” They pressed hard for joining Western institutions, and all of them indicated they 
wanted positive relationships with NATO.
79
 The Alliance already had working relationships 
with them as a consequence of its longstanding détente policy. In addition, cooperative 
relations with the members of the Warsaw Pact had been developed in the course of the CFE 
Treaty negotiations. These relationships incrementally expanded as NATO overtly 
undertook political efforts that supported its security goals. It was clear the post-communist 
countries wanted to institute democratic reforms, but they faced extensive challenges since 
this involved deep social, cultural, economic, and political change which was complicated 
by potential ethnic and territorial tensions. The Alliance could play a role in this reform 
effort and as such it undertook a mission to “project stability” outside the territory of NATO 
members.   
 NATO’s first formal step occurred at the London Summit in July 1990 when 
Alliance leaders extended invitations for the USSR and Eastern European nations to 
establish diplomatic ties and liaison offices at NATO; they were quickly established that 
year.
80
 Over the next few years a wide range of activities developed. They included 
reciprocal visits of senior military officials. NATO, SHAPE and the major military 
command headquarters were opened to visits by Central and Eastern European, as well as 
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 This was an unprecedented level of transparency for the Alliance. Other 
contacts included conferences, political and defense reform consultations, and staff talks. 
Military officers from the transitioning countries were invited to attend the NATO Defense 
College in Rome and the NATO School in Oberammergau in 1991. The offers were 
accepted and by October that year some 80 officers (in ranks from major to brigadier-
general) attended special NATO familiarization courses.
82
 The participation continued in 
subsequent years and in 1996 the non-NATO partner nations were invited to attend the 
Defense College’s regular five-month courses.83  
 Over time, NATO’s relations with the post-communist countries encompassed a 
range of activities that focused on increasing political stability, creating new structures to 
ensure East-West cooperation, and encouraging and assisting defense reform, civilian 
control of the military, and arms control. In general, the extensive range of contacts 
facilitated mutual understanding and reduced historic suspicions. They also gradually 
moved the transitioning countries towards interoperability with NATO military forces. 
 The deepening relations were accompanied by pressure from the democratizing 
countries for NATO membership. In 1991, instability in the Soviet Union and conflict in 
Yugoslavia raised concerns in Central and Eastern Europe about “the possibility of a 
refugee wave from the unraveling Soviet Union” or a spillover of violence from the 
disintegrating Yugoslavia.
84
 However, the allies were not ready for the political 
repercussions of enlarging the Alliance towards the east, and moreover, the defense 
establishments of the aspirant countries’ were incompatible with NATO. 
 Instead, the Alliance moved towards a structure that institutionalized regular 
consultations with the democratizing countries. In October 1991, U.S. Secretary of State 
James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed the creation 
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of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for East and West to discuss 
and cooperate on political and military issues.
85
 The forum was established at the Rome 
Summit in November 1991.
86
 Initially conceived as a mechanism to help “project stability” 
in the democratizing countries, within a few years it focused even further out-of-area, 
beyond the borders of NACC members. The body eventually produced a concrete security 
action since it initiated the first steps towards preparing both NATO members and partners 
to participate in new and unprecedented missions: peace support operations.
87
 
 At the inaugural meeting of the NACC in December 1991, during which nine 
Central and Eastern European countries joined the body, Alliance ministers “emphasized the 
NACC was not an end in itself but indeed another step in a continuing process to make 
NATO’s relationship with Central and Eastern Europe into an important element of a more 
peaceful and cooperative European security order.” Within two weeks of the first NACC 
meeting, the Soviet Union dissolved. Alliance leaders agreed that membership should be 
extended to the newly sovereign states once they were internationally recognized and they 
indicated “their acceptance of the values of the new Europe.”88 By June 1992, twelve more 
countries joined the body.
89
 
 Besides regular consultation and formal summit meetings, cooperative activities 
between Alliance members and the partners were documented in annual Work Plans. 
Cooperation ranged from defense planning and the conversion of defense industries, to arms 
control and civil-military relations. Consultations initially focused on residual Cold War 
issues such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Europe. However, in 1992, as 
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conflict in Yugoslavia spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the NACC discussed peacekeeping. In 
December 1992, the NACC agreed members would share peacekeeping experiences and 
possibly train together.
90
 In June 1993, NACC members agreed to actually engage in 
peacekeeping operations together, under UN or CSCE (Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe) auspices, and they developed processes to facilitate operational 
cooperation (sharing of doctrine, planning activities, identification of national contributions, 
and training).
91
 The NACC however, was not the right structure to facilitate the military 
integration required for NATO and partner nations to operate together. 
 The introduction of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program met this need. Adopted 
at the NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1994,
92
 it complemented the continuing 
operation of the NACC and all of the partner nations were invited to join it (it was also open 
to other countries). Besides providing a mechanism for developing convergent and 
cooperative military capabilities, it was purposefully focused on strengthening the ability of 
all nations to undertake multinational operations – in particular, peacekeeping, 
humanitarian, and search and rescue operations.
93
  
 Participation in PfP included specific requirements of partner nations: they had to 
honor basic principles of democracy and human rights, and settle disputes peacefully; they 
had to have transparent defense planning and budget processes and civilian control of the 
military; they had to develop military forces able to operate with NATO and to participate in 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations; and they had to actively involve themselves in 
joint planning, training, and exercises with NATO.
94
 To facilitate day-to-day coordination, 
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the partner nations established permanent offices at both NATO headquarters and SHAPE. 
A tangible benefit of the program was the extension of Article 4 rights to the partners. They 
gained the right of formal consultation in the event they felt directly threatened. The 
program was also a concrete way to ensure partners were producers as well as consumers of 
security. The program was so popular that 30 nations had joined it by 2006.
95
  
 PfP’s exercise program expanded rapidly. From three exercises in 1994, 96 the allies 
and partners held 80 exercises in 1996.
97
 The interoperability garnered from training 
together also contributed to the development of common peacekeeping doctrine, to 
standardizing administrative and operational procedures, and aiding common defense 
matériel procurement.
98
 The program was producing convergent organizational capacity. In 
fact, the level of military integration was such that partner nations were prepared to 
contribute military forces to NATO’s first peace support operations in its history. Partner 
nations deployed forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina and participated in both the 60,000-man 
Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995 and the 31,000-man Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) that took over from IFOR in December 1996.
99
  
 The cooperative partnerships the Alliance established with the transitioning post-
communist countries continued to evolve as partner capacities matured. In May 1997, 
NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to enhance the PfP program by giving the partners a larger 
role in decision-making related to the execution of operational missions in which they 
planned to contribute, and giving them a larger role in the oversight of on-going NATO 
missions in which they participated. They also revised the program’s Planning and Review 
Process (PARP) to make it mirror NATO’s force planning process and expanded the range 
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of potential military missions.
100
 The Foreign Ministers also launched the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC) which replaced the NACC.
101
 Open to all Euro-Atlantic 
countries,
102
 it became an overarching political consultation and cooperation body that 
deepened the NATO-partner relationship by opening consultation to a wider range of 
security issues. It also gave partner nations more decision-making power. By the late 1990s, 
the EAPC became the forum in which partners and allies developed the operational plan for 
the continuing SFOR mission and a common approach for the Kosovo crisis.
103
 
 The new bodies and programs created by NATO in the 1990s were a way for 
NATO to influence defense reform in the transitioning countries in a direction that served 
the interests of the allies. The Alliance’s insistence on transparency, civilian control of the 
military, respect for human rights, democratic principles, collective security, and 
international law ensured the countries complied with arms control agreements and 
contributed to democratic consolidation. The development of common doctrine and 
operational procedures in exercises, and partner nation participation in the NATO 
educational colleges, ensured the partner nation militaries became interoperable with the 
allies’ and thus were prepared to participate in the operations that were needed in the new 
security environment. Having partner nations participate in operations in the Balkans was 
also a way for the Alliance to spread the operational burden, particularly since partners 
“lived in the neighborhood” and had as strong an interest in maintaining or re-establishing 
peace as the allies. The bodies also firmly established habits of continuous NATO-partner 
consultation, planning, and decision-making, and the habit of operating outside NATO 
member territory, all of which were expansions in strategic culture. 
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 The Alliance eventually decided to admit new members (a shift in political will). 
Between 1999 and 2009, 12 of the post-communist countries joined NATO.
104
 Their 
participation in PfP, the NACC, and the EAPC meant when they joined they were 
immediately ready to participate in multinational operations, if they had not already done so. 
However, the road to the use of military force in both the Balkans and Afghanistan, as well 
as the Alliance’s engagement in entirely new forms of warfare, was not an easy one. 
NATO’s Response to War in the Balkans. 
 The Alliance concerns about political instability, nationalism, ethnic and territorial 
disputes, and refugee flows were legitimate and they were manifested in the conflicts in 
Yugoslavia as it disintegrated. While war in Yugoslavia provided an impetus for the 
Alliance to eventually undertake new military missions, it was not the initial driver for 
significant changes in NATO’s strategic culture. The Alliance had adopted a broader vision 
of its roles and functions, adjusted its strategy of Forward Defense and Flexible Response, 
and changed its force posture a year before Slovenia and Croatia declared their 
independence and war erupted. Furthermore, the expanded range of possible military 
missions identified at the Rome Summit applied to allied territory only because national 
views diverged on the out-of-area question. However, allied thinking on the out-of-area 
issue changed substantially over the next year. 
 War in Yugoslavia developed and spread in stages, beginning with the Slovenian 
and Croatian declarations of independence on June 25
th
, 1991. The conflict in Slovenia was 
over almost before it started. After only ten days, the Yugoslav government accepted peace 
mediations by the EC and a ceasefire began on July 7th.
105
 Croatia was different. Fighting 
between Croatian and federal military forces (the JNA) erupted as the JNA withdrew from 
Slovenia in July. Fighting was bitter and by the time a UN brokered ceasefire was 
announced in December 1991, Serb irregular forces and the JNA had occupied a third of 
Croatian territory. As the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) began deploying 
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into Croatia to monitor the ceasefire in March 1992,
106
 war broke out in Bosnia-
Herzegovina following its declaration of independence on March 6th.
107
 
   NATO was not initially engaged in Yugoslavia because the member nations did 
not ask it to get involved. Alliance leaders did not see NATO as the solution for all the 
problems in the new European security landscape and this was reflected in their support for 
the creation of conflict prevention/crisis management mechanisms in the UN and CSCE, 
and their support for the development of a European security and defense capability.
108
 
Furthermore, the EC stepped forward to help negotiate an end to the conflicts. European 
confidence was reflected in Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos’ statement, “The 
hour of Europe has dawned.”109 He added, “If one problem can be solved by the Europeans 
it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It 
is not up to anyone else.”110 The United States supported Europe’s role. It was not interested 
in getting involved in Yugoslavia, as demonstrated in Secretary of State James Baker’s 
famous quote, “We don’t have a dog in this fight.”111 
  While the UN remained the lead entity for resolving the conflict in Bosnia and 
various mediation efforts were attempted over the years, they were fruitless and violence 
escalated. Western media reporting of extensive ethnic cleansing and death camps increased 
the pressure for the international community to act.
112
 Since neither the UN nor the CSCE 
had the military capabilities required to deal with the conflict (and neither did the EC/EU), 
NATO very slowly became involved in 1992 as they turned to it.
113
 The allies also slowly 
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reached consensus on acting out-of-area. Discussions on peacekeeping occurred in parallel 
in both the NAC and the NACC.  
 In June 1992, members agreed at the Oslo Ministerial that the Alliance would 
support via resources or expertise, on a case-by-case basis, CSCE peacekeeping operations. 
The December Ministerial extended an offer of support to UN peacekeeping operations. 
NATO’s military authorities were subsequently directed to undertake planning and 
preparation for a range of peace operations. Both the CSCE and the UN accepted the offers 
and that year NATO launched three missions. Operation Maritime Monitor (July-November 
1992) employed warships to monitor compliance with the UN arms embargo in the Adriatic. 
It was complemented by a similar Western European Union (WEU) maritime monitoring 
mission. Operation Sky Monitor (October 1992-April 1993) employed AWACS aircraft to 
monitor the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia. Operation Maritime Guard (November 1992-June 
1993) actually enforced the arms embargo (it was also complemented by a WEU mission). 
Over the seven months of the mission, NATO warships challenged 12,000 ships, inspected 
176 of them, and detected nine violators.
114
  
 NATO’s military activity expanded in 1993. In April, the NAC agreed to actually 
enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia, and it began Operation Deny Flight (April 1993-
December 1995). For this mission over 100 AWACS, fighter, and reconnaissance aircraft 
operated over Bosnian airspace. In June, the NATO and WEU maritime enforcement 
missions were combined into a single operation: Operation Sharp Guard (June 1993-
October 1996). Additionally, after a June Ministerial meeting, the allies offered air power 
support to UNPROFOR’s mission to protect safe areas. It offered airstrikes and close air 
support, if needed, to UN peacekeepers.
115
 The UNPROFOR mission had expanded to 
Bosnia in September 1992 and the UN added the mission to protect safe areas in the spring 
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of 1993. Srebrenica was declared a protected safe area in April and five other areas were 
declared safe areas in June – Sarajevo, Žepa, Tuzla, Goražde, and Bihać.116 
 The UN accepted NATO’s airpower offer and this, as well as the continuing 
Operation Deny Flight, ultimately led to NATO’s first conventional combat operations in its 
history. On February 28, 1994, two NATO F-16 aircraft shot down four Bosnian Serb 
fighter-bombers that were violating the no-fly zone near Banja Luka. Over the rest of the 




 The next year, after repeated Bosnian Serb violations of safe areas, the massacre at 
Srebrenica, and a mortar attack on a marketplace in Sarajevo, the allies undertook a major 
air campaign with two linked phases. Operation Deadeye (August 30-31, 1995) attacked the 
Bosnian Serb integrated air defense system in Bosnia. After an inconclusive bombing halt, 
Operation Deliberate Force (September 5-14, 1995) targeted Bosnian Serb command and 
control facilities, air defenses, artillery units, logistics and ammunition depots, and bridges. 
In total, over the two and a half weeks, allies flew some 3,400 sorties, with 750 attack 
missions.
118
 This NATO show of strength converged with a shift in Serbian President 
Slobodan Milošević’s war aims as well as Croatian military successes that changed the 




 After the warring parties signed the Dayton Peace Accord in Paris in December 
1995, the UNPROFOR mission ended and NATO deployed ground forces out-of-area for 
the first time in its history. Operation Joint Endeavour (December 1995-December 1996) 
was also NATO’s first peace support operation. Planning for the operation had begun in 
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 which meant the 60,000-man Implementation Force (IFOR) could deploy 
immediately in December. It operated under a one-year UN mandate. All of the allies (16 
nations) and 18 non-NATO partners contributed forces. Since NATO did not have a 
standing deployable headquarters to activate for the IFOR mission, the designated 
commander worked with SHAPE to establish an ad hoc headquarters before forces 
deployed.
121
 Subordinate operational forces were distributed into three multinational task 
forces based in three different areas (Tuzla, Mostar, and Banja Luka).
122
 Thus, NATO’s first 
operational employment of land forces was in a purely multinational formation.  
 IFOR’s mission was technically very specific: separate the warring parties and 
create a secure environment to facilitate the political, economic, and reconstruction 
activities of civilian agencies. However, IFOR activities expanded beyond the purely 
military tasks outlined in the peace agreement and they included: election support; 
emergency humanitarian assistance; reconstruction of schools, hospitals, airports, roads, 
bridges, and rail-lines; de-mining and mine-awareness education; and transportation, 




 As IFOR’s end date approached, allied and partner foreign and defense ministers 
decided to extend the military presence in Bosnia because civil and political progress had 
been limited. They agreed the security provided by multinational military forces was 
necessary to provide the peace and stability required for progress on the civil side.
124
 In 
effect, the military, civil, and political “pillars” of the Dayton Agreement were mutually 
supporting and interdependent. IFOR was therefore followed by the Stabilization Force 
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(SFOR) which operated for eight years (as Operation Joint Guard, December 1996-June 
1998, and Operation Joint Forge, June 1998-December 2004) before the Alliance turned the 
mission over to the EU.
125
 While the numbers of troops deployed to support SFOR were 
substantially fewer than in IFOR (troop numbers started at 31,000 and gradually declined to 
7,000 by 2004), the nations that contributed to IFOR also contributed to SFOR; furthermore, 
four additional nations provided troops: Argentina, Ireland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
126
 
 The mission of SFOR was to deter fresh hostilities and stabilize the peace. The tasks 
performed by the forces again extended into the non-military realm. They included: 
assisting the paramilitary police; supporting UN efforts to reform the civil police; 
confiscating unauthorized weapons and closing down unauthorized police checkpoints; 
responding to civil unrest; supporting UN efforts to provide a variety of news sources to 
local populations; supporting elections; and assisting refugees and displaced persons.
127
 In 
addition, NATO initiated a number of activities to train and mentor the Bosnian armed 
forces. These included seminars and visits to strengthen the Bosnian central government’s 
defense institution, the conduct of special courses at the NATO School for military and 
defense officials from Bosnia’s three ethnic groups, and the opening of regular NATO 
School courses to Bosnian candidates.
128
 
 To facilitate coordination among military, governmental, and non-governmental 
agencies, IFOR/SFOR created a Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) organization. 
Meetings chaired by the Deputy Commander brought together military commanders, and 
representatives of the local civilian populations and the myriad of international 
organizations operating in Bosnia. They were meant to develop cooperative working 
relationships, synchronize activities, and identify areas where IFOR/SFOR could provide 
                                                 
125
 Allied Command Operations, “NATO’s Operations, 1949-Present.” 
126
 NATO, NATO Handbook (1999 edition), 125; and NATO, “Peace support operations in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.” As with the December 1995 military transfer of authority, some of the troops in 
IFOR remained in country and were transferred to SFOR authority. 
127
 Greg Schulte, Director, Bosnia Task Force, NATO International Staff, “SFOR continued,” NATO 
Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer 1998): 27-30. 
128
 David Lightburn, NATO’s International Staff Bosnia Task Force, “NATO Security Cooperation 





 Since the preponderance of the CIMIC capability came from the United States, 
SHAPE created a training program to meet the demand of non-U.S. allies interested in 
developing trained CIMIC personnel. Its first training courses were held in the fall of 
1997.
130
 With the addition of NATO’s experience in KFOR later in the decade, SHAPE 
began drafting policy and doctrine on CIMIC to ensure a proper level of military 
involvement in civilian tasks and to articulate how CIMIC should operate in a military 
theatre.
131
 This was one area where NATO began to institutionalize, through policy, 
education, and doctrine, its new operational missions. 
 The resolution of the Bosnia conflict did not end war in the Balkans. The next 
conflict area was Serbia and its province of Kosovo. The roots of the conflict were deep and 
were tied to tensions between Muslim Kosovar Albanians and Orthodox Serbs. The JNA 
was deployed to Kosovo five times between 1945 and 1990 to quell civil disturbances 
before Yugoslavia disintegrated.
132
 By 1991, Serbian political appointees controlled the 
executive and administrative institutions in Kosovo and 6,000 Serbian police maintained a 
fragile calm.
133
 The calm was punctuated with periodic violence by both sides during the 
early 1990s, but the situation changed substantially in 1996 when the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) began an armed insurrection. The insurgency targeted Serbian police, 
supposed Albanian collaborators, and Serbian civilians. KLA violence escalated in 1997 and 
1998. In response, the Serbian army and police launched what were essentially scorched 
earth counter-insurgency operations in May and September. By late 1998, some 200,000 
Kosovar Albanians were displaced within the province and 98,000 had fled the region.
134
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 International diplomatic efforts to stop the fighting in 1998 were unsuccessful. 
Neither the international monitors in the Kosovo Verification Mission nor NATO’s aerial 
monitoring mission (Operation Eagle Eye) had the power to constrain the two sides. In 
particular, Serbia repeatedly violated temporary ceasefires when “training exercises” turned 
into full-fledged offensive operations. The final international efforts at a negotiated peace at 
Rambouillet and in Paris in February and March 1999 also failed.
135
 
 The NATO air campaign (Operation Allied Force) to force Serbia to withdraw 
police and military forces from Kosovo began on March 24th and continued for 78 days 
until June 10, 1999. Preparation for the operation had begun long in advance. The NATO 
ministerial held in May 1998 tasked military authorities to begin planning for a range of 
contingencies, it announced a port visit by STANAVFORMED to Durres, and it announced 
a number of PfP activities (exercises and assistance programs) with Albania and Macedonia 
to signal its interest in resolving the crisis in Kosovo. The ministers also emphasized the 
Alliance’s close consultations with Albania, Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine, and the EAPC, 
and it proposed that relevant international organizations (UN, OSCE, and WEU) coordinate 
their efforts to resolve the crisis.
136
 At the June ministerial, the allies directed the military 
authorities to conduct air exercises in Albania and Macedonia to demonstrate NATO’s 
ability to project power rapidly into the region and it expanded the range of possible military 
contingency missions.
137
 These two ministerial meetings identified why NATO was 
concerned about Kosovo: allies feared the violence and instability could jeopardize the 
peace agreement in Bosnia; they worried the conflict could spill-over into, and destabilize, 
Albania and Macedonia; and they worried about humanitarian problems related to so many 
refugees and displaced persons.
138
 
                                                 
135
 R. Craig Nation, War in the Balkans (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 228-244. 
136
 NATO, “Statement on Kosovo Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
held in Luxembourg on 28 May 1998,” NATO Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Autumn 1998): D5. 
137
 NATO, “Statement on Kosovo Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Defence Ministers Session, Brussels, 11 June 1998,” NATO Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Autumn 1998): 
D12. 
138
 NATO, “Statement on Kosovo Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
held in Luxembourg on 28 May 1998,”, D5; and NATO, “Statement on Kosovo Issued at the 
75 
 
 Extensive planning efforts over the previous year meant NATO military forces were 
ready to act rapidly when negotiations broke down in March 1999.
139
 Operation Allied 
Force was the largest conventional operation on European soil since World War II. Some 
912 aircraft and more than 35 ships (from which cruise missiles were launched) participated 
in the campaign. According to the SACEUR, “Allied pilots flew 37,465 sorties, of which 
14,006 were strike missions.” The air operations had two objectives: to destroy and disrupt 
Serb police and military forces in Kosovo; and to destroy and disrupt the ability of the 
Serbian state to continue prosecuting its ethnic cleansing campaign. Targets included police 
and military units, command and control facilities, communications capabilities, artillery 
and air defenses, logistical facilities, the power grid, and key bridges in both Kosovo and 
Serbia proper.
140
 The air campaign lasted longer than NATO had anticipated (allied leaders 
had wrongly expected Milošević to crumble rapidly) but it was ultimately successful in 
forcing Serbia to meet international demands.
141
 
 Recognizing there would be a need for a peace implementation force once hostilities 
ended, to help the return of refugees and support humanitarian assistance efforts, to begin 
rebuilding the shattered province, and to stabilize the province while a durable political 
solution was sought, NATO prepared for its second peace support operation, carried out by 
KFOR. The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was tasked to serve as the headquarters 
element and it began arriving in Macedonia in February 1999. It shifted from its 
preparations to deploy into Kosovo in April as a humanitarian crisis developed in 
Macedonia, due to the massive influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees. The ARRC 
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built refugee camps, and delivered food, water, and other supplies until the UNHCR and 
other humanitarian agencies could take over relief operations.
142
 
 Another NATO force in Albania fulfilled similar humanitarian functions. Operation 
Allied Harbour was NATO’s first humanitarian assistance mission and it was approved by 
the NAC on April 15, 1999.
143
 The mission was activated to help the Albanian government 
deal with the humanitarian crisis created by an influx of some 430,000 refugees.
144
 The 
ACE Mobile Force (Land) deployed to Albania as the headquarters element of the Albania 
Force (AFOR).
145
 Twenty-four NATO and non-NATO countries contributed forces to the 
AFOR, which totaled 8,080 troops.
146
 Besides building refugee camps, the AFOR 
coordinated all civil and military air traffic in Albania, supported the onward movement of 




 Upon the signing of the Military Technical Agreement on June 9th and Serbia’s 
subsequent withdrawal of forces, hostilities ended and KFOR began deploying into Kosovo 
on June 12, 1999.
148
 KFOR’s mission was called Operation Joint Guardian (June 12, 1999-
present) and it operated under a UN mandate.
149
 At its height, the force included some 
50,000 troops. All of the allies (19 member nations) contributed forces as well as 20 non-
NATO partners.
150
 Over time, the number of troops decreased as security conditions 
improved and by 2014 there were less than 5,000 troops. The structure of KFOR also 
changed several times. Initially, forces were distributed into four multinational task forces. 
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In 2006, forces were re-distributed into five multinational task forces, and in 2010 the forces 
were consolidated into two multinational battle groups.
151
 The headquarters elements rotated 
every six months.
152
 As with IFOR/SFOR, therefore, KFOR was a wholly multinational 
formation. In addition, the periodic rotation of the headquarters elements provided 
operational experience to the various NATO headquarters. 
 KFOR’s mission was more complicated than the IFOR/SFOR mission because there 
was no functioning local government which could play a role in civil, political, and 
economic reconstruction. Instead, the NATO force coordinated with an interim “state” 
structure, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
153
 KFOR actions 
were also wide-ranging. Its military tasks included securing the province to prevent new 
hostilities, disarming the KLA, and turning the KLA into a civil emergency force under UN 
control. It cleared mines from roads and buildings, conducted hundreds of daily patrols, and 
operated over 200 vehicle checkpoints. Its non-military tasks included assisting 
humanitarian organizations to distribute aid, build temporary shelters, and aid the return of 
refugees. It fulfilled policing duties until civilian agencies arrived on the ground. Other tasks 
included: rebuilding roads, bridges, the railway, and the Priština airport; building houses, 
and restoring basic communications, and electrical and water services; providing routine and 
emergency medical services; and supporting elections.
154
 As IFOR/SFOR had done, KFOR 
established a CIMIC organization to coordinate military, civil, and economic activities with 




 In general, throughout the decade, NATO demonstrated it was a learning 
organization, although adaptation was often incremental and reluctant. It recognized it was 
in a new strategic environment and it grappled with the best way to respond. To address the 
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new threats and challenges it endeavored to improve its organizational capacities. Evidence 
of learning was reflected in the promulgation of new strategy, and the creation of new 
bodies (NACC, EAPC), and new programs (PfP) to support new relationships with the post-
communist countries and other non-NATO partners. It published new doctrine (peace 
operations and CIMIC) and adapted education, training, and exercise programs. The 
Alliance continually adapted its military structure to try to ensure it could achieve its 
strategic objectives as member governments reduced the size of their armed forces. It not 
only employed force for the first time in its history, albeit very incrementally and only after 
it became evident the CSCE, EU, and UN were not capable of dealing with the conflicts in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, but also adopted new military missions as it slowly got to grips with the 
character of the emerging security challenges. With each mission and operational 
deployment the various NATO leaders gathered lessons learned and sought to improve what 
the Alliance did and how it performed. 
 Overall the changes and adaptations that NATO underwent in the 1990s were 
evidence of enduring convergent political will (and member commitment to NATO) and 
they laid foundations for the Alliance that would subsequently prove useful after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks when adaptation was pushed even further. The Alliance’s shift 
in strategic culture meant members eventually reached consensus on operating out-of-area 
and agreed to execute a wide range of operational missions, both of which expanded even 
further after 2001. It developed some experience in deploying multinational military 
formations and it developed the habit of integrating non-NATO partners. Furthermore, 
NATO’s experience in pursuing mutually supporting political, economic, and military lines 
of effort to achieve its security objectives in both the democratizing countries and the 




SEPTEMBER 2001-JULY 2003: NATO ABSENCE 
 As the 21
st
 century dawned in 2001 and NATO settled in to conducting peace 
operations in the Balkans, no one would have predicted the Alliance would be leading a 
large, multinational coalition in a shattered country deep in the heart of Central Asia within 
a few years. Although the 1990s had seen a number of firsts for NATO – first use of 
military force in conventional combat operations, first out-of-area interventions, and the 
shift to the conduct of entirely new activities, including peace and humanitarian operations – 
the organization and its member nations were not prepared for the sudden change in the 
international security environment precipitated by the attack of a non-state actor against the 
most powerful state in the international system. Although transnational terrorism had been 
recognized as a security threat for decades, before September 2001 it was not a priority 
concern for either national policymakers or international security organizations. The 
attention of NATO was further limited by the fact that for Alliance members out-of-area 
meant focusing on geographic regions that were immediately adjacent to allied territory. In 
2001, NATO was not a global security organization. 
 Lack of concern and attention did not mean lack of threat and so al Qaeda’s 
coordinated attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 took political and military 
leaders, defense experts, and scholars by surprise. It was also a prime manifestation of the 
dangers posed by the combination of transnational terrorist groups, failed states, and 
ungoverned spaces, for the ideologies, values, and interests of Afghanistan’s Taliban 
government converged sufficiently with al Qaeda’s to give this Islamic jihadist movement a 
base from which to launch terrorist attacks around the world. Former Finnish President 
Martti Ahtisaari characterized the challenge posed by the new security environment when he 
said in an interview in Autumn, 2001, “Many of today’s most serious threats [such as 
terrorism, corruption, organized crime, drug trafficking, and collapsed states] are global in 
scale . . . Taken together, these new threats are such that it is extremely difficult for 
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governments to come up with effective responses. Clearly, these problems cannot be solved 
without effective international cooperation.”1 
 However, international cooperation is often difficult to achieve. NATO’s initial 
response to the attacks was another first. Alliance members invoked Article 5 for the first 
time in history. Ironically, the members rallied to the aid of the United States, when for 
more than 50 years they had expected it would be the United States who would come to 
their aid. But while NATO’s activities in the Balkans had laid the groundwork for eventual 
operations in Afghanistan because of the adaptations in organizational capacity it had 
undertaken and the experience it gained in dealing with complex challenges that called for 
the execution of a wide range of military operations in conjunction with civil authorities, 
this did not lead automatically, or easily, to the organization’s involvement in Afghanistan 
after the initial statement of solidarity. As with the Balkans in the 1990s, NATO’s 
involvement in Afghanistan was incremental and occurred only after significant shifts in 
political will and strategic culture.  
 This chapter covers the period of time when NATO was absent from Afghanistan. It 
briefly summarizes the country’s recent history to provide a context for the symbiotic 
relationship between the Taliban government and al Qaeda. It then covers the international 
response to the September 11
th
 attacks and key points in the ebb and flow of the conflict 
between September 2001 and July 2003, including developments in the U.S.-led OEF 
coalition and the implementation of the ISAF mission. While NATO was initially not 
engaged in Afghanistan, it gradually became involved, starting with its provision of 
assistance to the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps as it prepared for and then executed its 
leadership of ISAF III (February and August 2003), followed by the NAC decision to take 
over command of ISAF.  
 The proposed analytical framework can explain both NATO’s absence and the start 
of its involvement. In brief, NATO’s strategic culture did not initially encompass fighting a 
transnational Islamic terrorist movement and did not envision the Alliance operating 
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thousands of miles outside NATO territory. In addition, there was no political will on the 
part of the members to utilize the Alliance against either the Taliban government or al 
Qaeda, and the Alliance lacked the capacity to deploy and sustain coalition forces in a 
distant theater of operations. As NATO grappled with its role and purpose in the new 
security environment, the strategic-level drivers began to change, which ultimately led to 
NATO assuming command of an adaptive multinational coalition. However, NATO’s 
strategic evolution was gradual and it was also often half-hearted, contradictory, and 
ineffectual, which had negative consequences when the character of the conflict changed. 
A Shattered State and Terrorist Sanctuary 
 Afghanistan in 2001 was politically, economically, and socially shattered far 
beyond what Kosovo had been. This along with its austere environment (a high 
mountainous desert with scattered and isolated fertile valleys) and geographic remoteness 
made it a particular challenge for international intervention. Before the 1978 communist 
coup, it had been self-sufficient in food production and undergone halting political, social, 
and economic development.
2
 However, more than 20 years of war, between 1979 and 2001, 
destroyed much of the forward progress the country had made. In addition, the wars and 
associated massive refugee population movements damaged the traditional tribal authority 
structures which opened a power vacuum into which the Taliban and al Qaeda moved.
3
 
 Afghanistan’s destruction occurred in two phases and began with the Soviet 
Union’s invasion in December 1979. At the war’s height, 115,000 Soviet troops occupied 
the country. This Soviet-Afghan war was waged primarily in rural areas where the Russians 
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executed a methodical strategy to depopulate the countryside and destroy rural 
infrastructure. Their goal was to “obliterate the rebel’s support environment.”4 By the end of 
the occupation in February 1989, Afghanistan was awash in military equipment, from small 
arms and ammunition to rockets and heavy weapons, such as tanks, artillery, and SCUD 
missiles.
5
 The country was also flooded with land mines; according to the UN, some five-to-
seven million mines were scattered across the country by 1989.
6
 
 The various mujahedin movements that had formed to resist the Soviet occupation 
turned against each other in 1992 when the Mohammed Najibullah government collapsed 
(after Soviet sponsorship ended). The Afghan civil war in the 1990s completed the 
destruction begun by the Soviets as cities became the new primary battlefields between rival 
groups vying for power. Kabul, in particular, which had survived intact in the 1980s, “was 
destroyed, block by block.”7 In effect, the “rubblization” policy of the Soviets was 
duplicated in the cities. A new actor joined the conflict in 1994 when the Taliban, a Pashtun 
phenomenon, emerged. The civil war never entirely ended, even though the Taliban 
movement consolidated power over much of the country by 1996, since it was still fighting 




 By September 2001, Afghanistan was a shattered state,
9
 it was internationally 
isolated (only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates formally recognized the 
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Taliban government), and it depended on international humanitarian assistance.
10
 The 
Taliban government did not act like a conventional government. It did not rebuild traditional 
state political, economic, and security institutions, and in fact the leader, Mullah 
Muhammad Omar, remained largely isolated and interacted with only a small circle of 
advisors in Kandahar. Ministries in the capital, Kabul, were excluded from decision-making 
processes and remained “barely functional.”11 
 The fractured nature of the Taliban’s failed state served the interests of al Qaeda 
which moved into the country in 1996.
12
 The lack of governance structures and ongoing 
conflict gave al Qaeda freedom to maneuver. It reinvigorated the jihadist training 
infrastructure that had endured since the 1980s, trained, according to estimates, tens of 
thousands of jihadists between 1996 and 2001, and continued worldwide terrorist attacks 
with no interference.
13
 In addition, it made itself useful to the Taliban government by 




 Both the Taliban movement, which emerged from radical Pashtun madrassas in 
Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, and al Qaeda were founded on similar ideologies which 
draw on Wahabist, Muslim Brotherhood, and Deobandist teachings and interpretations of 
Islam.
15
 Both are salafist and takfiri movements. Salafists are “followers of the principles of 
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the first generation of Muslims” and salafi movements, in general, are dedicated to 
purifying Islam and Islamic society.
16
 Takfiris hold that Muslims whose beliefs are different 
from theirs are heretics and thus infidels. They advocate violent jihad to fight all infidels, to 
overturn apostate Muslim states and establish pure Islamic regimes, and to reinstate the 
Caliphate.
17
 Al Qaeda saw itself as the vanguard of an Islamic movement that was fighting 
to create a new world order based on this Caliphate and which would eventually defeat the 
West.
18
 The Taliban considered Afghanistan to be an emirate in this new order.
19
 
 Over time, through intermarriage, the establishment of businesses and charity 
activities, the reinvigoration of logistical, training, and funding networks, and the successful 
creation of order through dispute settlement mechanisms, al Qaeda embedded itself into 
tribal authority structures and the Pashtun social and geographic terrain.
20
 This terrain 
included areas in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, as Pashtun tribal areas spill over both sides 
of the Durand Line (a boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan drawn by the British 
colonial government in 1893, but which the Afghan government has never recognized as its 
international border with Pakistan).
21
 This cross-border al Qaeda sanctuary was like a 
natural fortress due to the austere conditions of the high mountain area which was reinforced 
by the Pashtun social code Pashtunwali. Pashtunwali shapes Pashtun identity, culture, and 
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social organization. Based on the concepts of hospitality (melmastia), honor (nang), revenge 
(badal), manhood (meranah), bravery (tureh), the right of asylum (nanawati), and the 
defense of the honor of women (namus),
22
 it was the cultural basis for the safe haven 
provided to al Qaeda (and the Taliban), both before and after September 2001. As a 
consequence, the Taliban and al Qaeda were linked by ideology, shared networks, and ties 
of marriage and blood within Pashtunwali. 
 Taken together, the geography and ideology, the endurance of radical madrassas 
which continued to turn out talibs in the 2000s, the deeply embedded logistical, training, 
and funding networks that crossed the Afghan-Pakistan border (and which overlapped with 
criminal networks), and Pashtunwali were a complex mix that influenced the character of 
the conflict after 2001. These complicated religious, social, cultural, political, and economic 
factors were often unappreciated, or underappreciated, by the international coalition but they 
had implications for coalition strategy. As the international community came to grips with 
the various interconnected dimensions of the conflict, the coalition strategy slowly 
expanded. International intervention needed a spark, however, and that spark was the attacks 
of September 11, 2001. 
New Strategic Environment: the West Goes to War 
 According to one scholar of Al Qaeda, its attacks in New York and Washington, 
D.C. were intended “to cripple the economic, military and political power of the United 
States and critically weaken its capacity for retaliation.”23 They had the opposite effect, 
since one of the first results was the rallying of NATO around the United States. On 
September 12th, the NAC invoked Article 5 which triggered the Alliance’s mutual defense 
guarantee.
24
 Similarly, the Australian government invoked the mutual defense guarantee of 
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the Australian-U.S. security alliance.
25
 In addition, UN Security Council Resolution 1368 
declared a response by the United States would be legitimate under the terms of the UN 
Charter, which subsequently led to an EU declaration of solidarity.
26
 EU leaders later called 





declarations had political and military significance, since they indicated the United States 
had the political backing of a large number of allies to form an anti-terror coalition and it 
also meant al Qaeda and the Taliban would not just face a U.S. response. NATO’s Article 5 
activation was not operationalized with concrete actions until October 4
th
 when the United 
States requested eight specific individual and collective actions. However, none of the 
actions involved military operations in Afghanistan; instead they were oriented on 
supporting U.S.-led action in Afghanistan, and the wider war on terrorism. 
 NATO did not undertake action in Afghanistan because its members did not ask it 
to do so. The organization was not prepared for such an unexpected strategic challenge and, 
in effect, strategic level drivers blocked the generation of a decision for action due to factors 
related to organizational capacity which resulted in an absence of political will. The main 
inhibitor was strategic culture, that is, the Alliance’s security role as conceived by its 
members and its beliefs about the use of force (when, how, and where it could employ 
military forces), as articulated in the Alliance’s strategic documents. In short, it was not a 
global security organization and the conduct of such an unusual anti-terror and regime 
change mission was not within the parameters of what was considered legitimate military 
activity. Although the 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts had mentioned “acts of terrorism” 
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as risks in the evolving security environment, this was not translated into military activities 
within the context of the Alliance.
28
 Before September 11
th
, fighting transnational terrorism 
was not something that NATO’s members thought the organization should do. Before 2001 
therefore, the Alliance’s military planning bodies had not developed any contingency plans 
to deal with a problem like al Qaeda and the Taliban government. Existing NATO 
operational plans also did not envision an unusual campaign like the one waged in the fall of 
2001 - the use of several hundred covert agents and special operations forces to coordinate 
the targeting of a bombing campaign and to organize and support the fighting of more than 
20,000 indigenous forces against the Taliban and al Qaeda. A NATO official eloquently 
described the situation:  
Part of the problem was that no had ever done this before, and all of us had an 
image from our schoolboy days that after Article 5 was invoked, the collective 
armies of the United States and Europe would march off together to slay a 
common foe. But this conflict is so unconventional that it didn’t fit any of those 
stereotypes of what NATO was all about. Because everyone was anticipating a 
longer campaign in Afghanistan, there was also a belief that we had more time to 




Furthermore, no member besides the United States had the means to deploy combat forces 
thousands of miles from NATO territory and logistically sustain them for a prolonged 
period of time. The United States possessed the vast majority of the key strategic assets 
required (airlift, refueling, strategic bombing, intelligence, secure communications, and 
precision munitions) and this influenced U.S. political will. The U.S. government had no 
interest in allowing its allies to constrain operational decisions through political conditions 
tied to military contributions.
30
 This lack of strategic-level organizational capacity 
influenced the U.S. position, but domestic politics also influenced it. The Bush 
administration wanted quick action and an unprecedented form of combat action. The 
Alliance could not have planned and executed such as innovative operation fast enough to 
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suit the preferences of the U.S. government. Leading an ad hoc coalition maximized the 
U.S. freedom of maneuver. Former U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 
described the administration’s position in her memoir: 
It is true that we were capable largely on our own to initiate war against the 
Taliban. It is also true that, after years of neglecting their military capabilities 
and concurrent failure to modernize for the war we’d eventually fight, most 
members of the Alliance were unable to move their military forces quickly. And 
we were single-minded, bruised, and determined to avenge 9/11 and destroy al 




 Given the existing conditions of organizational capacity in September 2001, a 
plausible case could be made that if the United States had asked NATO to lead the 
international military response, the organization would have declined due to the objection of 
allies like France (France’s subsequent resistance to NATO’s taking over ISAF and the 
merging of OEF and ISAF substantiates this assumption). In a number of ways, the situation 
was similar to 1990 and Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. The Alliance could not meet the 
immediate requirements of the new security environment. In recognition of this fact, the 
United States asked NATO to undertake the activities it could support. The U.S. Permanent 
Representative to NATO, Ambassador Nicholas Burns, described the U.S. position. He 
stated the overall effort to defeat the global Islamic terrorist networks would require “a 
multi-layered global coalition.” He argued NATO was an integral part of the coalition and 
that the U.S. had asked the Alliance for actions and contributions that made best use of its 
existing capabilities.
32
 The eight collective and individual activities were: intelligence 
sharing; assisting allies and partners to defend against terrorist attacks; providing increased 
security for U.S. and allied facilities; backfilling allied assets that deployed to fight 
terrorism; providing blanket overflight clearances; providing port and airfield access to all 
allies; deploying STANAVFORMED to the Eastern Mediterranean (Operation Active 
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 Just as they had at the end of the Cold War, national governments and NATO had to 
grapple with how to respond to the changed security environment and their public 
statements reflected the uncertain and fluid nature of the time. While the allies, and the 
EAPC partners, repeatedly pledged to work together to “combat the scourge of terrorism,” 
the Secretary General qualified their support by adding “members shall respond 
commensurate with their judgment and resources.”34 In particular, the member policy 
positions on the use of force ranged widely and they changed over time. For example in 
mid-September, the Italian defense minister initially ruled out contributing any military 
troops to a response to the terrorist attacks, but later stated Italy might contribute special 
forces to a NATO response. The German president and chancellor made opposing 
statements – the president doubted German troops would be involved in a military response 
while the chancellor refused to rule it out. The French government pledged its solidarity but 
also warned against a disproportionate military response. Spain pledged its full support with 
no reservations.
35
 The initial reluctance of some European countries to contribute air, 
ground, and naval forces disappeared by October as policy positions converged and the EU 
legitimized regime change at its summit in Ghent. 
 As mentioned above, the Bush administration did not turn to NATO partly because 
its conception of the conflict was broader than just a military effort in Afghanistan. It 
described the conflict as a fight against global networks of Islamic terrorist groups, led by al 
Qaeda, and stated the United States would use all its resources to fight them – diplomatic, 
intelligence, financial, law enforcement, and military. It also saw the conflict as the world’s 
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fight, which is why the president called on every nation to join it. While administration 
officials welcomed NATO’s solidarity, it conceptualized that the war on terrorism would be 
fought by a number of different kinds of coalitions.
36
  
The allies indicated their support for this U.S. position a number of times, which 
suggested all members were more comfortable coordinating military contributions on a 
bilateral basis, since it increased their room for maneuver, but it also reflected an unspoken 
agreement that NATO did not have the organizational capacity to undertake immediate 
military action in a country so far from continental Europe. In the lead up to combat 
operations, no member publically pressed the case that NATO should lead military action in 
Afghanistan; political will was lacking across the board among the allies and so NATO’s 
decision and planning mechanisms were not activated for the initial coalition operation. 
Instead, in official statements, from the NAC to informal defense minister meetings, the 
allies reiterated they were ready to assist the United States as required.
37
 This coincided with 
the consensus of the time that out-of-area for NATO meant regions peripheral to Alliance 
territory.  
 Just like in 1990-1991 in Kuwait, while NATO did not lead action in Afghanistan, it 
supported it, as did the allies and partners. For example, the countries in Central Asia joined 
their fellow EAPC members in condemning the 9/11 attacks and they pledged their support 
in defeating terrorism. They subsequently opened their airspace to the coalition by granting 
blanket overflight clearances and three of them approved Central Command’s (CENTCOM) 
request to establish critical airbases in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and 
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 The Alliance’s partnership building efforts with countries 
in Central Asia during the 1990s via the NACC, EAPC, and PfP had facilitated this security 
outcome, as did copious amounts of U.S. monetary assistance.
39
 As Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) began on October 7
th
, with targeted bombing raids and the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance by U.S. and British forces, the other allies reaffirmed their support, 
with some, such as Canada, France, Germany, and Italy pledging to contribute military 
forces in the coming days and weeks.
40
 In early November, President Jacques Chirac 
acknowledged 2,000 French troops were already involved in operations and his prime 
minister told the French National Assembly that the country was ready to increase “the 
density of its support.” Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder announced Germany would mobilize 
some 3,900 specialized troops.
41
 The first military “boots on the ground” were special forces 
from the U.S. and UK (October). They were joined by New Zealand (November) and 
Canada, Australia, Germany, Denmark, and France (December).
42
 European allies took the 
new security challenge seriously and they ultimately provided a wide range of ground, air, 
and naval support, to include special forces, combat and support troops, combat and 
refueling aircraft, strategic airlift, and a variety of naval assets, such as frigates, resupply 
ships, and aircraft carrier battle groups, to operations in Afghanistan.
43
  
Thus while initially including only American and British forces, the coalition 
quickly expanded after October 2001. Contrary to media reporting, the United States did not 
spurn allied military contributions. General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM Commander, 
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briefed the president, defense secretary, and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff on his 
operational concept for Afghanistan on September 20th. An integral part of his plan was the 
building of a military coalition whose core was the NATO allies. During the brief, he stated, 
“America’s NATO partners, as well as Australia, were already lining up to contribute forces 
and logistical support to a coalition.” 44  
However, the contributions were accompanied by a delicate political-military 
negotiation process that took time. The negotiation process went something like this: Ally 
said, “I want to contribute.” CENTCOM staff responded, “What do you want to 
contribute?” Ally replied, “What do you want?” CENTCOM, “What have you got?” Since 
the allied armed forces representatives (liaison officers) did not want to put their entire 
military on the table, they would then describe the ground, air, or naval assets their 
governments had indicated they were willing to contribute and the staff officers from the 
two sides then worked to figure out where they could best be integrated.
45
 Unfortunately, the 
acceptance and integration of coalition forces was frequently not communicated within the 
contributing nation’s government. In his memoir, former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Douglas Feith described the complaints the Bush administration received, both 
publically and through diplomatic channels, from senior government ministers about alleged 
CENTCOM non-responsiveness to offers, which fed into the inaccurate perception of U.S. 
unilateralism. He said they eventually unraveled the mystery, “The messages often weren’t 
flowing clearly or quickly enough from those [liaison] officers to the civilian leaders of their 
own defense ministries – and those officials, in turn, sometimes failed to inform their 
colleagues in their foreign ministry and prime minister’s office.” The administration 
resolved the communications problem by devising procedures to deliver acceptance and 
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coordination messages to allies and partners through Defense, State Department, and 
National Security Council channels.
46
 
By February 2002, there were 25 nations contributing forces to military activities in 
Afghanistan (to include 16 of the 19 NATO members).
47
 Operation Anaconda in March 
2002, OEF’s largest ground combat operation thus far and the first major multinational 
operation, was conducted by more than 2,000 coalition troops from eight nations (Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, UK, and U.S.). They were supported by 
Afghan militia forces and they killed, wounded, or captured hundreds of al Qaeda and 
Taliban forces who had concentrated in the Shahi Kowt Valley in Paktia Province.
48
 By 
April 2002, it seemed the allies and partners had stepped up to the plate and were bearing an 
equal share of the operational burden. The majority of the 11,000 forces in OEF and ISAF 
were not U.S. (approximately 6,000).
49
  
 With participation came national caveats. For example, Belgium contributed 
strategic airlift (C-130 aircraft) but it could be used only for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance.
50
 The coordination of national contributions under the terms of various national 
caveats made the execution of multinational operations and coalition warfare more complex. 
It also necessitated the establishment of new structures and processes, such as the “coalition 
village” at CENTCOM headquarters where allied and partner liaison teams worked together 
and with the CENTCOM staff.
51
 Similar multinational coordination structures and processes 
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were eventually created in the ISAF headquarters to facilitate the integration of diverse 
national contributions. 
 International military contributions were only one component of an international 
effort that remained focused on achieving a specific overarching objective throughout the 
time period under examination in this thesis: to keep Afghanistan from reverting back to 
becoming a safe haven for transnational Islamic terrorist groups.
52
 This objective was more 
complex than it at first appeared. It meant the international community had to facilitate the 
creation of a resilient Afghan state that would be capable of preventing the re-conquest of 
the country by insurgents and terrorists.  
 This in turn required a strategy that involved three mutually supporting lines of 
effort in the domains of security, governance, and economic development
53
 (thus they 
echoed NATO efforts in the Balkans). The provision of security was the immediate priority, 
but over the long term governance and economic development were the more important 
domains. Initially, the military coalition was faced with defeating the Taliban government, 
the al Qaeda terrorists, and the insurgent coalition that formed after the Taliban government 
collapsed, while it rebuilt Afghan security forces (military and police) which were expected 
to progressively take over the fight. In principle, increasing security would underpin the 
rebuilding of functioning state institutions, as well as provide space for economic 
development. Over time the three domains would reinforce each other. For example, 
functioning governance structures and capable security forces would increase the 
government’s stability and legitimacy, and a functioning national economy would provide 
the revenue for a self-sufficient state, all of which would protect the country from again 
becoming a failed state and a terrorist sanctuary. However, executing and calibrating a 
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complex strategy with multiple lines of effort over a long time horizon is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, as the coalitions found in Afghanistan. 
 In practice, the OEF coalition became involved in all three lines of effort (as ISAF 
did later) since the conflict never ended, non-military international efforts were often slow 
to start and develop, and governance and economic development could not wait until after 
security was established.
54
 Specific elements of the strategy constantly evolved over time 
(for example, the forms of coalition warfare expanded as the character of the conflict 
changed) and its implementation was often under-resourced, uncoordinated, and ad hoc. The 
situation was further complicated by the fact that Afghan institution building was slow and 
corruption-ridden which over time undermined the faith of Afghan citizens in their 
government. These failures and weaknesses provided the opportunity for an insurgent 
coalition to form and for the conflict to continue. 
 The strategy’s three lines of effort relied on the creation of several civilian and 
military multinational coalitions and initially they were based on a lead nation/lead entity 
concept.
55
 They also reflected the inter-connected and institutionalized international 
environment in that contributing nations recognized that the coalition efforts were linked – 
they depended on each other for long term success. Under U.S. leadership, annual 
international coordination meetings began in November 2001
56
 and different nations and 
international organizations volunteered to take responsibility for various efforts. The United 
Nations took the lead for the political transition process after the Taliban government 
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collapsed and assisted Afghan representatives in establishing a transitional government and 
a roadmap for the creation of a representative government in the Afghan Bonn Agreement in 
early December 2001.
57
 The United States took the lead for creating and training a new 
Afghan Army. Germany took up police training, the United Kingdom took the counter-
narcotics mission, Italy took up judicial reform, and Japan led the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program.
58
 No single nation or organization took 
the lead, however, for reconstruction and economic development and this was ultimately a 
significant weakness that seriously undermined the overall strategy. Individual nations and 
organizations, like the World Bank, UN, and Asia Development Bank, pledged funds 
(which were often slow to be committed) or volunteered for specific projects. This meant 
the reconstruction efforts were uncoordinated, slow to develop, and at times conflicted with 
each other. Even after the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 
was created it did not become the central coordination point for all economic development, 
reconstruction, and humanitarian activities. A number of the initiatives were eventually 
taken up by ISAF (police and counter-narcotics) which further complicated the situation 
because the Afghan government was forced to deal with conflicting groups of officials from 
NATO, contributing nations, and a wide range of international organizations. 
 In the meantime, OEF’s campaign plan for military operations relied on a light 
footprint. Military planners at CENTCOM kept historical and religious lessons in mind as 
they built the plan and adjusted it over time. They did not want to repeat the mistakes of the 
British (19
th
 century) or the Russians (1980s) and they did not want to be perceived as an 
occupation force or as infidel invaders necessitating Afghan resistance for religious 
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 The coalition also did not want to “foster a relationship of dependency.”60 
Furthermore, as U.S. attention turned to Iraq in early 2003, there was “enormous pressure” 
on CENTCOM not to “over commit” resources to OEF. In effect, OEF became an economy 
of force mission for the U.S. government.
61
 This concern to keep troop levels low 
contributed to the creation of a security vacuum that Taliban insurgents exploited. 
 CENTCOM and OEF commanders and planners benefitted from the fact that 
violence levels were low for a number of years and this facilitated the coalition’s transition 
in military operations. They adapted to what they thought was the winding down of the 
conflict. The adaptation included both new organizational structures and new missions. By 
early 2002, OEF forces began stabilization and reconstruction efforts in conjunction with 
combat operations. While U.S. military leaders did not initially envision conducting any 
nation-building tasks as they built the OEF campaign plan in the fall of 2001, after 
Operation Anaconda they substantially changed OEF’s activities. By mid-2002, OEF was 
engaged in three lines of effort: security operations; stability and reconstruction operations; 
and training.
62
 All of these activities were eventually subsumed into ISAF.  
 The security operations dealt with Taliban and al Qaeda “remnants.”63 In general, 
OEF forces, comprised of a combat brigade (Combined Task Force-82, CTF-82) and special 
operations forces assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan 
(CJSOTF-A) (see Appendix 2), conducted pursuit operations, cordon and search operations, 
and raids to capture or destroy remaining pockets of militants. They destroyed training 
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camps and seized and destroyed arms caches. These operations were multinational and 
many were small efforts with a limited number of forces, but others were quite large, such 
as Operation Anaconda in March 2002.
64
 Overall, these operations could be considered 
strategic failures, since coalition forces rarely engaged directly with organized enemy 
elements after the spring of 2002 and they never completely eliminated the militants. The 
operations were not counter-insurgency efforts, since there was not a perception that an 
active insurgency existed and military forces did not permanently secure the population. 
Instead coalition forces launched their operations from bases at Bagram, Kandahar, and a 
handful of small forward operating bases (FOBs) in southeastern Afghanistan and returned 
to the bases when operations were complete.
65
 As such, the lack of physical control of the 
Afghan countryside contributed to the security vacuum. 
  Humanitarian assistance activities were integrated with the security operations. For 
example, during Operation Village Search in October 2002, civil affairs teams assessed 
medical conditions and identified potential reconstruction projects.
66
  Furthermore, since 
ISAF’s initial mandate was limited to Kabul and international reconstruction and economic 
development pledges were frequently slow to be honored,
67
 the OEF commander created a 
new organizational element and started civil-military operations to jump start civil, 
economic, and reconstruction activities in the provinces. This effort surpassed the CIMIC 
efforts in the Balkans. The Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force 
(CJCMOTF) did far more than coordinate humanitarian, governance, and economic 
development activities among governmental and non-governmental organizations. It also 
managed Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) in ten cities throughout 
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Afghanistan which directly provided assistance on the ground. These small six-man cells 
were popular and successful at providing “quick impact” assistance in 2002, especially in 
unsecured areas where NGOs did not operate, but the Afghan needs for development, 
reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance were massive. Much more needed to be done, 
and faster, and so the CHLC’s inspired the creation of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRT)
68
 an innovative organizational structure that fully merged the civil-military efforts.   
 While the idea for the PRTs began germinating in the spring of 2002, the concept 
was not fleshed out or proposed to the Hamid Karzai government until the fall. After the 
transitional government’s approval, the OEF command element, CJTF-180, established 
three U.S.-led pilot PRTs in 2003 in Gardez (January), Bamiyan (March), and Kunduz 
(April). The other members of the coalition were encouraged to participate in the effort. As 
a consequence, in July the UK established a fourth PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif
69
 and New 
Zealand’s government decided to take over the Bamiyan PRT.70  
 The PRTs were intended to make the reconstruction effort more effective by 
combining representatives from the lead nation’s defense, foreign, and aid agencies into one 
focused team. Team size varied depending on the local security conditions, but in general it 
ranged from 70-100 personnel, of which the vast majority were troops (60-80) who provided 
force protection and support services to the rest of the PRT. The teams worked directly with 
local Afghans to coordinate the humanitarian, governance, and reconstruction projects that 
were most needed in their areas. Since representatives from the Afghan transitional 
government (such as Agriculture and Education Ministries) were included in the 
coordination chain, the PRTs were also intended to extend the reach of the new government 
and enhance its legitimacy.
71
 For the OEF coalition, the PRTs represented the beginning of 
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 The PRTs also bridged the ISAF mandate problem. Since ISAF was not present 
outside Kabul, where there were critical requirements for major reconstruction efforts, the 
PRTs filled the gap. However, they were not popular with many NGOs who felt coalition 
military forces were getting involved in work that exceeded their range of expertise. They 
also feared PRT activity would undermine the traditional neutrality of NGOs. Some also 
believed the teams would be perceived as military occupation forces by provincial 
Afghans.
73
 In the end, they were not and, in general, the teams were well-received. The 
PRTs however, did not solve the security problem. The transitional government had 
virtually no presence outside Kabul and both it and the coalition were aware that Taliban 
and al Qaeda remnants continued to exist within various communities. In addition, various 




 Therefore, as part of the expansion of coalition efforts into stability operations, the 
training of the new Afghan security forces (ANSF) – army and police – began. The training 
efforts were meant to strengthen the new government by building its capability to provide 
security within the country. Germany refurbished the police academy in Kabul and began a 
comprehensive five year program in mid-2002 that concentrated on traditional law 
enforcement training for the new Afghan National Police (ANP). To manage the effort to 
build the ANA, CENTCOM created the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-
A) in February 2002. While it was a military organization that fell under CJTF-180 in May, 
it was also part of the American ambassador’s country team and it was oriented on security-
related governance issues identified in the Bonn Agreement; specifically, working with the 
nascent Afghan Defense Ministry to create an army. OMC-A was “the main thrust of the 
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coalition’s effort to assist the new Karzai government” and it was “the most active 
proponent of governance operations in 2002.”75 
 OMC-A got to work in an on-the-fly manner which was necessitated by the 
CENTCOM commander’s desire to quickly build capable indigenous security forces so that 
the coalition could withdraw quickly. According to an officer who worked in the OEF 
headquarters, the coalition was optimistic it could quickly build sufficient ANA forces and 
rapidly turn everything over to the Afghans and then leave (this was grossly inaccurate as it 
turned out). He stated in the interview, “We’re going to keep the environment secure long 
enough for the Afghan system of government to kick in through the loya jirga process . . . 
and we’re going to start the ANA out on a good footing.” In fact, he added that the U.S. 
forces were so convinced they would not be in the country very long that they were not 
allowed to build any permanent headquarters or billeting infrastructure. Their command was 
literally a tent city in Bagram.
76
 The OEF coalition was in such a hurry that the first set of 
Afghan recruits reported for their 10-week training in May 2002 before funds and resources 
were in place. The American special forces trainers began organizing the training of this 
first new Afghan battalion while OMC-A was finalizing negotiations with the interim 
government to use the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) as the basic training facility. 
To further complicate matters, the trainers graduated the first three Afghan army battalions 
(between July and October) while leaders in ISAF and OEF were still negotiating with the 
Afghan government over the size and shape of the new ANA. It was not until December 
2002 that Karzai approved the plan to build a 70,000 soldier ANA.
77
 
 The training effort was further complicated by the existence of the Afghan Military 
Forces (AMF). The AMF was the collective term for the mujahedin, Afghan armed forces, 
and armed groups who had fought with the coalition to remove the Taliban government. The 
                                                 
75
 Ibid., 198-199, 229. 
76
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Holler, U.S. Army (served as the G3 Battle Captain in Headquarters, 
CJTF-180, Bagram, Afghanistan, May-November 2002; also served as a brigade operations officer of 
a combat unit in Regional Command-East, ISAF, Afghanistan, January 2007-January 2008), 
interview with author at Carlisle Barracks, PA, November, 15, 2013. 
77
 Wright, A Different Kind of War, 200-201, 230. 
102 
 
Bonn Agreement declared these groups would come under the control of the interim 
authority and that they would “be reorganized according to the requirements of the new 
Afghan security and armed forces.”78 The idea was that some of the officers and soldiers 
would be integrated into the ANA and the rest demobilized. However, the Japanese-led 
DDR program did not get off the ground until April 2003, many of the troops were 
unsuitable for the new ANA, and many of the armed groups proved more loyal to their local 
leaders and provincial governors (often called “warlords”) than to the central government.79 
Furthermore, elements of the AMF continued to operate with the coalition in 2002 and 2003 




 The scale of the ANA development plan was huge. The coalition in effect 
committed itself to building a national armed force from the ground up. The plan envisioned 
creating both combat and support units (with their necessary equipment), the bases and 
infrastructure required for the training programs as well as the operational units, a small air 
force, and a fully functioning defense ministry and general staff.
81
 Coalition members 
involved in the effort included the British who took over noncommissioned officer (NCO) 
training, the French who took over officer training, and the Bulgarian, Mongolian, and 
Romanian armies who agreed to provide specialized training on Soviet-designed weapons 
and equipment. By the fall of 2002, the OMC-A commander realized his staff was too small 
for the mission. He convinced CJTF-180 to create a new organization, Combined Joint Task 
Force Phoenix (CJTF Phoenix), which stood up in June 2003 to manage the training. It was 
built upon a U.S. infantry brigade comprised of about 1,000 conventional soldiers who took 
over the training mission from the special forces. Besides organizing trainers into mobile 
training teams (MTT) to maximize the efficiency of basic training, OMC-A and CJTF 
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Phoenix also created embedded training teams (ETT) who accompanied the new Afghan 




 As the OEF coalition undertook the humanitarian, reconstruction, and training 
missions it believed it was entering a phase of the campaign where combat operations were 
tailing off, while stability operations increased. However, the perception that the conflict 
was largely over in 2002-2003 was premature. The unconventional campaign fought in the 
fall of 2001 was spectacularly successful and it killed thousands of Taliban and al Qaeda 
fighters but it did not result in a decisive defeat of either movement. Even though the 
Taliban government collapsed more quickly than expected, the key leadership of both 
movements and many fighters fled to Pakistan (to both the autonomous regions and the 
cities) where they found sanctuary.
83
 For several years, the Taliban and al Qaeda primarily 
focused on regrouping and establishing control of regions within Pakistan’s Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The enduring Pashtun tribal, Taliban, and al Qaeda 
networks were resuscitated, new insurgent fighters were recruited from the radical 
madrassas, and Pashtunwali provided the cultural foundation for both the reconstitution 
efforts and the safe haven.
84
 
 By mid-2002, Taliban leaders had established a base in Quetta and they constituted 
the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), a leadership council under Mullah Omar.
85
 This 
organization was different from Taliban rule in Afghanistan as three regional shuras were 
established under the QST in Quetta, Peshawar, and Miram Shah. Together they led and 
coordinated a loose coalition of former and new Taliban members and groups sympathetic 
to the Taliban (the new movement was sometimes called the neo-Taliban). Groups that 
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affiliated themselves with the Quetta Shura Taliban included Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-
i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) and Jalaluddin Haqqani’s Haqqani Network. Altogether they 
formed a loose insurgent coalition that continued to rely on al Qaeda for mass appeal, 
funding, resources, and training.
86
 Some fighters from these groups infiltrated into 
Afghanistan to conduct attacks; they were joined by militants hiding in Afghanistan. 
 Militant activity throughout 2002 and 2003 was limited which meant violence levels 
remained low. The activity included: sporadic use of improved explosive devices (IEDs) 
and car bombs; assassinations of Afghan officials and attacks against Afghan civilians and 
aid workers; sporadic rocket, artillery, and mortar attacks on Afghan and coalition 
compounds throughout the country; and some limited organized attacks by militants – such 
as ambushes.
87
 The level and frequency of violence slowly increased during the two years.
88
 
Given the generally low level and disparate violence, the largely counter-terrorism-like 
security operations of OEF seemed appropriate, although the heavy handed nature of some 
search-and-destroy and raid techniques contributed to undermining support for the coalition 
among Pashtun communities who already resented their loss of political power in the new 
government. This made them ripe for exploitation by the emerging insurgent coalition 
which had undertaken a new three-phase campaign in Afghanistan: infiltrate and establish 
contact with potential allies (through oral and written communications, threats such as the 
infamous night letters, or violence if necessary); establish permanent areas of influence, 
base areas, and shadow authority structures; and then move into organized military action.
89
 
 The goal of the insurgent campaign was to challenge the authority of the new 
Afghan government and to counter its state-building efforts. Ultimately the reconstituted 
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Taliban movement wanted to force the international coalition to withdraw and re-establish 
an Islamic emirate.
90
 Phase I of the campaign began in late 2002 and it moved into Phase III 
in 2006.
91
 With this incremental insurgent strategy, the character of the conflict slowly 
started to change, just as NATO was adapting. 
NATO Starts to Adapt and Gets Involved in Afghanistan 
 A shift in NATO’s strategic culture was the first and most substantial adaptation 
and it began to change as OEF got underway and ISAF was established. The realization that 
modern civilization gives extremist terrorist organizations potentially enormous destructive 
power, particularly groups like al Qaeda that overtly sought weapons of mass destruction,
92
 
changed Alliance member perceptions about the role and purpose of NATO going forward. 
By December 2001, allied foreign and defense ministers started thinking about how NATO 
needed to change and adapt and what it should do to combat terrorism. Specifically, military 
authorities were tasked to develop “a military concept for defence against terrorism” by the 
Prague Summit scheduled for November 2002.
93
  
 A further impetus for the shift in strategic culture was the recognition that Europe 
already had experience with jihadists. Al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan had facilitated 
attacks in Europe. From the early 1990s, al Qaeda had established relationships with some 
30 terrorists groups worldwide. It inspired and assisted them both directly and indirectly. 
Beginning in the 1990s, Islamic radicals in these affiliated groups opened a second front in 
their war against apostate regimes by attacking the United States and its allies. They 
perceived that they could not “bring about change in their home countries . . . without 
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directly challenging Western military power, economic strength and cultural influence.”94 
As a consequence, Europe was attacked repeatedly. For example, the al Qaeda-affiliated 
Algerian jihadist group Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) hijacked an Air France flight in 
December 1994, intending to crash it into the Eiffel Tower, but it was stopped while the 
plane was refueling in Marseille (3 killed). In 1995, the GIA waged a four-month bombing 
campaign against the Paris metro system (8 killed, 200 wounded). Scores of terrorist 
bombing plans were foiled, such as the attempts by the al Qaeda-affiliated Groupe Salafiste 
pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) to bomb the Strasbourg Christmas market 
(December 2000), the U.S. Embassy in Paris, the U.S. Consulate in Marseille, and a 
munitions depot in Belgium (July 2001), and the U.S. Embassy in Rome (February 2002). 
Other foiled GIA-linked plots included plans to bomb an Antwerp synagogue and the Kleine 
Brogel military base in Belgium (September 2001), the Strasbourg cathedral (November 
2002), and the Russian Embassy in Paris (December 2002). Attacks against Europeans 
abroad included the bombing of an ancient synagogue in Tunisia (April 2002, 19 killed), the 
bombing of French naval engineers in Karachi, Pakistan (May 2002, 14 killed, 34 
wounded), and the bombing of the French oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen 
(October 2002, 1 killed). As European police and security services arrested jihadists in the 
aftermath of 9/11 they discovered extensive, interconnected terrorist networks all over 
Europe – which indoctrinated, recruited, trained, supplied and fund-raised, as well as carried 
out attacks within Europe and outside it.
95
 These networks were linked to the al Qaeda 
sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
 Protecting Europe therefore meant eliminating the sanctuary in Afghanistan, and 
this led to the objective of building a resilient Afghan state which further meant nation-
building. Stabilization and reconstruction missions, like those that NATO had undertaken in 
the Balkans, would need to be repeated, on a much larger scale, in Afghanistan. While 
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President Bush noted in his memoir that he changed his mind about nation-building after 
9/11, his administration was not interested in leading these types of missions and so it 
supported the Afghan proposal from the Bonn Agreement for the establishment of a UN-
authorized international security force led by someone else.
96
 Discussions within NATO and 
at national political levels about a possible peace operations role started shortly after 9/11 as 
the Alliance grappled with its place in the new security environment. In November 2001, 
some Alliance members proposed that NATO provide security to peacekeepers in 
Afghanistan, but others, such as France, disagreed and the proposal died.
97
 Turkey had 
indicated in the fall of 2001 that it was willing to lead some sort of post-conflict peace 
operation, but the collapse of the Taliban government occurred faster than expected and it 
could not react quickly enough to take the lead of the newly authorized International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in December 2001.
98
 However, the United Kingdom could 
and so it volunteered to lead the first rotation.
99
 ISAF’s mandate was limited to assisting the 
newly created Afghan interim administration in establishing security in Kabul and 
facilitating reconstruction efforts. It also operated in coordination with UNAMA after it was 
created in March 2002 by UNSCR 1401.
100
 
 The UK originally only volunteered to lead ISAF for three months,
101
 but it 
extended its command for an additional three months because the negotiations for Turkey to 
take over as the next lead nation were more difficult than expected (it required funding and 
assistance with strategic airlift, logistics, and communications and the United States 
eventually agreed to provide them), therefore the change of command did not occur until 
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 Negotiations for the next lead nation began immediately, with Germany and 
the Netherlands agreeing to jointly lead ISAF III.
103
 Turkey was required to extend its 
rotation by two months due to demands by German and Dutch trade unions for security 
guarantees for the troops which slowed down the negotiations. The United States ultimately 
agreed to guarantee the safe withdrawal of German and Dutch troops in the event of an 
emergency evacuation.
104
 Elements of the 1 (German/ Netherlands) Corps deployed to 
Kabul and comprised the core of the ISAF III headquarters from February to August 2003. 
 Each of the first three ISAF rotations was multinational. The force numbered about 
4,500 troops in ISAF I and increased to about 5,000 in ISAF II and III. Both NATO and 
partner nations contributed: 18 nations in ISAF I (12 NATO and 6 partners); 21 nations in 
ISAF II (10 NATO and 11 partners); and 28 nations in ISAF III (13 NATO and 15 partners). 
ISAF activities consisted primarily of patrolling, helping with the training of new Afghan 
security forces, and participating in humanitarian and reconstruction projects. The ISAF 
force itself was composed of three components (see Appendix 2): a headquarters element, a 
multinational brigade (which engaged in the day-to-day patrols and civil-military efforts), 
and an airport task force (which initiated the rehabilitation of the Kabul International 
Airport).
105
 Given the wide variation in national troop contributions - from a few troops 
(from Austria, Iceland, and Ireland) to thousands (Canada, Germany, Poland, and the UK) – 
the burden-sharing was widely disproportionate. In effect, some nations did little more than 
grant political legitimacy by their presence.  
 While recognizing continuing disparate violence, the coalition perceived the conflict 
was largely over because the “large-scale fighting” was over.106 A senior British commander 
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in Afghanistan assessed that al Qaeda and the Taliban no longer posed a great threat in May 
2002 and he predicted OEF’s offensive operations would end within weeks because  
“they’re not showing a predisposition to reorganize and regroup to mount offensive 
operations against us.”107 U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld went as far as declaring 
that major combat operations were over during a visit to Afghanistan in May 2003, adding 
that “the bulk of this country today is permissive, it’s secure.”108 According to one western 
journalist, “For around eighteen months it was possible to travel anywhere without concern 
for anything other than the appalling state of the roads . . .”109 The light footprint of both 
OEF and ISAF (in April 2002 there were 6,500 OEF troops and 4,500 ISAF troops; by mid-
2003 the combined troop levels stood at 17,000)
110
 seemed to be justified by a security 
environment where most of the violence occurred in the south and southeast of the country. 
 Even with the relatively minimal violence, the existence of a security vacuum was 
recognized as a problem, so the Karzai government, the UN Secretary General, and various 
NGO’s asked that ISAF’s mandate be expanded outside Kabul and the number of 
peacekeepers increased. Despite repeated requests from the interim government, the 
contributing nations refused.
111
 Turkey in particular agreed to assume leadership of ISAF II 
on the condition that the mandate was not expanded beyond Kabul. Its resistance was partly 
due to concerns about cost, but also partly because it feared “a backlash at home” if its 
soldiers killed fellow Muslims.
112
 The United States kept the debate alive when the Bush 
administration announced a policy shift in September 2002. It stated it supported expanding 
ISAF’s mandate.113 However, the proposal was initially resisted. The EU’s envoy to 
Afghanistan, Francesc Vendrell, asserted expanding ISAF outside Kabul “was ‘virtually 
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impossible at the moment’ because European governments do not have the resources.”114 
The issue of the mandate continued to percolate for another year until the fall of 2003. It 
took time for national policy positions to converge on such a significant change. 
 Furthermore, despite the low violence levels and perception the conflict was over, 
the international negotiation and coordination effort to identify successive lead nations for 
ISAF was painful; nations were not eagerly lining up to command a rotation. Negotiations 
were also time-consuming and they had taken longer than expected for the Turkish and 
GE/NL rotations. The successive change in lead nation for ISAF I through III was also 
inefficient, since each new lead nation had to start from scratch – learning the nuances of a 
fairly complex situation and executing a difficult deployment and logistics effort to set up a 
completely new headquarters with new equipment.
115
 According to a NATO officer, “It 
became really, really hard. It became really messy.” As a consequence, key national 
governments and the NATO and UN Secretaries General had “open discussions about how 
to help Afghanistan in an orderly fashion” and as such they continued to explore NATO’s 
potential role.
116
 Among other meetings, Prime Minister Tony Blair met with Bush 
administration officials to discuss expanding NATO’s missions.117 However, NATO’s 
eventual involvement in Afghanistan was not a given and it took almost two years for 
incremental shifts in political will and organizational capacity to occur before the 
organization took over leadership of ISAF in August 2003. 
 A major shift in NATO’s strategic culture occurred first and it opened the door to its 
eventual involvement in Afghanistan. The German defense minister, Rudolf Scharping, 
indicated the shift in thinking about NATO and the out-of-area debate when he argued in 
early May 2002 that the Alliance had to be ready to defend its vital security interests 
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anywhere – to include Europe “or some other corner of the world.”118 Later that month, at 
the NATO ministerial in Reykjavik, Alliance foreign ministers formally announced the 
organization’s global role when they reiterated their “determination to combat the threat of 
terrorism for as long as necessary,” as well as deal with other strategic threats to members 
and, to that end, to acquire the capabilities necessary to “field forces that can move quickly 
to wherever they are needed” and sustain them over distance and time.119 President George 
Bush reinforced the shift in NATO’s strategic culture when he stated he wanted the Alliance 
“to play a central role in the war against terrorism,” during a trip to Europe later that month. 
He added the new role required a new strategy and new capabilities. However, the difficult 
road ahead for NATO’s adaptation was highlighted by a statement from the German foreign 




 NATO’s global perspective was codified at the Prague Summit in November 2002 
and it was expressed in a series of measures to strengthen the Alliance’s ability to meet 
contemporary security challenges, regardless of where they originated. The measures 
included the announcement of a new anti-terrorism concept, a major organizational 
structural change, and a plan to modernize NATO capabilities. Allied leaders repeated their 
commitment to combat terrorism for as long as necessary and they envisioned different 
ways of dealing with it. The official new military concept on terrorism was framed within 
the traditional defensive posture of the Alliance. It identified various intelligence sharing, 
civil preparedness, and consequence management measures to protect allied populations, 
territory, and forces, and thus did not relate to on-going operations in Afghanistan. 
However, allied leaders also stated their intention to deter, disrupt, defend, and protect 
against terrorist attacks, as and where required, which implied activity outside NATO 
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 The other changes indirectly related to Afghanistan but in effect built the 
capabilities the Alliance would need for its subsequent wide-ranging activities within the 
country. 
 The major organizational change was the decision to transform the military 
command structure. The two strategic commands, ACE and ACLANT, were to be 
transformed into Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation 
(ACT). This change was significant because it moved the Alliance away from its traditional 
regional and geographic focus (on Europe and the Atlantic) and toward a functional focus. It 
facilitated efforts to streamline and reduce the number of operational and component 
headquarters,
122
 but more importantly it institutionalized the change in NATO’s mindset 
about out-of-area operations. The transformation gave the Alliance the organizational 
capacity to manage global operations. This was an overdue capability, since the Alliance 
had taken small steps toward operating further out-of-area than the Balkans after the 9/11 
attacks. As a result of the American request for collective actions on October 4, 2001, seven 
NATO AWACS aircraft patrolled the airspace over the continental United States (Operation 
Eagle Assist) for seven months, from October 2001 to May 2002
123
 and naval forces began 
patrolling the Mediterranean Sea (Operation Active Endeavour) to deter and detect terrorist-
related activity and protect shipping.
124
 It took a larger step towards global operations with 
the NAC approval, in October 2002, of the German and Dutch request for the Alliance to 
assist them with the planning and execution of ISAF III. Not only did SHAPE host a force 
generation conference in November, but during the GE/NL ISAF rotation it also facilitated 
information sharing among the contributing nations (which included NATO and EAPC 
                                                 
121
 NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating 
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002,” http://www.nato. 
int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm. 
122
 Air Vice-Marshal Andrew Vallance, “A radically new Command Structure for NATO,” NATO 
Review (September 1, 2003), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/NATO-Strategic-Partners/EN/ 
index.htm. 
123
 In total, 830 crews from 13 NATO nations patrolled U.S. airspace in the course of 360 operational 
sorties; NATO, “Statement by the Secretary General on the conclusion of Operation Eagle Assist,” 
April 30, 2002, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_19412.htm.  
124
 NATO, “Operation Active Endeavour.” 
113 
 
members and New Zealand), it gave them access to NATO intelligence and communications 
networks, and it assisted with coordinating air transportation requirements.
125
 The Alliance 
did not know at the time that this activity would continue for the next 12 years. 
 The transformation of the strategic commands created a streamlined chain of 
authority and command that gave the Alliance a plug and play capacity that turned out to be 
very useful for Afghanistan. After NATO took over ISAF, the strategic and operational 
command chain never changed (NAC for political direction – ACO at SHAPE for strategic 
direction – JFC at Brunssum for operational direction – ISAF headquarters in Kabul for 
operational execution), while the 6-monthly rotations of ISAF headquarters elements 
continued. Even though the Prague Summit had also created the NATO Response Force 
(NRF), it was not the only deployable headquarters and the Alliance continued a practice it 
had established with SFOR and KFOR. Between August 2003 and the end of the ISAF 
mission it deployed the various NATO component commands, as well as affiliated 
European commands (ARRC, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Italy, NRF, Eurocorps, allied 
land component commands, etc.) through Kabul. 
 The third significant measure announced at Prague was the capabilities initiative. It 
was a result of what Secretary General Lord Robertson called “Europe’s military 
incapability.”126 The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) improved on the 1999 
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) by focusing on acquiring the most urgently needed 
capabilities and attempting to get firm promises from national governments that they would 
deliver.
127
 In some areas the capability shortfalls were not just a gap, but a chasm: in the 
spring of 2003 the United States had 250 long-range transport aircraft, the UK had four, and 
there were none in the remaining allied nations.
128
 This capabilities gap fed European 
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concerns that it would encourage U.S. unilateralism.
129
 While many of the capabilities were 
critical for subsequent operations in Afghanistan, the initiative was only partially successful. 
There was progress in the purchasing and leasing of sea lift, for example, but serious 
shortfalls in air lift and aerial refueling remained for years after Prague.
130
 This was an area 
where structural organizational capacity continued to lag due to domestic restraints on 
defense spending in many NATO members, and which only intensified after the global 
financial crisis. As such, this was a fraying force that never dissipated and it contributed to 
enduring Alliance tensions over burden-sharing.  
 After Prague, allied governments continued thinking about NATO’s role in 
Afghanistan. For example, the Bush administration continued to press the Alliance to 
assume a greater role in the country.
131
 Consequently, NATO experienced a “watershed 
moment” in April 2003 that was on the order of its decision to become involved in the 
Balkans in the 1990s.
132
 The NAC agreed to take over responsibility for ISAF. This open-
ended, out-of-area decision was unprecedented in the organization’s history, and it was 
surprising considering it was made during a contentious time – during the lead up to and 
invasion of Iraq. The Iraq issue could have been a hugely damaging fraying force but 
paradoxically it was not. The Iraq war was deeply divisive, both among European nations 
and between Europe and the United States. While there was general agreement something 
needed to be done about the Saddam Hussein regime, there was disagreement on timing and 
processes (i.e., continue to use the UN and diplomacy or use force to remove the regime). It 
was not a case of all European nations opposing the United States. Eighteen European 
nations expressed their support for Bush administration policy in two joint declarations of 
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solidarity that were published in European newspapers in January and February 2003.
133
 
Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, however, vocally and vociferously opposed 
U.S. policy and the movement towards military intervention. Statements by political leaders 
increased the rancor. For example, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld referred to France and 
Germany as “problems” in the Iraq crisis and dismissed them as old Europe in January.134 
President Chirac exacerbated the tensions after an EU summit on February 18
th
 when he 
“derided those Central and East European countries that have signed letters expressing their 
support for the United States as ‘childish,’ ‘dangerous,’ and missing ‘an opportunity to shut 
up.’”135 
 The actual Iraq intervention on March 20, 2003 was multinational (some 40 
countries provided ground, air, and/or naval forces, or logistical or other support). The 
ground force totaled 183,000 soldiers and Marines, the vast proportion of which were U.S., 
but it also included 41,000 British, 4,000 Australian, 1,300 Spanish, and a contingent of 
Polish special forces.
136
 At the same time, seven NATO aspirants were moving toward 
Alliance accession. They attended a signing ceremony for the protocols of accession in 




 Some of the countries felt they were put in a position where they 
had to choose between the United States and Europe, and this they wanted to avoid.
138
 In the 
meantime, the allies were searching for the successor to the German/Netherlands Corps as 
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the lead for ISAF. By early April, there were no volunteers and the ISAF commander 
admitted “there’s a little bit of panic” about it.139 
 By April, there was a desire to bring the Alliance back into harmony,
140
 to try to get 
past all the acrimony, since there continued to be serious international challenges that 
needed to be addressed, including additional terrorist attacks, and the rebuilding of 
Afghanistan, not to mention NATO efforts at transformation and enlargement. Civilian and 
military leaders at NATO perceived that the mission in Afghanistan “seemed to be done . . . 
the kinetics were done . . . all you’ve got to do is help [the Afghans] help themselves.” 
Taking over ISAF would be “honorable . . . and you’ve got all the people on the ground 
anyway.” The fact there were few combat operations “made the mission easier for everyone 
to undertake.”141 For national political leaders, therefore, there were both moral/ethical and 
practical reasons for NATO to get involved. As a consequence, France “dropped its 
opposition to NATO taking the lead in Afghanistan’s military operations,”142 enabling the 
NAC’s decision to take over command of ISAF on April 16th, at the formal request of 
Germany, Netherlands, and Canada.
 143
 Essentially, this was a non-contentious way to bring 
the allies back into harmony and give them an area where they could work together 
cooperatively. In a way, the decision was easy because NATO had already become formally 
involved during the ISAF III rotation. There was also continuing consensus that Afghanistan 
would need international assistance over the long term, so the stabilization mission was 
essential, it was considered legitimate, and it was welcomed by the Afghans. The NATO 
commitment was also a way for the allies to signal to the Afghan people that the 
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international community would not abandon them this time, as it had done before. The 
decision was also based on the flawed assessment that the conflict was largely over and that 
stabilization and peace-building would be the primary security mission going forward. The 
allies were confident in their ability to execute such a peace operation given their experience 
in the Balkans. In the end, Iraq contributed to the convergence of political will with regards 
to Afghanistan, due to a shared desire to get past the acrimony, which when combined with 
the shift in strategic culture (global focus) and the perceptions of the conflict led to the 
decision to take over ISAF. 
 The convergence in political will that underlay the decision also manifested 
NATO’s new global perspective as announced at Prague in a concrete way. At the time, the 
Secretary General, Lord Robertson, framed Alliance involvement in Afghanistan as 
necessary to deal with international terrorism and the instabilities generated by failed states 
(through drug and refugee flows)
144
 but the allies were also modest in their initial vision. 
They agreed to execute the ISAF mission under the prevailing UN mandate and did not 
discuss expanding operations outside of Kabul. As military planners began developing the 
operational plans for NATO’s assumption of the ISAF mission, they estimated they would 
be ready to assume the ISAF lead as the GE/NL rotation ended in August 2003.
145
 Given the 
extensive experience military authorities had in planning and executing combat and peace 
operations in the Balkans, which included multiple rotations of command elements through 
SFOR and KFOR, this task was likely simple and straightforward.  
 While an effort was made to clearly distinguish between OEF and ISAF, one NATO 
official calling them “wholly distinct in nature and purpose,”146 and the attempt was made to 
articulate the difference in ISAF’s Military Technical Agreement with the Afghan interim 
authorities,
147
 the lines separating their activities quickly blurred. For example, even though 
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the United States had agreed to be lead nation for building the new Afghan army, British 
forces within ISAF began training a battalion of what was called the Afghan National Guard 
in February 2002, several months before the U.S. training effort had started within the 
structure of OEF and before coalition forces and the Afghan government had agreed on the 
shape and size of the new Afghan National Army (ANA). Similarly, the first units trained 
by OMC-A were assigned to the first corps activated for the ANA, the 201
st
 Corps, or 
Central Corps, based in Kabul. Once the units arrived in the capital, ISAF forces provided 
specialized training, such as checkpoint training by the Italians.
148
 In some cases, OEF and 
ISAF were directly linked. For example, between October 2002 and April 2003 a tri-
national detachment of 18 Danish, Dutch, and Norwegian F-16 fighters and one Dutch 
KDC-10 tanker provided day and night air support to both OEF and ISAF.
149
  
 Despite the emphasis of the contributing nations on maintaining a light footprint, to 
a remarkable degree, the OEF and ISAF coalitions came together quickly and were able to 
seamlessly execute operations in very short order in austere and remote locations. Besides 
the multinational ground operations mentioned earlier (such as Operation Anaconda), by the 
spring of 2002, eight nations were working closely together at the Manas air base. Six 
American and six French bombers were supported by tanker aircraft from Australia and 
France, and transport aircraft from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain, while 
South Korea provided medical support to the entire base. One journalist credited American 
commanders with being able to “quickly [master] the tricky art of integrating forces from a 
number of nations.”150 The mastery was more likely a result of solid organizational capacity 
and cultural familiarity developed through the experiences of operating together in the 
Balkans and decades of training and planning activities among NATO and partner nations. 
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 Operational cooperation and interdependence did not mean contributing nations 
were in unison. The allies and partners had joined the civil and military multinational 
coalitions, volunteered to be lead nations, and in some cases made contributions that were 
historic, such as the British government’s deployment of 1,700 marines and army artillery in 
March 2002, which was the country’s largest combat deployment since the 1991 Gulf 
war.
151
 However, this did not mean they agreed totally with U.S. policy on Afghanistan (or 
the wider war on terrorism). Early on, the EU warned against a disproportionate military 
response and the potential for civilian casualties from collateral damage.
152
 The French 
president emphasized that military action was insufficient to fight international terrorism 
and the long term solution for Afghanistan was political, not military.
153
 There was also 
consistent concern about U.S. unilateralism. However, throughout this period allies and 
partners stayed engaged and cohesion endured within the OEF and ISAF coalitions. This 
was somewhat surprising given there was no vital security threat, so the stakes were low. In 
addition, the coalitions became larger over time and nations did not drop out as free-riders 
even though the burden-sharing was widely disproportionate.  
 The operations in Afghanistan were not something for which NATO had been 
created, but the organization slowly adapted to the changed security environment, when 
members agreed it needed to change. More importantly, members also achieved consensus 
that the Alliance needed to be global. For the major decisions related to ISAF, individual 
members triggered the decision-making processes when they requested the organization 
provide support to ISAF and then take over the mission. Interestingly, it was not the most 
powerful members of the Alliance who initiated these decisions. 
 National reasons for contributing forces for both OEF and ISAF were varied and 
political will was derived from both alliance and domestic influences. Besides the direct 
experience of terrorist attacks and plots by Western European nations, the new NATO 
members and the aspirants shared the concerns about the threat of international terrorism. 
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More importantly, they wanted to fulfill the obligations of Alliance membership, or hoped 
to increase their chances of joining the Alliance as full members sooner rather than later by 
participating in the coalition.
154
 This political will was the initial impetus for coalition 
cohesion. As the conflict changed and a variety of fraying forces surfaced, the allies would 
need operational adaptation to sustain it over time. 
 By the summer of 2003, as NATO prepared to take over the next rotation of ISAF, 
there had been positive and negative developments in the country over the previous two 
years. The political transition road map was being executed largely on time. A loya jirga to 
select the transitional government had met in June 2002, a constitutional commission wrote 
a new constitution and presented it to the Karzai government in March 2003, and planning 
for a constitutional loya jirga (scheduled for October 2003) and voter registration (for the 
2004 national election) was on track. On the development side, girls returned to school in 
the spring of 2002 for the first time since the Taliban came to power and a total of some 
three million children were enrolled in school.
155
 Economically, the newly introduced 
national currency, the afghani, was accepted and stable and the IMF estimated GDP growth 
in 2002 had been 28%.
156
 Mobile phone systems had been built in several cities, major 
infrastructure projects had started, and Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan signed a 
deal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan.
157




 But there were also significant problems. Many of the returned refugees had no 
homes or jobs. Mortality and disease rates remained high.
159
 Opium poppy production 
exploded, 
160
 which funded not only the provincial governors who resisted the authority of 
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the central government (some of them were still called “warlords”), but also criminal 
elements and the emerging insurgent coalition. The training of army and police forces was 
too slow, leading to a security vacuum where violence increased, particularly in the south 
and southeast. By the summer of 2003, aid agencies and the UN suspended their activities in 
the south due to the danger. Donors were also slow to honor their aid pledges. Although 
some $4.5 billion had been pledged at the 2002 international conference in Tokyo, only $1 
billion had shown up.
161
 Perhaps the most significant problem was the rogue provincial 
governors, or “warlords.” Even though former war heroes like Ismail Khan made Herat one 
of the safest cities in Afghanistan, the fact they maintained independent militias, engaged in 
local rivalries, and resisted and undermined the authority of the Karzai government (by, for 
example, Khan keeping customs duties), made them a challenge that had to be addressed.
162
 
Many of them were also brutal, corrupt, and unpopular with local citizens.
163
 Worst of all, 
the fact that the OEF coalition continued to support some of the “warlords,” and relied on 
some local militias and armed groups to hunt down remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban 
undermined the purpose of the DDR program and the building of a legitimate government 
with effective army and police forces. 
 Against this backdrop, the OEF and ISAF coalitions (numbering 11,000 and 6,100 
respectively by August 2003) can be credited with some achievements by the summer of 
2003. Most, if not all terrorist training camps were destroyed. ISAF helped produce a safe 
and booming Kabul.
164
 OMC-A had trained 7,000 Afghan soldiers, although due to high 
attrition rates (which would be an enduring problem), only 4,000 turned up to serve in 
units.
165
 ANA troops were, however, operating in various locations, such as Bamiyan, where 
villagers said they felt safer due to the army’s presence and the activity of the PRT.166 The 
PRTs were contributing to governance and economic development requirements in four 
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regions. However, the PRTs were a drop in the ocean compared to the massive 
requirements, the training efforts were insufficient, and strategically the enemy had not been 
vanquished. The coalitions underestimated how long and difficult the training efforts would 
be, the difficulty of the governance and economic development lines of effort, the danger 
posed by the sanctuaries in Pakistan, and the immense security gap problem in the 
provinces. The inaccurate assessment by the coalitions that combat operations were tailing 
off and their lack of appreciation for the resilience of the Taliban and al Qaeda movements, 
exacerbated by the institutional weakness and corruption of the Afghan government, helped 
create the conditions for the emergence of the insurgent coalition. The NATO decision to 
take over ISAF was made with little appreciation for what the Alliance was getting itself 





AUGUST 2003-SEPTEMBER 2008: NATO GETS INTO THE GAME 
 As NATO prepared to take over ISAF, an overwhelming majority of Afghans 
supported the international mission and were more worried that foreign troops would leave 
the country prematurely than stay too long.
1
 The Alliance’s strategic-level adaptations after 
9/11 (expanded strategic culture, new missions, transformed organizational command 
structures) had laid the support foundations for NATO-led ISAF operations. Both NATO 
and the ISAF coalition had a sense of confidence about the mission based on prior 
experiences (rotating commands, conducting stability operations) and an expectation that 
ISAF would be operating in a relatively benign environment in Kabul.
2
 From 2003 and 
through 2005, the members of the coalition also had the sense the war was largely over 
since violence levels were relatively low and combat activity seemed to be concentrated in 
limited areas in the south and east.
3
 In fact, in 2005 U.S. commanders assessed that the 
cumulative effect of four years of combat, combined with the political and economic 
developments, “had weakened the insurgency to the point of virtual irrelevance.”4 
Condoleezza Rice expressed the Bush administration’s optimism after her visit to the 
country as the Secretary of State in March 2005, “In 2005 we thought that the Afghan 
project was in relatively good shape.”5 
 These assessments turned out to be inaccurate because, after a period of 
reconstitution, insurgent activity and violence gradually increased and expanded 
geographically. By 2006 the insurgent coalition was able to launch a number of large, 
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organized attacks. Because the insurgency progressively worsened to the point where 
Taliban forces actually held terrain, there was a widespread perception that ISAF was failing 
by 2007-2008.
6
 Despite the negative perception, members of the coalition stayed engaged. 
This was due to the two drivers identified in the analytical framework. The ISAF 
commander, General David Richards, starkly articulated the collective strategic political 
reason for the enduring commitment even as the conflict escalated in 2006: “We can’t afford 
to lose this. And we will dig deeper if we have to. If NATO doesn’t succeed in the south, it 
might as well pack up as an international military alliance.”7 Thanks to existing 
organizational capacities, the coalition was able to learn and subsequently adapt 
operationally. In effect, ISAF continually evolved as it created, or assumed control of, new 
command and control structures and undertook new missions as the coalition recognized it 
was in the middle of a complex conflict. The combination of the two drivers sustained 
cohesion and, in the end, ISAF settled down to fight back as well as rebuild. 
 The adaptation was not smooth or problem-free. One could argue this period 
(August 2003-September 2008) was characterized for the ISAF coalition by a posture of 
continuously playing catch-up, because it seemed to be constantly reacting to a situation that 
progressively worsened. The overall goal remained unchanged (prevent Afghanistan from 
reverting back to becoming a safe haven for terrorists by assisting in the creation of a stable 
and secure Afghanistan),
8
 and the strategy remained what came to be called “the 
Comprehensive Approach” at the Riga Summit in November 2006.9 That is, civilian and 
military efforts in the domains of security, development, and governance, but ISAF’s 
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operational approach shifted to encompass counter-insurgency (COIN) operations (as did 
OEF). However, even though combined OEF and ISAF troop numbers gradually increased 
from about 17,000 in August 2003 to over 60,000 in February 2008 (see Appendix 4), none 
of the contributing nations committed adequate resources to pull off the strategy and 
succeed along the three lines of effort, let alone succeed at COIN.  
 This chapter will cover the major developments in both ISAF and OEF during this 
period, as the commands progressively converged. It will also highlight the changing 
character of the conflict, how the coalition responded, and why cohesion endured during 
both the “easy” times (2003-2005) and the “hard” times (2006-2008). 
NATO Deploys and Expands 
 NATO’s assumption of ISAF followed a deliberate institutional process that began 
with decisions by political authorities. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the NAC 
announced in April 2003 that the Alliance would take over the ISAF mission. The NAC 
would exercise overall political direction, in close consultation with non-NATO partners, 
and SHAPE would exercise strategic planning, coordination, command, and control of 
ISAF. Procedurally this would entail the deployment of successive “composite 
headquarters” with personnel augmentation, as necessary, from within NATO and from 
contributing nations, as well as communications and logistic support. Furthermore, the 
SACEUR would choose who the ISAF commander would be from among the contributing 
nations. After the formal announcement, the NAC subsequently tasked the military bodies to 
plan for and execute the ISAF IV rotation, as well as the subsequent rotations (see Appendix 
3).
10
 While NATO’s assumption of lead for ISAF provided long-term coherence and 
stability to the overall command situation, the frequent headquarters rotations meant the 
problem of “learning from scratch” endured for each unit, even for those that deployed more 
than once. However, this was mitigated somewhat because many of the staff personnel were 
rotated in and out of Kabul in a staggered way. This was considered a positive because it 
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made the basic structure more permanent but it also meant some of the staff members were 
always on a steep learning curve. 
 In recognition of the inherently civilian-military nature of NATO’s engagement in 
Afghanistan, the NAC created the position of Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) in 
October 2003. The SCR acted as the civilian counterpart of the ISAF commander and co-
located with him in the headquarters. As such, the SCRs represented “the political 
leadership of the Alliance in Kabul.” The NATO Secretary General appointed the 
successive SCRs, all of whom were experienced European diplomats, parliamentarians, or 
senior government ministers. Their key roles included communicating NATO policy and its 
political-military objectives to local and international media, and liaising and coordinating 
with the Afghan government and civil society, UNAMA, the EU, other representatives of 
the international community and international organizations, and representatives of 
neighboring nations to facilitate development and reconstruction efforts and support the 
political process.
11
 This did not mean things progressed smoothly. According to 
Ambassador Fernando Gentilini, the SCR between 2008 and 2010, “The truth is that when it 
comes down to coordination, everyone wants to coordinate and nobody wants to be 
coordinated.”12 To an extent the SCRs were just another voice in the cacophony of actors 
pursuing what were frequently independent agendas. However, they also served as a direct 
communication channel between ISAF, NATO headquarters in Brussels, and the NAC. This 
meant they could provide critical advice from a political and diplomatic perspective to 
Alliance leaders as they grappled with how to ensure coherence among the security, 
economic development, and governance lines of efforts. 
 The unit designated to form the core nucleus of ISAF IV, the Joint Command 
Center in Heidelberg (one of the Alliance’s two land component commands), received its 
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alert order in June. Since it could only deploy about half its staff (due to ongoing operational 
and exercise commitments in other theaters), SHAPE convened a force generation 
conference that merged together the 120 deploying members of the command with staff 
officers and specialized elements that were already in country and other new national 
contributions. The new headquarters rotation (about 240 personnel) occurred in parallel with 
a new multinational brigade rotation led by Canada. The combined ISAF force included 
6,100 troops from 31 nations.
13
 
 The Alliance’s assumption of ISAF was almost a routine organizational action. It 
had a highly developed organizational capacity to take over this limited mission. It had 
extensive experience from the SFOR and KFOR rotations, both in the actual deployment of 
a succession of commands and in the types of missions performed. It had a command 
structure that readily provided units for deployment as well as training and operational 
direction since the transformation announced at the 2002 Prague Summit was complete: in 
2003, Allied Command Europe (ACE) became Allied Command Operations (ACO) and 
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) became Allied Command Transformation (ACT).
14
 
In addition, the Alliance’s consultation and decision bodies met routinely, with Afghanistan 
at the top of their agendas, the military planning bodies were in constant action,
15
 and senior 
military leaders from SHAPE and JFC Brunssum traveled to Afghanistan almost every 
month.
16
 The NATO ambassadors visited the country annually. The contact was not only 
one way. Besides formal written reports from the ISAF Commander and the SCR, ISAF 
hosted a weekly video teleconference with JFC Brunssum and the ISAF commander 
travelled to Belgium periodically to brief civil and military leaders on what was happening 
in the country, the status of progress or problems, and the coalition’s operational plans.17 
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 When NATO assumed command of ISAF on August 11
th
, 2003, its mission was no 
different from the previous rotations – conducting operations in Kabul and its environs “in 
order to support and assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in developing a safe and stable 
environment.” In practice, ISAF performed political and military functions and the German 
commander, Lieutenant General Götz Gliemeroth, developed a campaign plan with five 
lines of operation which included enhancing security through patrolling activities, 
supporting the security sector reform activities where possible (such as assisting the 
Japanese DDR program and sending their legal advisor out to help the Italian judicial reform 
efforts), supporting the development activities of NGOs, actively maintaining positive 
public perception and public support, and establishing long-term ISAF operating capability 
(by building a permanent headquarters building) since the mission was seen as no-fail for 
NATO. It also considered liaison a key task and it established constant communications 
with the Afghan government, the UN, the command headquarters of OEF (Combined Forces 
Command-Afghanistan, or CFC-A), the coalition contingent commanders, and international 
development agencies. ISAF also began consultation and negotiations with visiting groups 
of national representatives. International interest in participating in Afghanistan was high 
and the visiting delegations asked ISAF “Where might we go? Where [can we] do the most 
good?”18 The headquarters therefore had to quickly develop the capacity to integrate new 
contributions into the areas and missions they best suited. The ISAF staff elements created 
to do this coordination ultimately linked back into NATO’s force generation processes. 
 In the meantime, the interim Karzai government, with UN and U.S. support, had 
continued to ask that ISAF’s mandate be expanded and so on September 18th, after national 
political positions converged, the NAC tasked its military planners to develop options on 
expanding ISAF outside Kabul.
19
 The shift and convergence in political will was influenced 
by the fact that the environment was peaceful in large parts of Afghanistan. The expansion 
was not contentious since ISAF would only be continuing the stability operations it had 
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begun in the capital. The expansion decision was also influenced by alliance and domestic 
politics. According to a former political advisor to the U.S. Mission in NATO, the “allies 
realized it was in their interest as well as ours that we come back together” after the 
damaging split caused by Iraq. The allies’ perception of Afghanistan was that “all the 
fighting, the hot and heavy stuff, it’s over here in the east. OEF is there . . . we won’t have 
to worry about that” because the Americans are taking care of it. Domestically, it was easier 
for the allies “to do something in Afghanistan,” particularly, for those which had opposed 
the Iraq intervention. Politicians in France and Germany could not go back to their publics 
and say “All right, well, you’ve already invaded Iraq so we’ll go in there and help you out.” 
They wanted to heal the Alliance damage “as long as it wasn’t Iraq.”20 On October 6th, 
NATO’s Secretary General informed the UN that NATO was ready to expand and later that 
month the UN Security Council extended the ISAF mandate to cover all of Afghanistan in 
UNSCR 1510.
21
 In December, the NAC authorized the SACEUR to start the expansion and 
ISAF’s first action was to assume responsibility for the PRT in Kunduz, which Germany 
had taken over from the U.S.
22
 
 The initial ISAF expansion plan entailed little more than the assumption of 
responsibility for existing, and creation of new, PRTs, and it was very short on details. It 
was also a very slow, deliberate process that played out over three years (and as it was 
happening OEF was busy establishing PRTs; by 2005 it had 13 in the south and east). Each 
phase of the four-stage expansion began with an announcement by senior NATO officials, 
followed by ISAF operational action. In June 2004, at the Istanbul Summit, Alliance 
officials announced ISAF would take over the British PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif and establish 
three additional PRTs in the north (in Meymaneh, Feyzabad, and Pol-e-Khomri). Once they 
were stood up in October 2004, Stage 1, into the north, was considered complete. In 
February 2005, NATO announced ISAF would expand into the west.  It took over the PRTs 
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in Herat and Farah in May and established two new ones in Chaghcharan and Qala-i-Naw in 
September. This completed Stage 2.
23
  
 The actual ISAF presence on the ground, after these stages, was nine PRTs and two 
forward support bases (FSBs) in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat which provided logistical 
support to the PRTs.
24
 The presence was overlapped by OEF forces because by 2004, CFC-
A had realized it needed to establish a permanent presence across the country; it could not 
rely on basing the bulk of its forces in Kabul, its environs, and a few forward operating 
bases and sending troops out for operations for discrete periods of time, particularly since it 
had introduced a new approach – COIN – in the fall of 2003. Therefore, in 2004 and 2005, 
various task forces subordinate to CJTF-76 were assigned geographic operational areas and 
as a consequence they established new commands that became known as Regional 
Command (RC)-South, RC-East, RC-West and RC-North.
25
 
 Since the period 2003 to 2005 was “quiet,” the operational overlapping of OEF and 
ISAF was not considered a critical issue. More importantly, the low level of organized 
violence in the majority of the country, and the sense the conflict was over, did not lead to 
an unraveling of the ISAF coalition even though there was no significant security threat that 
could serve as a bonding agent. Instead, step by step the coalition grew larger (both in terms 
of the number of troops deployed and number of contributing nations), it assumed a larger 
geographic footprint, and it expanded its missions and activities. Coalition members 
recognized there was a massive need for development activities in the regions and they 
wanted to assist the Afghan government establish its legitimacy with the population. In the 
absence of faster, more comprehensive civilian development efforts, they needed to get 
involved to kick start activities. Their experience in the Balkans gave them confidence they 
could undertake this mission. They also assumed the areas would remain “permissive,” or 
calm and stable, particularly in the north and west, so the reconstruction and governance 
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activities would be relatively simple to coordinate and oversee. Thus, it did not matter very 
much that the expansion plan was thin on details, especially since they did not think they 
would be deployed in the country very long. 
 The allied perceptions and assumptions reinforced national decisions (political will) 
to contribute to NATO’s ISAF. The decisions were based on a variety of national interests 
that derived from domestic and alliance politics. Some nations, such as Canada and New 
Zealand, were involved for humanitarian reasons to assist a stricken nation.
26
 For the United 
States, it was the right thing to do since Afghanistan had been abandoned after the Soviet-
Afghan war.
27
 Sweden decided it could not remain “neutral” in a security environment 
threatened by international terrorism, but because it would not involve itself in combat 
activity it volunteered to lead the multinational PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif.
28
 Canada 
contributed one of the largest contingents and volunteered to lead the ISAF V rotation 
because it did not want to become involved in Iraq
29
 (thus nations could have multiple 
reasons for contributing). Norway contributed and stayed due to loyalty to the United States 
and to NATO.
30
 Spain contributed initially because it wanted to be taken seriously as a top 
tier member of the international community. Later it wanted to continue to be seen as a 
reliable ally despite Iraq. That is, Spain withdrew from Iraq after the Madrid bombing, but 
the new Socialist government of Prime Minister José Zapatero wanted to communicate it 
still valued NATO, so it increased its troop contribution to Afghanistan.
31
 Other countries 
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wanted to demonstrate their value in a complex global security environment as new or 
aspiring Alliance members. Small nations like Lithuania and Croatia not only wanted to be 
members of a security organization that shared their values and interests, but also because 
joining was seen as a form of protection against external threats.
32
 For Albania it was about 
more than just earning an invitation to join NATO. According to Albanian officers who 
served in Afghanistan, their country harbors a fierce loyalty toward the United States. They 
credit their current existence as a nation to U.S. support after World War II and as such 
“they will always be our allies . . . they will follow America anywhere, anytime, to do 
anything.”33 In addition, there was a desire to repair the frayed relationships caused by the 
Iraq intervention and Afghanistan seemed a good vehicle to bring the allies back into 
harmony.
34
 The allies reiterated at the 2004 Istanbul Summit they wanted to ensure the 
country did not slide back into being a sanctuary for international jihadism,
35
 especially 
since al Qaeda and its affiliates continued attacks in Europe and around the world, such as: 
November 2003 Istanbul bombings (57 killed; 700 wounded); March 2004 Madrid 
bombings (191 killed, 1,500 wounded); and July 2005 London suicide bombings (56 killed, 
over 700 wounded). Numerous plots were also discovered and prevented in the UK, 
Belgium, Spain, Germany, France, and the Netherlands.
36
 The international jihadist threat 
therefore remained real for the allies. The combination of confidence (from organizational 
capacity) and commitment (political will) led to a level of cohesion within ISAF. 
 The cohesion did not prevent ISAF from having an ad hoc character. During the 
first two expansion stages, the political and strategic level authorities issued very little 
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concrete guidance to the ISAF commanders. According to General Rick Hillier, who 
commanded ISAF V between February and August 2004, JFC Brunssum did not provide a 
military strategy for the expansion and did not articulate what NATO was trying to achieve 
or how it would do it.
37
 This left a lot of room for the commanders on the ground to figure 
out how to execute the mission, especially since PRTs were adapted to the needs and 
conditions of the regions in which they were located. General Hillier’s criticism indicated he 
was uncomfortable with the light touch of the strategic civilian and military leaders in 
NATO however this attitude gave him and the later ISAF commanders a lot of autonomy 
which proved useful as the conflict changed and learning occurred. They had the latitude 
and the authority to adapt operations when they felt they needed to do so. 
 NATO supported ISAF operations as best it could and it was often less than perfect. 
For example, it had some difficulties initially in fielding necessary enabling capabilities. 
NATO leaders had trouble convincing members to contribute sufficient aviation assets 
(tactical airlift and close air support) and quick reaction forces to support the PRTs.
38
 This 
resulted in wide diversity in the size, structure, and actions of the individual PRTs. The fact 
that NATO leaders such as the Secretary General and the SACEUR followed the expansion 
announcements with pleas for nations to volunteer to establish, lead, or contribute to new 
PRTs and to provide enabling capabilities 
39
 probably exacerbated the situation. It created 
the impression that NATO was constantly catching up with itself as it undertook and 
expanded ISAF. 
 The general idea in the expansion plan was to help the Afghan government establish 
its presence in the provinces by assisting local authorities with reconstruction and security. 
It was thought the ISAF PRTs would support and coordinate the work of humanitarian aid 
and development agencies, rather than doing the bulk of the reconstruction work 
                                                 
37
 Hillier, A Soldier First, 290. 
38
 Nicholas Fiorenza, “NATO Seeks More Troops for ISAF in Afghanistan,” DefenseNews, 
November 8, 2004. 
39






 According to General Jean-Louis Py, who commanded the ISAF VI rotation, 
it did not work out that way, however, since development money was slow to manifest and 
major projects took time to culminate. Since expectations were very high, on the part of the 
international community and the Afghans, that development and reconstruction results 
would appear quickly, the PRTs got involved in quick impact projects and progressively 
became more directly involved in reconstruction and development activities,
41
 especially as 
the security situation worsened in 2006 and aid agencies withdrew from some rural areas. 
The increase in insurgent violence affected the next two stages of the ISAF expansion. 
 In December 2005, NATO announced ISAF would expand into the south.
42
 Not 
long afterwards, in February 2006, the Norwegian PRT in Meymaneh, in Faryab Province, a 
region that had hitherto been quite peaceful, was attacked. Given the way ISAF was 
structured in this northern region, there were no combat forces available to come to its aid, 
and the national caveats of nearby coalition nations prohibited them from participating in 
combat operations. Eventually British forces deployed to the area and saved the PRT.
43
 The 
growing recognition that an insurgency was rising and the current form of the NATO 
footprint was woefully insufficient, led to adaptation and the implementation of a proposal 
that had been percolating at NATO since the fall of 2005 for ISAF to officially assume the 
lead role in all of the regions.
44
    





The Stage 3 ISAF expansion into the south on July 31st entailed it taking over command of 
RC-South, all the battle groups in the region, and four PRTs.
46
 Contributing nations also 
deployed additional forces into the region, bringing ISAF totals up to 15,000 troops from 37 
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 Most notably, the nations deployed in the south imposed virtually no caveats on 
how their forces could operate.
48
 The Stage 4 expansion into the east was similar. ISAF 





Italy also assumed command of RC-West and ISAF created RC-Capital during the year.
50
  
 During the first few years of NATO taking over ISAF and the command expanding 
operationally throughout the country (2003-2005) there were few forces fraying coalition 
cohesion because violence levels were low and insurgent activity disparate. This reinforced 
the allied perception the conflict was over and the assumption the environment would 
remain benign, and it contributed to the sense of confidence about the mission. Conducting 
stability operations through patrols and ANSF training and overseeing governance, 
reconstruction, and development activities was not something totally new due to the Balkans 
experience. However, despite the belief in the legitimacy of the mission and the multiple 
national reasons for joining (which aided the convergence of political will into the decision 
to take over ISAF and expand), nations were reluctant to commit substantial forces – the 
rationale for maintaining a light footprint was a useful excuse – which ultimately had 
significant negative consequences because it allowed a security vacuum to develop. The 
nature of the ISAF expansion also allowed the development of a complicated relationship 
with OEF and U.S. forces. 
 OEF Evolves and Expands 
 While ISAF was expanding, OEF was also adapting and changing. The adaptations 
included new organizational structures and new missions. OEF’s expansion into 
reconstruction and training activities, as well as its continuing security operations, along 
with the requirement to coordinate closely with the Afghan government, the UN, coalition 
partners and ISAF, and governmental and non-governmental development organizations 
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was too much for the CJTF-180 commander to handle. Therefore, CENTCOM decided to 
create Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) which stood up in October 2003. 
This was a theater strategic headquarters that concentrated on political-military affairs (it 
essentially mirrored the ISAF headquarters). In particular the new commander, Lieutenant 
General David Barno, concentrated on building a strong relationship with the Afghan 
government and harmonizing civilian and military efforts through close coordination with 
the U.S. Embassy and ISAF.
51
 The existing commands of CJTF-180 and OMC-A were 
subordinated to it (see Appendix 2). With the creation of CFC-A, OEF was no longer 
temporary or short-term. Lieutenant General Barno transitioned the command and mission 
to a long-term posture and as such it built permanent basing infrastructure. 
 More importantly, Lieutenant General Barno assessed that previous OEF efforts had 
been too focused on enemy forces. His longer term view, based on an overall objective that 
was similar to the ISAF goal, concluded that OEF needed to shift its focus to “rebuilding the 
physical and social infrastructure” of Afghanistan so that the people would support the 
nascent Afghan government and reject the Taliban and its associated groups. He therefore 
implemented a campaign plan, which his successor continued, that involved five lines of 
operation. The “Defeat Terrorism and Deny Sanctuary” line involved special forces counter-
terrorism activities against al Qaeda and traditional COIN operations that involved combat 
operations against insurgents, negotiations with rival groups, and reconstruction. The 
“Enable Afghan Security Structure” line involved rebuilding and training the Afghan 
security forces (both army and police). The “Sustain Area Ownership” line involved 
creating regional commands and permanently deploying forces in them. The “Enable 
Reconstruction and Good Governance” line was undertaken by the PRTs, and the “Engage 
Regional States” line involved coordination with bordering nations. It was a very ambitious 
campaign plan that suffered from serious resourcing shortfalls. CFC-A never received 
enough combat forces to “hold” territory and secure the population in the provinces in the 
absence of sufficient Afghan security forces and it even had difficulty fully manning the 
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headquarters. Coalition partners were slow to contribute officers to the multinational staff 




 There were also major changes within OMC-A as its mission expanded. As noted in 
the previous chapter, CJTF Phoenix was created in June 2003 to execute the building of the 
ANA and this was a hugely ambitious multinational undertaking that involved the creation 
of a new Afghan Army from the ground up. The program was developed in consultation 
with Afghan leadership and involved basic training for enlisted soldiers (U.S. lead), officer 
training (France lead), and non-commissioned officer training (UK lead) at KMTC.
53
 The 
troops were then equipped and formed into units. The ANA plan approved by the Karzai 
government in 2002 called for the activation of five regional Afghan Corps: 201
st
 Corps in 
Kabul, 203
rd
 Corps in Gardez, 205
th
 Corps in Kandahar, 207
th





 To the extent possible, the Afghan Corps headquarters were 
located in proximity to OEF’s regional commands. After Afghan battalions, called kandaks, 
were formed in KMTC, they were posted to the Afghans Corps and CJTF Phoenix 
continued their training through multinational ETTs. Rather than conducting individual 
training, the ETTs engaged in collective training of squads, platoons, and companies. They 
also mentored leaders at the battalion, company, and platoon level, as well as staff officers. 
In addition, they accompanied kandaks on operational missions as advisers.
55
 ISAF got 
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 Corps was activated first, in the fall of 2003, and received a full complement of battalions 
and brigades (10,000 troops) by mid 2004. In the latter half of 2004, the MOD activated the four 
other Corps and CJTF Phoenix started training their forces. By 2005, all of the Afghan Corps had 
sufficient troop strength to support the parliamentary election. 
55
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involved in the collective training effort in 2005 when the PRTs began training Afghan 
security forces, too.
56
 It called the teams Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams 
(OMLTs), not ETTs, and they were eventually embedded into Afghan units.  
 This building of the Afghan Corps process shared the ad hoc, or catching-up, 
character of ISAF. For example, the first kandaks for the 209
th
 Corps began arriving at 
Mazar-e-Sharif in RC-North in February 2005, but they had no billets. Their permanent base 
was still in the process of being built, so the ETT had to find them temporary billets at a 
satellite camp while also coordinating the contract to build and open their base.
57
 
 Besides training, OMC-A also had overall responsibility for overseeing and 
coordinating security sector reform activities, so this was an area that overlapped ISAF. One 
activity in particular was critical for long-term security: the collection and cantonment of 
heavy weapons and the demobilization of the militias. It was only through a successful DDR 
program and the building up of the ANA that the U.S. could stop the corrosive policy of 
relying on Afghan militias. OMC-A also had the mission to reform the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) and create the General Staff. It did this primarily through a mentoring program that 
initially relied on U.S. soldiers and contractors. However, allies were also asked to assist 
OMC-A with the defense mentoring program.
58
 Ministry mentoring was mirrored by ISAF 
when General Hillier agreed to a Karzai request to help the Afghans build “a functioning 
government structure.” Hillier established a Strategic Advisory Team that worked for Karzai 
and the Afghan government between 2004 and 2008. The Canadian military officers and 
civil servants who comprised the team were assigned within a variety of Afghan ministries 
and they advised various ministers on how to do strategic planning, they explained 
budgetary processes, and they educated Afghans on inter-governmental coordination 
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 As the next chapter will describe, these initial mentoring efforts were eventually 
expanded into a formal ministerial mentoring program and subsumed into NTM-A. 
 OMC-A expanded into police training in 2005. The German-led ANP development 
program was oriented on training traditional law enforcement methods and it was slow to 
produce sufficient trained police officers.
60
 The German efforts were hampered by funding 
and personnel shortages.
61
  By December 2004, there were 33,000 police on duty to support 
a population of some 27 million Afghans in a country the size of France (the ANA 
numbered 18,000 at the time).
62
 As the insurgency heated up and violence levels increased, 
the country needed significantly more police forces with a more expanded set of skills so 
they could assist the ANA in protecting the population, but the German program was 
constrained by national caveats and could not meet this demand.
63
 The coalition had 
unintentionally allowed a serious security gap to open and it needed to quickly catch-up the 
Afghan security forces to meet the challenge.  
 In late 2004, OMC-A was tasked to study the program. The ANA training program 
was considered both comprehensive and successful and Lieutenant General Barno wanted 
OMC-A to see if it could replicate the program for the ANP. After developing “a detailed 
plan for restructuring the ANP training program” and gaining the approval of the Germans, 
NATO, the UN, and the Afghan government, OMC-A was officially assigned the mission in 
July 2005. It was intended to support the German effort. As a result, OMC-A was renamed 
the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSC-A) and it stood up CJTF Police, 
which paralleled CJTF Phoenix. The next year, OSC-A was renamed the Combined Security 
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 For all intents and purposes, the United 
States became the lead nation for police training. It was also an embarrassing demonstration 
of the lack of allied will to commit sufficient resources to the effort and the 
unacknowledged need for U.S. leadership. With the increased American involvement came 




 The reformed ANP training program was just as ambitious as the ANA program. It 
not only involved training the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), or the regular, local 
uniformed police, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a gendarmerie-like 
elite force, and the Afghan Border Police (ABP), but also reforming the Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) through mentoring. The plan emphasized quality over quantity (since attrition and 
corruption were major problems) and included equipping, reforming recruitment methods, 
pay improvements, and the building of infrastructure (these included the Wardak Police 
Academy and regional training centers).
66
 Like the ANA program, training continued after 
police officers were posted to their duty stations. CJTF Police created Police Mentoring 
Teams (PMT), which mirrored the ANA’s ETTs.67 ISAF also got involved, but it called the 
teams Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLT).
68
  
 In addition, the ANP program adapted over time, in response to changing conditions 
and other emerging challenges. As the insurgency heated up, the Taliban and associated 
groups increasingly targeted police officers and assaulted police facilities to undermine 
morale and recruitment efforts. By 2008, ANP deaths were triple ANA deaths. Furthermore, 
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many local police were implicated in criminal activity and were perceived as corrupt by the 
public. To improve the capabilities of the AUP and overcome cultural conditions that 
encouraged corruption, CSTC-A implemented the Focused District Development (FDD) 
program in 2007.
69
 This ambitious program aimed to reform police at the district level by 
pulling out the entire district police force for reconstitution, equipping, and a special eight 
week training program at the regional training centers. They were backfilled by ANCOP 
forces while they were absent. When they returned, they were assigned PMTs to continue 
their development.
70
 In addition, judges and prosecutors in the districts were given special 
training and police infrastructure was repaired.
71
 By August 2008, 31 police districts had 
gone through FDD.
72
 Where it was implemented, the program was largely successful, but 
due to shortfalls in resources (money and trainers) it was not possible to implement it in all 
365 districts. To maximize impact, CSTC-A concentrated on districts that had particular 




 The countries and entities involved in police training also changed over time. Given 
the enduring challenges to the German training efforts, ISAF’s SCR urged the EU to step in 
and help both police and judiciary efforts in November 2006.
74
 NATO’s Secretary General 
followed up the request in early 2007.
75
 After consultation and consideration, the EU took 
over from Germany in mid-2007. The EU mission, EUPOL, attempted to tie together the 
non-U.S. efforts and coordinate activities with the UN and CSTC-A, but it was seriously 
under-staffed (there were only 184 people assigned to the mission by the end of 2008) and 
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suffered logistical and funding problems. Furthermore, its personnel were dispersed into 
PRTs and the ISAF regional commands.
76
 In the end, the police training and reform efforts 
were a complex, and in some cases disappointing, example of interlocking international 
institutions. CSTC-A, ISAF, the EU, and the UN were involved and a number of countries 
also had bilateral efforts, including the UK, U.S., Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Canada. The various efforts were poorly coordinated and the establishment of the 
International Policing Coordination Board, chaired by the Afghan Minister of Interior, did 
not solve the problem. Despite the EU contributions to police development and reform, the 
U.S. and CSTC-A efforts dwarfed everything else. Furthermore, CSTC-A’s involvement 
raised concerns that Afghan police would become too militarized, particularly since it was 
increasingly used to help the ANA in fighting insurgent forces.
77
 As the next chapter will 
show, this was later addressed by ISAF when NTM-A was established. 
 The final OEF changes involved command and control. The U.S. combat forces and 
PRTs in RC-South and RC-East transferred under ISAF, and thus foreign, command in 2006 
in Stages 3 and 4 of the expansion. This was a first (since World War II) for the United 
States and the issue was discussed well in advance of the expansion.
78
 Coordination for the 
remaining U.S. forces in OEF was also discussed in advance. The final arrangement was 
rather unorthodox. According to General David Richards, who commanded the ISAF IX 
rotation, May 2006-February 2007, coordination with OEF forces was made through his 
Deputy Commander for Security, a U.S. two star general. General Richards maintained he 
had no problems with the arrangement and that all U.S. forces, both those within ISAF and 
the remaining OEF elements, operated in line with his intent.
79
 However, this was really just 
an informal arrangement based on good personal relations between U.S. and UK senior 
leaders. With the consequent operational reduction in OEF command responsibility in 
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theater, CENTCOM made the decision to de-activate CFC-A shortly after Lieutenant 
General Karl Eikenberry relinquished command in January 2007.
80
  This left major military 
elements in Afghanistan which did not come under formal ISAF control. They officially 
belonged, and reported separately, to CENTCOM: CSTC-A with its expanding training 
mission; CJSOTF-A, with its special forces operations; and a task force that conducted 
detainee operations. Even after an American became the ISAF commander in 2007, the 
Deputy Commander for Security continued to be the coordination point between ISAF and 
OEF forces, until late 2008.
81
 These command and control changes further blended the 
original OEF and ISAF missions, but they also partially disconnected the security and 
reconstruction activities from the training efforts for almost three years. 
 The disjointed nature of military operations, combined with the continuing problem 
of insufficient forces, contributed to the coalitions’ failure to secure the population and 
achieve in a durable manner the security objectives. On the other hand, the foundations laid 
by CSTC-A, particularly the building of basing and training infrastructure and the creation 
of the nascent ANSF forces, later proved useful to ISAF. As the next chapter will show, 
when the training mission was subsumed into ISAF in 2009, it had a foundation to build 
upon. In the meantime, ISAF was about to face its toughest test. 
Fighting Heats Up 
 The other reason OEF and ISAF missions increasingly blurred together was because 
ISAF could not avoid combat operations as the insurgency heated up. In particular, contrary 
to the expectations reflected in the strategic guidance, Operation Plan 10302, NATO issued 
in December 2005 for the next stages of the expansion,
82
 the Canadian, British, and other 
coalition forces in RC-South could not just conduct reconstruction and development 
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activities, because they found themselves in the middle of serious combat operations by the 
summer of 2006. That year was a major test for the Alliance and ISAF because the 
organized nature of insurgent operations shattered the assumptions of the allies. By the end 
of that year, the ISAF coalition could no longer maintain it was only there to do stabilization 
and peace operations. The pressure of intense combat operations could have been a 
destructive fraying force, but rather than falling apart, the forces in RC-South knuckled 
under and fought, and ISAF shifted its operational approach, even as forces remained thin. 
 As previously mentioned, the insurgent coalition had a strategy that it began to 
implement in 2002. The core Taliban leadership that had escaped in 2001 did not accept that 
they had been defeated and they did not accept the new Afghan government. They believed 
it was their religious duty to continue fighting. They primarily spent 2002 re-organizing, 
resuscitating networks, recruiting, and establishing training camps and bases in Pakistan. By 
2003, Phase I had begun: infiltration into the east, southeast, and southern areas of 
Afghanistan. Small teams began recruiting local fighters and they assessed which villages 
were receptive to the insurgents. If necessary, they used hostile methods to gain influence 
over local communities: threats, night letters, or assassination of anyone who cooperated 
with the government (police, doctors, teachers, judges, clerics, government officials, and 
NGOs).
83
 There were also sporadic attacks, primarily rockets and mortar fire, on coalition 
forces in the south and east.
84
 
 By 2004, Phase II had begun which included consolidation of base areas in 
Afghanistan, the creation of authority structures in safe areas, and small scale attacks.
85
 
Insurgent consolidation efforts were aided by the light footprint of coalition and Afghan 
security forces; there was no one to stop them. They were also aided by the institutional 
weakness of the Karzai government which had a minimal presence outside Kabul (and some 
Taliban recruitment was the result of the predations of government officials), the autonomy 
of the provincial governors (some of whom sided with the insurgents in the context of local 
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power struggles), and the complex networks of criminal activity and corruption (for 
example, some Afghans joined the Taliban as a response to poppy eradication because they 
had no livelihood alternatives).
86
 The Taliban and its associates were experts at capitalizing 
on and manipulating the cultural, economic, and political conditions in the provinces which 
helped facilitate their return.
87
 However, they were more successful in some areas than 
others in consolidating their presence. In the east, the insurgents operated freely in Kunar, 
Nuristan, and the north of Laghman. In the southeast, they established a presence in Ghazni 
and parts of Paktika and Paktia. They were most successful in the south. Most of Zabul 
came under insurgent control by 2004. Much of the countryside in Helmand was under de 
facto Taliban control by 2006, and insurgents penetrated into Kandahar in 2006 and 
Uruzgan in 2007.
88
    
 With the consolidations, insurgent tactics changed. In 2004, attacks against coalition 
FOBs increased to almost daily. They involved not only rockets, mortar fire, and snipers, 
but also assaults and ambushes by small groups of insurgents. Attacks against Afghan 
security forces, Afghan officials, and aid workers also continued and they were not confined 
to the eastern-southern border region. The insurgents also began kidnappings and they used 
suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) more frequently. They also 
attacked reconstruction projects. By 2005, there were approximately 50 attacks a month 
against coalition and Afghan security forces, as well as infrastructure.
89
 
 By late 2005, the insurgent coalition included ideologically motivated “hard core” 
jihadists, local recruits who joined for a wide variety of reasons (such as local power 
struggles, resentment at coalition heavy-handedness and collateral damage, need for money, 
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etc.), a small number of mercenaries, and the Haqqani and Hekmatyr groups. The coalition 
was so confident of its strength in the south by 2006 that it moved into Phase III, large 
coordinated offensives.
90
 The attacks were given religious justification by Mullah Omar’s 
Taliban which issued a fatwa in 2005 that ordered the death of all infidels and others who 
supported the Afghan government.
91
 
 Between March and July, the insurgents launched a series of attacks against the 
Canadians in Kandahar and then massed in Pashmul, about 20 kilometers from Kandahar 
City, for what appeared to be an imminent major attack in August.
92
 The British also found 
themselves in serious, constant combat operations as soon as they deployed into northern 
Helmand province in the summer.
93
 The attacks had multiple objectives. Antonio Giustozzi 
assessed the insurgents were so confident of their strength they actually thought they could 
launch a final set of offensives and win the war. This did not turn out to be the case because, 
unexpectedly for the insurgents, ISAF fought back and inflicted hundreds of casualties.
94
 
However, the insurgents were also well aware of the ISAF expansion phases and there was 
evidence the insurgent attacks were to test ISAF resolve. Taliban propagandists explicitly 
stated they wanted to discourage ISAF members from deploying troops in the south.
95
 
Failing that, they hoped to force the European troops to withdraw because they believed 
they were weak and would “run away” if they were struck hard.96 In fact, ISAF intelligence 
sources intercepted message traffic in December 2005 in which Taliban leaders talked 
“about targeting the Dutch and other NATO countries to try to get them to retreat, as the 
Spaniards did out of Iraq.”97 The insurgents were also initially supremely confident of their 
abilities. One Taliban spokesman declared, “We are here to destroy the British.”98 
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It was clear for ISAF, as soon as it expanded into the south in 2006, that its original 
plan to conduct reconstruction, development, and governance activities, primarily with 
PRTs,
99
 was insufficient. It had a full blown, well-established insurgency on its hands and 
its military footprint was too light. The previous concerns about creating dependency and 
being perceived as an occupation force were irrelevant, especially since the Afghan 
government and security forces could not fill the gap. In addition, the efforts by Pakistan to 
clear its tribal areas of militants failed in the years before 2008. Initially it relied on the 
poorly trained and equipped Frontier Corps, a locally raised paramilitary force in the FATA, 
but even after it began sending large numbers of Army troops into the autonomous 
provinces in 2005, they suffered embarrassing defeats and heavy casualties at the hands of 
the insurgents. This led to a series of peace agreements that ultimately failed in 2007 when 
Pakistani insurgent groups launched a widespread rebellion. Pakistan also allegedly 
responded quickly to U.S. demands to seal the border after 9/11. It established some 1,000 
border posts along its 2,500 kilometer border with Afghanistan, but this was an impossible 
task given the extreme nature of the terrain: high mountains and deep ravines that could not 
be visually policed. The Pakistani military forces were further seriously hampered by their 
lack of ground and air mobility assets (4-wheel drive vehicles and helicopters).
100
 The 
insurgent coalition’s sanctuary in Pakistan was therefore secure for years after 2001 and 
guaranteed the next phase of the conflict.  
 The massing of insurgent forces in Pashmul was the precipitating agent for NATO’s 
first conventional land battle in its history.
101
 According to General Richards, Operation 
Medusa was “a Second World War-style battle for Kandahar.”102 Over the course of two 
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weeks, 1-14 September 2006, Canadian, U.S., and Afghan combat forces, who were assisted 
by British, Danish, Dutch, and French close air, artillery, and other support, assaulted 
Taliban forces who had established themselves in fortified defensive positions.
103
 The 
operation was tactically successful. Hundreds of insurgents were killed and the Taliban did 
not launch any further major operations that year.
104
 However, it was not a glittering 
example of coalition warfare because requests before the operation by the RC-South 
commander, Brigadier General David Fraser, for combat troops from the European allies 
were refused. He stated in frustration, “We found out what NATO could not do. We simply 
couldn’t get everyone we needed . . . the Germans wouldn’t come down here; the French 
company weren’t allowed to come down here; and I couldn’t get the Italians . . .” He added 
that many of the enablers he requested, such as intelligence and aviation support, came with 
restrictions due to national caveats.
105
 Strategically, the operation was a draw because even 
though ISAF did not have sufficient forces to consolidate security and ensure the Taliban 
did not come back to the area later, the battle itself was a significant psychological victory 
for the coalition. It demonstrated to the Afghans they could trust ISAF’s capabilities and it 
made the Taliban take ISAF seriously.
106
 
 Due to the changed character of the conflict and allied recognition that the war was 
not over, ISAF adapted. It instituted counter-insurgency operations under General Richards 
during ISAF IX. ISAF was essentially forced into combat operations by the large, 
coordinated insurgent attacks. To further complicate matters, conditions varied widely 
across the provinces. As a consequence, contributing nations implemented different versions 
of COIN.  
 For example, U.S. forces in RC-East applied a “clear, hold, build, and engage” 
approach in the Korengal Valley in the spring of 2006. The approach relied on the 
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construction of combat outposts and inserting ANA and ANP forces into them. Afghan 
security forces, with U.S. support, were expected to underpin subsequent development and 
governance activities. The approach was repeated in several other operations later in the 
year.
107
 The Dutch deployed into Uruzgan in August 2006 expecting the same kind of 
“welcome” the Canadians had received in Kandahar. However, they entered and operated in 
the province in a very different way. They were much more cautious. They did not build 
fortified combat outposts; instead they built “multi-functional qalas” which were Pashtun-
inspired traditional houses with a guest room for visitors. They also emphasized talking and 
negotiation – with local residents, with local government, and with the Taliban. They 
literally tried to come in and operate without fighting. By the time the first rotation of Dutch 
troops departed the region, they had coordinated the building of roads, bridges, schools and 
clinics, and they had engaged in no combat actions. Over the course of four months, they 
encountered only 18 roadside bombs and seven ambushes, and no soldiers were killed in 
action.
108
 In contrast, the British and Canadians each suffered 36 soldier fatalities that year 
which were significant increases over the previous years.
109
  
 It must be noted that COIN is not a simple approach. Some coalition actions that 
made sense from a governance perspective actually created more conflict. For example, the 
British took seriously the problem of corrupt provincial leaders and the corrosive effect they 
had on the population. However their successful pressuring of the Afghan government to 
remove a powerful “warlord,” Sher Mohammed, from the Helmand provincial governorship 
in December 2005 because he was deeply involved in narcotics trafficking had seriously 
negative consequences over the course of the next year. Sher Mohammed resented being 
removed from a lucrative power position and even though he became a senator in Kabul he 
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had lost face at the hands of foreigners.
110
 He therefore played both sides in 2006. He 
claimed allegiance to Karzai but he also ordered his militia to fight with the Taliban 
coalition against the British.
111
 Thus a political action directly contributed to the increase in 
violence in Helmand as the British arrived. 
 General Richards understood that the military operations were insufficient in the 
long-run. Short term tactical military successes had to be followed up by governance, 
reconstruction, and development activities.
112
 He had wide latitude to adjust ISAF’s 
operational approach and he experimented with various mechanisms to ensure a more 
effective comprehensive approach; under his command ISAF seemed to demonstrate it was 
a multinational operational force trying to learn and adapt. He created an international 
civilian think tank on his staff to encourage broad and creative thinking. He made an overt 
effort to include civilian advisors into planning and decision efforts to ensure ISAF did not 
default into a “military solution” mode. More importantly, his command identified that one 
of their most serious challenges was the mismatch between the development aspirations 
stated in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and local capacity. There 
was no process to align intent and action or to ensure “the right project happens in the right 
place and without unnecessary delay.”113 To correct this deficiency, ISAF, with the support 
of President Karzai, created the Policy Action Group (PAG) which included the president, 
key Afghan ministers (security, foreign affairs, finance, rural development, and education), 
and all the key international players (EU, NATO/ISAF, OEF, UN, World Bank, relevant 
ambassadors, and development agencies). This executive group made decisions on where to 
focus efforts and spending. The decisions were translated into actions in Afghan 
Development Zones (ADZ). This was essentially an “ink-spot” approach that concentrated 
reconstruction, development, and governance efforts in secure but strategically important 
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areas that were small to begin with but could be expanded.
114
 The initiative ran out of steam 
when General Richards rotated out of command, but a version of his initiative was 
resuscitated under General Stanley McChrystal when he assumed command of ISAF in 
2009. This was an inherent deficiency of the constant ISAF command rotations. Learning 
could be lost and initiatives die since each new commander had different priorities. 
 The unexpected combat challenges of 2006 did not result in an unraveling of the 
coalition. All 26 NATO members remained in ISAF, along with 11 partners. Surprisingly, 
cohesion endured, despite bitter recriminations among the contributing nations. For 
example, British and Canadian political leaders severely criticized the restrictions of other 
countries (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) that kept their troops away from the more 
dangerous south.
115
 There were also bitter debates within countries: Romano Prodi’s 
coalition government in Italy was repeatedly challenged by radical leftists who demanded 
the country pull its troops out of Afghanistan. It maintained its commitment only by 
initiating a vote of confidence.
116
 The primary strategic driver holding the coalition together 
was fear of the consequences of failure. NATO leaders acknowledged the Alliance’s 
credibility was on the line in Afghanistan and they stated so explicitly at the Riga Summit in 
November.
117
 ISAF could not afford to be defeated by the insurgent coalition because of the 
repercussions such a major operational failure would have on the Alliance as a whole. This 
was the main cohesive glue that sustained political will and held the coalition together in 
2006. As such, it generated repeated requests for more troops by NATO’s leaders and the 
ISAF commander.
118
 Some countries refused, such as Turkey,
119
 but others responded 
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quickly and agreed to send more troops: Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, and Spain.
120
 Latvia agreed to increase its 
contributions to ISAF because it took its collective security responsibilities seriously; it did 
not want to be a “passive consumer of security” and so this small Baltic state stretched itself 
to participate in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and Iraq.
121
 Furthermore, Alliance members 
gave their permission for ISAF to conduct combat operations,
122
 and after repeated 
complaints about restrictive national caveats, there was agreement on loosening them. 
France, Germany, and Italy agreed to send troops to other regions in emergencies at Riga.
123
 
Thus, the Alliance’s organizational capacity to adapt to the changed conditions in 
Afghanistan at the strategic and operational levels continued, although it was painful and 
major disagreements still endured. In 2005, the United States had proposed that NATO 
should “eventually take command of the entire Afghan mission” and it maintained this 
preference for combining NATO-led and U.S.-led forces into 2006. However, France, 
Germany, and Spain opposed the idea because they wanted to retain the distinction between 
ISAF (peacekeeping) and OEF (offensive combat).
124
 Over time, the distinction lost its 
meaning, paving the way for a full merging in 2009 and 2010. 
 The maintenance of cohesion and willingness to fight (by some) meant the 
Taliban’s large scale attacks were defeated in 2006 by relatively small NATO forces using a 
lot of direct and indirect firepower. To maintain the gains, General Richards recommended 
troop levels be increased going into 2007 so that the coalition would be ready for further 
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 However, the insurgent coalition shifted tactics in 2007-2008. It no 
longer engaged in large, organized attacks by armed groups (so the much anticipated spring 
offensives never happened). Instead it greatly increased the use of IEDs, suicide bombings, 
ambushes, and assassinations
126
 (see Figure 1 below). While most of the violence still 
occurred in the south and east, there were more frequent attacks in Kabul and the north and 
west.
127
 The Taliban coalition also focused more on soft targets such as pro-government 
civilians and construction projects throughout the country. There were reportedly more  
 
Figure 1: Number of Insurgent Attacks and Type by Week, January 2004-July 2010 (source: 
Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 
Afghanistan, November 11, 2010). 
 
 
attacks against ISAF and the ANSF. This, however, was attributed to the fact that NATO 
and Afghan forces were increasingly operating in contested areas across the country as troop 
levels increased.
128
 The increasing violence in 2007-2008 was reflected in the number of 
fatalities, with Afghan civilians bearing the brunt: more than 3,000 killed, with the vast 
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majority caused by the Taliban.
129
 Among the military forces, the international coalition lost 
464 troops, the ANA lost 505, and the ANP lost 1,215.
130
 ISAF’s resolve, therefore, 
continued to be tested.  
 As violence in Afghanistan increased, terrorist attacks around the world continued, 
such as: April 2007 suicide bombings in Algeria (33 killed, 222 wounded); and June 2007 
attempted suicide bombings in Glasgow (airport damage but no fatalities).
131
 In a twist of 
fate, the response of the Pakistani government to increasing Islamist militancy actually 
created more conflict in Pakistan which affected the war in Afghanistan. Militants started 
using the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad as a base to launch attacks against local 
infidel activities in January 2007. After failing to negotiate a peaceful surrender, the 
government ordered the Pakistani Army to assault it in July. The action led to a wave of 
outrage and the formation of the Pakistani Taliban, the Tehrik-i-Taliban-i-Pakistan (TTP), 
who allied with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda. They, along with an additional affiliated 
group, the Tehriq-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammedi (TNSM), revolted in the autonomous 
provinces of the FATA and North West Frontier Province (NWFP).
132
 All previous peace 
agreements with the insurgents were null and void. As a consequence, the Army launched a 
counter-offensive in November. Given the extensive reach of the insurgent groups and their 
threat to the Pakistani state, the Army shifted to counter-insurgency operations in 2008 and 
it progressively ramped up the scale of operations.
133
  
 Pakistani military actions were coordinated with the coalitions in Afghanistan. Both 
the OEF and ISAF coalitions understood a regional approach was necessary and they 
created new organizational elements and new procedures to develop new relationships and 
coordinate activities on the two sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. When Lieutenant 
General Barno assumed command of CFC-A in October 2003, he established the Tripartite 
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Commission. It was originally a standing committee for senior leaders from OEF and the 
Afghan and Pakistani militaries to meet every two months. Meetings rotated between the 
two countries. While primarily a strategic level forum to build relationships, trust, and 
confidence, particularly between the Afghans and Pakistanis, it was also a means for 
Pakistan and OEF/Afghanistan to brief upcoming operations and otherwise to coordinate 
military activities. The Commission also included three standing sub-committees for 
counter-IED, border security, and intelligence sharing which met monthly. These sub-
forums concentrated on tactical and operational coordination.
134
 As ISAF prepared to 
expand into the south and east, it was accorded observer status at the 16
th
 meeting of the 
Tripartite Commission in April 2006.
135
 It became a full member of the Commission in 
June
136
 and then stepped into the lead international coalition role when CFC-A de-activated 
in early 2007.
137
 The regional communication and coordination became more critical as the 
insurgencies became more virulent on both sides of the border. Trilateral cooperation 
became even closer when ISAF, Afghan, and Pakistani forces established a Joint 
Intelligence and Operations Cell in Kabul in 2007,
138
 and then opened jointly-manned 
border coordination centers at seven strategic locations, to include the Torkham Gate, an 
important crossing point through the Khyber Pass, in 2008.
139
 At the operational level, 
commanders understood they had to work together if they were to defeat the insurgencies. 
At one point, during Lieutenant General Eikenberry’s command of CFC-A he implicitly 
acknowledged the importance of the sanctuaries when he stated Pakistan was the key 
“because the war will be won or lost there.”140 Given the fact the Taliban coalition was 
never definitively defeated during this period, violence increased, and counter-insurgency as 
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an operational approach, as well as the comprehensive approach, could not succeed due to 
lack of resources, it can be argued the conflict reached a stalemate by 2008. Neither side 
was winning. 
 Despite the challenges and difficulty of the fighting between 2006 and 2008, the 
ISAF coalition did not fracture. Cohesion endured as no contributing nation pulled out, and 
in fact the coalition increased to 40 nations by early 2008. This was a critical period, 
particularly for allies who had joined believing they would only be doing reconstruction and 
stability operations. A number of them found they had to fight, even if their domestic 
populations (such as Canada, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands) were not supportive of the 
mission in Afghanistan.
141
 Cohesion endured for political reasons related to alliance and 
domestic politics. Too much had been invested for NATO to allow failure or for ISAF to 
withdraw in the near term. While British leaders like Defense Secretary Des Browne and 
General Richards called it a noble cause and that Afghans deserved the international 
community’s help after all they had been through since the 1980s,142 one of the officers 
interviewed articulated in more concrete terms the reasons for Britain’s continuing 
involvement and its increase in forces from about 3,000 in 2006 to 9,500 by early 2010. He 
said, “NATO must be seen to have delivered success” in Afghanistan because the Alliance’s 
viability is “vital national interest” for the UK. NATO is “really critical for the future 
because it offers you a credible force package and headquarters . . . a deployable capability 
that can do stuff on behalf of the UN . . . and it’s important.” He added, “Britain wishes to 
be a global player . . . [but] we don’t have the resources” to do it alone. A viable 
multinational organization is therefore critical. He further described a very particular reason 
for trying to achieve a British success in Afghanistan. He said, “We are adamant to 
demonstrate to the Americans that we are worth . . . we can be trusted  . . . We lost a little bit 
of credibility in Iraq” and so the government had “a very strong desire to change that 
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[negative American] perception.” Essentially, the UK wanted to regain U.S. respect in order 
to maintain the “special relationship.”143  
 The collective belief in the legitimacy and importance of the mission, which 
underlay the political will of contributing nations (even in the face of low public support), 
resulted in public statements of enduring commitment by a variety of national and Alliance 
leaders. The German foreign minister stated in mid-2006 that Germany’s “engagement in 
Afghanistan is long-lasting.”144 The Canadian government stated it would “finish the 
mission” and “get the job done” in the fall of 2006145 and then reiterated its commitment in 
early 2007.
146
 The New Zealand defense minister pledged his country’s commitment to the 
Alliance’s mission shortly after New Zealand troops came under ISAF command.147 U.S. 
Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann and President Bush repeatedly stated that the 
United States would stay committed in Afghanistan.
148
 This cross-national solidarity was 
reinforced by improved relations between the United States and European allies. The anti-
American hostility generated by the Iraq war was receding by 2007 and relations were “on 
an upswing,” according to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates.149 Secretary General Jaap 
de Hoop Scheffer stated after an informal defense ministers meeting in February 2008 that 
the allies “were of the opinion that we are there having entered a long-term commitment.”150 
The Alliance’s long-term commitment was formally reiterated at the Bucharest Summit in 
April 2008.
151
 This enduring political will was supported by cautious optimism that ISAF 
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could succeed in the end, but there were challenges that needed to be surmounted.
152
 ISAF 
repeatedly demonstrated its operational competence because it defeated the Taliban 
whenever it attacked, and so political leaders developed a level of confidence in the 
deployed forces. This generated a sort of top-down cohesion. 
 More importantly, cohesion was reinforced and sustained from the bottom-up for 
organizational reasons. The coalition was deeply multinational, with most units (battle 
groups, PRTs, and OMLT/POMLTs), regional forces, and all major headquarters (from the 
regional commands to ISAF, and even CFC-A) comprised of multiple contributing nations. 
In RC-North, 18 nations operated together and some of the smaller nations received German 
logistical support (Albania, Croatia, Macedonia).
153
 In RC-West, a Spanish helicopter 
squadron provided transport, attack, and maneuver support to all the multinational forces in 
the region.
154
 In RC-South, Danish and Canadian armor units, and an Estonian maneuver 
company and medical element, were embedded with the British in Helmand.
155
 In Uruzgan, 
the Dutch task force included combat engineers, a combined arms battle group, and special 
forces from Australia, a Slovenian platoon, and a Singapore medical element.
156
 Even the 
predominantly U.S. region of RC-East was multinational. For example, the Polish battalion 
and brigade battle groups deployed after 2006 were embedded in U.S. units in the volatile 
regions of Paktika and Ghazni.
157
 A U.S. battalion task force commander in Kunar and 
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Wardak Provinces stated he operated with a Lithuanian OMLT, which was embedded in one 
of his partnered ANA battalions, and Hungarian special forces, who trained one of his 
partnered ANP units.
158
 The battlespace for another U.S. brigade covered five provinces and 
the unit operated and coordinated with the New Zealand and Turkish PRTs, Norwegian 
special forces, and the French regimental battle group and OMLT in its area.
159
 When 
Jordan decided to join ISAF it insisted it be embedded with U.S. units and so its 800-man 
combat battalion deployed to RC-East.
160
 The nature of national contributions also produced 
multi-nationality. For example, by 2008 the Australian contributions included a special 
operations group operating across the country, a battle group conducting training and 
reconstruction that was embedded in the Dutch task force in Uruzgan, an engineer task force 
embedded in the Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt, a detachment of CH-47 transport helicopters 
embedded with the combat aviation battalion in Kandahar, an air force radar detachment in 
Kandahar, an artillery detachment embedded with a British artillery battery in Helmand, and 
individuals assigned to various OMLTs and the RC-South and ISAF headquarters.
161
 
  Major operations were multinational. A former Dutch commander of RC-South, 
Lieutenant General Mart de Kruif, described the situation well: 
Now, when [a young Dutch commander] leaves the base, he’s accompanied by 
Afghan national army and Afghan national police. They are mentored by 
Australians and by French. The camp is guarded by Slovakians. His top cover 
comes from Belgian F-16s and Mirages from France and U.S. fighters from 
Bagram. If he gets in a fight in troops-in-contact, and one of his soldiers is 
wounded, we call in the MEDEVAC helicopter from the United States, which is 
accompanied by Apaches from the Dutch Air Force. We bring him back to the 
field dressing station where a surgical team from Singapore saves his life, 
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probably with blood from the British blood bank from Helmand. Then we call in 
a Canadian C-130; we fly him back to Kandahar where nurses from Romania 
will take him to the operating room where a surgeon from the United States will 
stabilize him. We fly him back with a British plane to the United Kingdom and 




  The inter-weaving of units and specialist capabilities, particularly combat air 
support, intelligence, medical, and transport, forced the allies to rely on each other and this 
generated constant training efforts once forces arrived in country. To ensure interoperability 
units ironed out communication and coordination procedures through exercises before crisis 
situations or combat operations because there was “constant concern” about the need to 
minimize “misunderstandings.”163 Training and operating together generated trust and the 
norms and practices that partners do not abandon each other, especially in adversity. In fact, 
“the heat of battle” acted as a sort of incubator of cohesion. According to the officers 
interviewed for this thesis, as units fought together, their feeling of mutual trust and 
confidence tended to increase over time. The bonding was so extensive that according to 
one officer, “From the first moment when you got to Afghanistan, actually you forget your 
nationality. You just need to bond with . . . any other level who actually brings you some 
support, help, whatever . . .”164 Another officer echoed this sentiment, observing “There 
isn’t nationality, there’s just the team.”165 Another officer stated, “The flags don’t matter 
when you are fighting . . . the most important thing is that you are helping the Afghans and 
you are fighting with other soldiers, regardless if he is Italian or American . . . there is no 
difference in the fight. Cohesion was something real, above all in difficult situations.”166 
Another officer attributed the high levels of trust to the common values shared by soldiers 
from contributing nations, longstanding relationships from the stationing of U.S. and other 
allied forces in Europe (and decades of training and operating together), and the shared 
ethos of professional soldiering: “I’m a soldier, he’s a soldier. We’re there to protect the 
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people and accomplish a mission.”167 Another officer observed that the standing 
multinational formations in Europe, such as the Eurocorps, German-French Brigade, and 1 
(German/Netherlands) Corps, generated cohorts of officers, NCOs, and soldiers who were 
“used to working with other nations, on a day-to-day basis.” This was advantageous in 
Afghanistan, especially at the tactical level, because the troops “would know how others 
would react . . . [they would] know their way of thinking about things”168 which was critical 
in high stress combat situations when split second decisions needed to be made. The 
knowledge and familiarity produced both interoperability and cohesion.  
 It also appears that the trust and commitment of military forces on the ground 
influenced national political leaders (and thus sustained national policy and political will) 
through the senior military commanders. For example, a Spanish officer who served in RC-
West claimed Spanish senior military leaders and the minister of defense convinced Prime 
Minister Zapatero to increase troop levels in Afghanistan in 2004, even though he had come 
into office promising “no more troops.”169 According to another officer:  
One of the histories of the British presence in Helmand Province is military 
officers, who’ve been blooded or have . . . leading their men, saying we’ve got to 
do more here, we’ve got to do more . . . and that becomes a voice. We’ve got to 
support our troops. We’ve got to get this right. We’ve got to get the strategy 
right, therefore politicians deliver this . . . deliver us the right equipment. Deliver 
us the right manpower levels. You have got to own this now, because we’re 





The fighting forces, therefore, generated and sustained cohesion from the bottom-up. Over 
this period, the various ISAF commanders repeatedly asked for more forces. While the 
coalition forces managed to successfully defeat insurgent attacks where they occurred, many 
times they were only “just sufficient.”171 Give the hard won gains, commanders did not want 
to lose them, and they could not do this without more forces, either Afghan or coalition, to 
hold territory, especially since the reliance on overwhelming firepower could produce 
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unacceptable levels of civilian casualties which undermined Afghan support. To assuage 
Afghan government concerns, maintain public support, and counter Taliban propaganda, the 
coalition needed to shift its approach, but it took years for this to happen. As the next 
chapter will show, force levels were eventually substantially increased, the ISAF 
commanders imposed more restrictive rules of engagement to reduce civilian casualties, and 
the coalition changed its operational approach by implementing a coordinated civil-military 
campaign plan. 
 As the forces on the ground operated together, NATO’s strategic-level 
organizational capacities incrementally changed in ways that supported ISAF. The changes 
were adaptations based on learning. Just as ISAF learned and adapted operationally, so did 
NATO learn and adapt. The creation of ACT meant the Alliance had the structural capacity 
to prepare units and specialist teams for deployment. In 2004, the NATO Joint Warfare 
Center in Stavanger, Norway began providing mission rehearsal training and exercises for 
the ISAF headquarters commanders and staffs prior to their deployment to Kabul.
172
 In 
2007, the new NATO Joint Force Training Center in Bydgoszcz, Poland began providing 
mission rehearsal training and exercises for the regional command headquarters elements as 
they prepared to deploy. In 2008, it began training brigade, corps, and garrison level OMLT 
teams (kandak OMLTs were trained at the U.S. Joint Readiness Training Center in 
Hohenfels, Germany) and in 2010 it began training POMLTs.
173
 Due to the difficulties 
NATO headquarters had in filling shortfalls in national force contributions and operational 
enablers (such as transport helicopters), it instituted annual force generation conferences in 
November 2004. The conferences identified all of the Alliance’s operational needs (ISAF, 
KFOR, etc.) for the next 12 months. Thus, it tried to minimize issuing reactive short notice 
requests for forces. The conferences also provided a venue for allies to see how equitable 
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 In November 2005, NATO convened a workshop in Brussels for 
all the countries and organizations involved in PRTs. Discussions involved the roles, tasks, 
and practices of the diverse array of PRTs in order to share lessons learned, disseminate best 
practices, and harmonize PRT activities.
175
 
 Some of the incremental changes and adaptations were only partial. For example, 
the U.S. Army and Marine Corps jointly published a new counter-insurgency doctrine in 
2006.
176
 However, during the period under examination in this chapter, NATO did not have 
and did not publish a COIN doctrine.
177
 There were no uniform standards for certifying 
battle groups or for training the PRTs or the ETT/PMT and OMLT/POMLT teams. Nations 
were not required to send their forces to the ACT facilities in Norway or Poland. The larger 
contributing nations, such as the U.S., UK, France, Italy, Canada, and Germany developed 
their own national training programs; the smaller contributing nations relied on the NATO 
training infrastructure because they lacked sufficient national training capabilities. Even 
though the SACEUR announced a standardized system for tracking progress in Afghanistan 
using 63 metrics in December 2005,
178
 national capitals (as well as ISAF and NATO 
headquarters) had voracious appetites for reports, and there was no single standard for 
reporting format, or for measuring, or calculating successes and failures.
179
 Finally, 
command structures and relationships were incrementally adjusted as forces levels 
increased, missions changed or expanded, and the conflict worsened. However, by and 
large, during this period, they were disjointed. Additional learning and adaptation was 
clearly needed to ensure more effective operations and to break the stalemate.  
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 During this period, there were also clearly collective action problems as NATO got 
involved in Afghanistan and then expanded ISAF which can be considered fraying forces at 
the operational level. For example, the German forces did not fly at night, so they could not 
provide MEDEVAC support during night operations; they also did not fly in bad weather.
180
 
These were conditions imposed on the German military by its political authorities, who were 
casualty averse and concerned about low public support.
181
 Italian reluctance to loosen 
caveats and send troops to the south in 2006 to conduct combat operations was related to its 
constitution which outlawed war.
182
 The coalition had to figure out how to operate within 
the myriad of national constraints. Sometimes partners shifted their positions: France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain would not permanently send troops to the south, but agreed at the 
Riga Summit to deploy them to the region in emergencies.
183
  
It can be argued many countries constrained what they did due to the attributes of 
their national militaries - small size and narrow operational competence - rather than a 
desire to free-ride. European countries had much smaller pools of available forces to draw 
from than the United States, as shown in the table below. Those countries with conscript 
armies were further constrained by national laws which banned conscripts from being 
involuntarily deployed on foreign missions. They relied on volunteers, which necessitated 
the creation of ad hoc units for deployment.
184
 While 11 of the countries listed below phased 
out conscription between 2003 and 2011 (Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden), the pool of available forces 
for most countries decreased as governments cut defense budgets. The largest allies made  
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European Armed Forces (2002/2003) 
  
Country Prof/Consc   Army          Navy     Air Force    Total 
Austria  Conscript   34,600                 0       6,850   34,600 
Belgium Professional   24,800         2,450     10,250   39,200 
Czechy  Conscript   39,850                 0     13,100   49,400 
Denmark Conscript   14,700          4,000       3,500   22,700 
Estonia  Conscript     2,550             440          220     5,000 
Finland  Conscript   19,200          5,000       2,800   31,800 
France  Professional 137,000        44,250     64,000 260,000 
Germany Conscript 191,350        25,650     67,500 296,000 
Greece  Conscript 114,000        19,000     33,000 177,000 
Hungary Conscript   23,600                 0       7,700   33,000 
Ireland  Professional     8,500          1,100          860   10,500 
Italy  Conscript 116,000        36,000     48,000 216,000 
Latvia  Conscript     4,000             620          250     5,500 
Lithuania Conscript     7,950             650       1,150   13,500 
Luxembourg Professional        900                  0              0        900 
Netherlands Professional   23,150        12,130     11,050   49,600 
Norway Conscript   14,700          6,100       5,000   26,600 
Poland  Conscript 104,050        14,300     36,450 163,000 
Portugal Conscript   26,700        10,950       7,250   43,600 
Slovakia Conscript   13,700                  0       7,000    26,000 
Slovenia Conscript     6,500                  0          530     9,000 
Spain  Professional   95,600        22,900     22,750 177,900 
Sweden  Conscript   13,800          7,900       5,900   33,000 
Turkey  Conscript 402,000        52,750     60,100 514,850 
UK  Professional 116,670        42,370     53,620 210,400 
 
Source: Jolyon Howorth, “A European Union with Teeth?” in Nicolas Jabko and Craig 
Parsons, eds., The State of the European Union, Vol. 7: With US or Against US? European 
Trends in American Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 50. 
 
the deepest cuts. By 2010, the British armed forces had been reduced to 180,000, the French 
armed forces to 211,000, and German armed forces to 252,000.
185
 Operationally, the smaller 
allies were not capable of conducting high intensity combat operations, much less complex 
counter-insurgency operations,
186
 so they volunteered to do the missions where they had 
useful capacity, for example, Bulgarian, Macedonian and Slovakian (as well as Mongolian) 
forces guarded bases. Other countries provided trainers (Albania, Croatia, and Slovenia).  
The plethora of ongoing multinational missions worldwide put further pressure on 
national governments because they did not have unlimited operational capability. Thus, 
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political will was strained by other operational deployments which constrained ISAF 
operationally. The coalition never had sufficient resources during this period to achieve its 
campaign objectives. The “competing” multinational missions included the ongoing 
stabilization missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. By 2004, the UN had legitimized the 
stabilization mission in Iraq and 39 countries joined a multinational effort comprised of 
163,930 military forces. Poland and the UK had also volunteered to be lead nations for two 
of the five regional commands, Multinational Division Center-South and Multinational 
Division South-East.
187
 The British contribution to Iraq was large in relative terms (more 
than 8,000 in 2004, reduced to about 4,500 in 2007) however the war degenerated badly, 
forcing the UK to stay longer than originally intended, which had consequences for 
Afghanistan. Between 2006 and 2008, Britain found itself fighting “two campaigns without 
being able to resource either of them properly” and consequently it found itself “mowing the 
grass” in Helmand – repeating tactical operations in the same areas over and over because it 
did not have sufficient forces to hold what it cleared.
188
 In the United States, Defense 
Secretary Gates realized he had a similar resource problem in 2007. President Bush 
announced the surge in Iraq the same month that U.S. commanders in Afghanistan requested 
more forces. Gates realized he could not “deliver in both places at once.” While he was able 
to provide some of the requested forces to Afghanistan, the Iraq surge meant U.S. “ground 
forces were stretched very thin.”189 France also felt the pressure. In 2007, it had 16,000 
forces deployed in multiple locations (Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon, Balkans, and 
Afghanistan), so as with other nations it was spread thinly and did not have a lot of excess to 
deploy to Afghanistan.
190
 To a certain extent, the variations in security conditions across the 
country and the broad range of missions were advantageous for the coalition because they 
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provided options to the contributing nations, however in the aggregate none of them 
provided sufficient resources. 
 The diverse nature of national military capabilities and the wide range of missions 
required headquarters staffs that would “knit” the various contributed elements together in 
the most effective manner possible. This was a time-consuming, often difficult, and 
continuous process, since most contributing nations maintained short troop rotation periods; 
six months was common. Their efforts were complicated by overlapping OEF and ISAF 
mandates. OEF forces operated independently in the north and west in 2004-2005 during the 
ISAF expansion. NATO’s assumption of all the regional commands did not centralize 
command and control. There were still largely autonomous OEF forces (CSTC-A and 
CJSOTF-A) operating throughout the country. Furthermore, there was no unity of effort 
within ISAF. Even though the ISAF headquarters created campaign plans that were sent to 
JFC Brunssum for formal approval, the ISAF commander left it to the regional commanders 
to carry out operations independently and individually. Not only did each of the regional 
commands essentially “fight their own war,”191 but RC-South itself had three different 
conflicts ongoing in Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan and there was no cooperation 
between the provinces.
192
 This de-centralized execution of military activities produced 
major negative operational consequences. A number of the officers interviewed commented 
that the Taliban coalition recognized the lack of coordination and cooperation within ISAF 
and subsequently exploited the seams between the regional commands. The conflict 
developed a kind of “whack-a-mole” character as a result. Overall, the command and 
control structures and processes were unwieldy during this period and they created an 
additional fragility, or vulnerability, for the coalition: personal relationships became 
critical.
193
 At times they were the only thing that ensured some coherence across operational 
activities. 
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 The overlapping of ISAF and OEF was more than geographic. For a time during the 
period, both coalitions were engaged in combat operations as well as stabilization and 
reconstruction. In other words, both of them conducted counter-insurgency operations, 
supported security sector reform activities, mentored and operationally partnered with the 
ANA, trained the ANSF, and conducted PRT activities. Furthermore, there was redundancy 
and overlap among the three areas of military activity: battle groups conducted security 
operations as well as governance (which included key leader engagements, shuras, and 
coordination with province and district leaders), training/partnering/mentoring, 
development, reconstruction, and humanitarian activities; PRTs conducted governance, 
development, reconstruction, and humanitarian activities as well as security operations and 
training/partnering/mentoring; and OMLTs conducted training/partnering/mentoring 
activities as well as accompanying Afghan units on security operations while coordinating 
air, fire, and medical support.
194
 The three areas of military activity were frequently 
uncoordinated, despite the overlap, however at times they blended completely together. For 
example, the team leader for an OMLT in RC-North described a joint Afghan-coalition 
operation in 2008 that encompassed a battle group, PRT, and OMLT. His OMLT deployed 
with its kandak to Meymaneh in Faryab Province for an Afghan-led security operation. The 
Norwegian task force in the region was a combined battle group and PRT and it operated 
with the Afghans while his OMLT coordinated emergency combat and medical support.
195
 
 It slowly became clear to the OEF and ISAF coalitions that their most crucial long-
term activity was training and equipping the ANSF. It also slowly became evident how 
difficult the process would be. For example, there was an unprecedented need to institute 
literacy education and basic skills training, like drivers training, for both the army and 
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 Leaders perceived that a capable ANSF would be the agent that would allow the 
multinational forces to eventually withdraw, but the increasing violence over time meant 
they progressively increased the end-strength goals for the ANA and ANP. In December 
2002, the coalitions and Afghan government initially set the goals of building a 70,000 
ANA and 62,000 ANP by 2006.
197
 In February 2008, they revised the goals to 80,000 ANA 
and 82,000 ANP by 2010.
198
 In September 2008, they revised the ANA goal again to 
134,000 by 2013. By the end of 2008, there were 79,000 ANA and 75,954 ANP on duty.
199
 
The constant revisions upwards meant the coalitions were constantly playing catch-up in the 
training missions. Commanders repeatedly highlighted their shortages in trainers and by 
2008 both CSTC-A and ISAF could articulate in hard numbers what their requirements and 
shortfalls were, for example at the end of the year: U.S. ETTs required 2,225 trainers, but 
only 1,138 were assigned (50 percent fill); 2,375 trainers were required for the U.S. PMTs, 
but only 886 were assigned (37 percent fill); and NATO had filled only 42 of the 103 
OMLT teams it had promised.
200
 These shortfalls were one reason the PRTs and battle 
groups took up training and mentoring, too. As ANA forces increased over time and were 
stationed across the country in the various ANA Corps they needed assistance in order to 
increasingly be involved in operations. 
 As soon as ANSF forces were available they were employed in partnership with 
coalition forces. The ANA began joint patrols in Kabul in 2003 with ISAF’s multinational 
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 The ANA and ANP supported the elections in 2004 and 2005.
202
 Afghan Army 
kandaks began assisting special operations forces in the south in 2004.
203
 By 2006, 
“virtually every ISAF operation against the Taliban [involved] ANA participation.”204 The 
standing up and employment of ANSF forces occurred while the AMF and other militias 




 Overall, there was tremendous pressure on the ISAF coalition during the hard time 
of 2006-2008 because there were multiple potentially destructive fraying forces. They 
included intense intra-alliance acrimony about burden-sharing and the lack of will by major 
partners to engage in combat. The shock of tough combat shattered the initial assumptions 
about the character of the conflict and led to the realization that ISAF could not just engage 
in stabilization and reconstruction. It had to be ready to engage in complex counter-
insurgency operations. This was undermined by insufficient resources – troops and enabling 
capabilities – which forced commanders to rely extensively on overwhelming direct and 
indirect fire support. This in turn resulted in collateral damage that eroded Afghan support. 
Disagreements on the role and purpose of OEF and ISAF, and the disjointed nature of their 
command and control relationships, despite their functional and geographic overlapping, 
hindered the coherent execution of the comprehensive approach. Furthermore, operational 
inefficiencies from restrictive national caveats and training and doctrinal shortfalls that led 
to only short-term tactical gains produced a widespread perception the international effort 
was a failure.  
Taken together, and based on the historical experiences of alliances and coalitions, 
these pressures should have destroyed cohesion, fractured the coalition, and led to 
abandonment, especially since insurgent violence continued to increase. However, they did 
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not. The coalition held together due to the interaction of the two drivers. Political will was 
derived from multiple alliance and domestic politics influences – including humanitarian 
and moral aspirations, solidarity in the face of a shared terrorist threat, and belief that 
ISAF’s defeat by the Taliban would be fatal for NATO as a security institution – and was 
sustained by incremental adaptations in organizational capacity at the strategic and 
operational levels (new organizational structures, new missions, new training initiatives) and 
operational- and tactical-level unit bonding through shared adversity. Together the drivers 
produced continuing cohesion. This cohesion endured even as the coalition grew from 31 to 
40 nations and included countries like Azerbaijan, Georgia, Jordan, and Ukraine. As a 
result, even the “hard time” of 2006-2008 led to further commitments by a number of the 
allies and partners. In fact, between spring 2006 and November 2008, coalition forces 
significantly increased from 9,000 to 51,100 (see Appendix 4). Operationally, ISAF seemed 
to demonstrate it was a learning organization as it fought back (and Operation Medusa was 
a significant psychological success), shifted its operational approach, and undertook new 
missions in training, mentoring, and counter-insurgency. In short, both ISAF and NATO 
adapted to the changed character of the conflict as NATO got into the game. After a limited 
and constrained beginning in Kabul in 2003, by 2008 the ISAF footprint encompassed the 
whole country and was comprised of five regional commands along with the ISAF 
headquarters, 26 PRTs, a multitude of OMLT/POMLTs, and a wide variety of battle groups. 
However, the major shortfall in ISAF’s coalition operations was the continued national 
unwillingness to commit sufficient resources to ensure success. This contributed to the 
“catching-up” nature of coalition activities during this period.  
 Between 2003 and 2008, there were some major positive developments in 
Afghanistan such as: the completion of the Bonn Agreement by the holding of presidential 
and parliamentary elections; the initiation of the Afghanistan Compact; the economy more 
than doubled in six years; more than five million children were enrolled in school; and some 
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4,000 kilometers of roads were paved.
206
 Despite the positive progress, there was a 
perception of failure since the conflict was at a stalemate. By 2007-2008, the Bush 
administration realized something needed to change and it took the initial, tentative steps 
toward assuming a leading role. U.S. concerns about the conflict were paralleled at NATO 
headquarters and, as a result of consultation, plans were made to increase troop numbers and 
adjust the command and control configuration.
207
 President Bush decided to increase U.S. 
forces over the course of 2007 and 2008 in what he called a “silent surge.” Troop numbers 
rose from 21,000 to over 35,000. He doubled reconstruction funding, increased PRTs, 
“ordered more U.S. civilian experts to Afghanistan to help the ministries in Kabul become 
more effective (and less corrupt)” and encouraged the allies and partners to do more.208 The 
President also decided to establish better unity of command for U.S. forces and to improve 
coordination between ISAF and OEF. General David McKiernan took command of ISAF in 
June 2008 and, as will be described in the next chapter, he subsequently took command of 
the OEF forces (CSTC-A and CJSOTF-A) in October 2008. Furthermore, the allied 
assessments resulted in significant decisions that changed entirely the structure, scope, and 
focus of the coalition’s activities. 
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OCTOBER 2008-DECEMBER 2014: NATO SURGES 
 By the fall of 2008, the international coalition recognized it was in an untenable 
position as insurgent violence continued to rise. The allies and partners knew something 
needed to change if ISAF was to break the Taliban momentum. As a consequence, national 
governments, NATO headquarters, and the ISAF headquarters initiated a variety of strategic 
reviews. At the same time, there were intensive discussions about Afghanistan in 
multilateral and bilateral forums which included key Afghan representatives. Secretary 
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer articulated the common view in February 2009: NATO 
allies and partners, through the ISAF coalition, needed to do more.
1
 The question was what 
and how. 
 The answers were developed through a series of discussions and consultations at 
formal and informal defense and foreign minister meetings in 2008 and 2009 and they 
ultimately reflected substantial changes in the two drivers of the analytical framework. The 
United States, under the new president, Barack Obama, decided to substantially increase its 
contributions, in both personnel and material resources, and take a leading role in the 
coalition. The surge in U.S. commitment, particularly the tripling of forces deployed from 
35,000 to over 100,000, sustained the collective political will of the allies and partners and 
led to further contributions from them. It also facilitated a significant change in ISAF’s 
organizational structure, multiple adaptations in its operating procedures, and an expansion 
in its activities as OEF and ISAF fully merged. Although the ISAF coalition knew it still 
had a long, hard road ahead of it, the massive increase in resources finally gave it the means 
to prosecute a more effective counter-insurgency campaign and implement a more robust 
comprehensive approach (civilian and military efforts in the domains of security, economic 
development, and governance).  
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 The changes in the coalition’s organizational capacity produced more effective 
operational action, which in turn reinforced political commitment. In fact, the conflict 
shifted in 2010 when coalition and Afghan forces started to gain the upper hand due to 
erosions in Taliban capabilities. While national governments were openly starting to think 
about the timeline for withdrawal that year, the progressive improvements in Afghan army 
and police capabilities enabled the coalition to sustain the operational gains as it transitioned 
responsibility for security to Afghan forces between 2011 and 2013 and then conducted its 
withdrawal. In the end, the combination of the two drivers sustained cohesion throughout 
the period examined in this chapter – October 2008 through the end of the ISAF mission in 
December 2014. 
 This chapter will cover the decisions and actions that resulted from the deteriorating 
security situation. It will analyze the changes in the scope and focus of ISAF operations, 
which ultimately encompassed precision strike operations (also known as counter-terrorism 
operations), counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations, large-scale training, 
mentoring, and partnering with Afghan security forces, stability and reconstruction 
operations through PRTs, and institutional development through ministerial mentoring and 
advising, in the context of enduring cohesion during the toughest phase of the fighting 
(2008-2010) and the transition (2011-2014). 
The Conflict Escalates and NATO Changes Direction 
 Insurgent violence, comprised of IED attacks, suicide bombings, small arms, 
mortar, and rocket attacks, and small-scale ambushes, was on a greatly escalating trend 
between 2008 and 2010, as the Taliban coalition regained some territory and fought hard 
against a strengthening ISAF. During this period, the conflict spiraled into more intense 
fighting because the ISAF coalition increasingly operated and remained, in partnership with 
ANSF forces, in areas that had previously been uncontested as their troop levels increased. 
The coalition was also increasingly successful in de-activating and clearing IEDs before 





Figure 1: Number of Insurgent Attacks and Type by Week, January 2004-July 2010 (source: 
Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 
Afghanistan, November 11, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 2: Monthly Security Incidents, April 2009-March 2013 (source: Report on Progress 




As the conflict escalated, coalition nations, NATO, and ISAF conducted major strategic 
assessments as they consulted together. The result was a succession of decisions in 2008 and 
2009 that dramatically increased resources - between November 2008 and November 2010 
coalition forces almost doubled from 70,100 to 130,930.
2
 The coalition also agreed to 
undertake major organizational changes that enabled operational activities that were 
substantial orders of magnitude larger than previous combat and non-combat operations. 
 The Bush administration’s review and planning effort in the latter half of 2008 
started the process. It was a coordinated effort among the president’s National Security 
Council, the new commander of CENTCOM, General David Petreaus, NATO, ISAF, and 
UNAMA.
3
 The first major change for the multinational coalition was the president’s 
decision to appoint General McKiernan as the commander of OEF forces (CSTC-A and 
CJSOTF-A) in October 2008. This was meant to improve the linkage and coordination 
between the OEF and ISAF coalitions.
4
 The dual-hatting of McKiernan improved the U.S. 
operational unity of effort, but it did not establish unity of command for the rest of the 
multinational forces. While CSTC-A and CJSOTF-A came under McKiernan’s command, 
they were still formally separate from the ISAF mission, so the ANSF training and 
mentoring mission, as well as special operations, remained de-linked from the security and 
stability operations of ISAF. The new command arrangements put General McKiernan in a 
position where he reported to two different command chains: to NATO for ISAF operations 
and to CENTCOM for OEF operations. This meant military operations remained disjointed; 
there was neither unity of command nor unity of effort for all the multinational forces.  
 In fact, the whole coalition suffered from very complex command and control 
structures and General McKiernan’s position was not unique in that he was required to serve 
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multiple masters. Each contributing nation designated a national contingent commander. 
These officers were the senior officers in country, and they held a wide variety of positions. 
Some held “just” the job of contingent commander which allowed them to focus on 
providing administrative, logistical, and operational support to their national forces, but 
others were dual-hatted with another responsibility: such as serving as a PRT commander, a 
battle group commander, or as a commander or staff member in a regional command or in 
the ISAF headquarters. They were required to report back to, and were ultimately 
answerable to, their national governments, as well as serve the ISAF/NATO chain of 
command.
5
 This complexity was unavoidable because it was an enduring aspect of NATO. 
Even when operating in multinational formations, sustainment and logistical support 
remains the responsibility of the contributing nations. 
 The United States further complicated the situation when it created U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan (USFOR-A) in October 2008 when General McKiernan took over CSTC-A and 
CJSOTF-A (see Appendix 2). This new command filled the gap CENTCOM created when it 
de-activated CFC-A in 2007 and it brought all U.S. forces in country under one commander. 
The command had the institutional capacity to provide the administrative and logistical 
support that the RC-East headquarters had been incapable of providing to the increasing 
U.S. footprint.
6
 However, USFOR-A was also partially merged with the ISAF headquarters. 
For example, a U.S. officer was dual-hatted to serve as the J1 (personnel officer) for both 
ISAF headquarters and USFOR-A. But if a senior staff position in ISAF headquarters was 
filled by an allied nation, the United States created a mirror position in USFOR-A. For 
example, in 2010 the Deputy Commander (DCOM) of ISAF was a British officer and the 
                                                 
5
 Colonel Ingrid Gjerde, Norwegian Army (served as the commander of the Norwegian contingent in 
Afghanistan, Mazar-e-Sharif, Regional Command-North, ISAF, Afghanistan, June 2011-January 
2012), interview with author at Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 12, 2013. Lieutenant Colonel Ken 
Knudsen, Danish Army (served both as the commander of the Danish contingent in Afghanistan and 
as the commander of a battle group battalion, Helmand Province, Regional Command-Southwest, 
ISAF, Afghanistan, August 2011-February 2012), interview with author at Carlisle Barracks, PA, 
May 6, 2013. Author interview at Carlisle Barracks, PA with Officer C (who served as a contingent 
commander and in a PRT in Afghanistan), May 14, 2013. 
6
 Headquarters, RC-East had become the default national support element for all U.S. forces in 
country when CFC-A de-activated. 
178 
 
ISAF Chief of Staff (COS) was a German officer, and so USFOR-A created mirrored 
DCOM and COS positions filled by Americans for its headquarters staff.
7
 Staff officers 
within the various departments also worked for both elements. This created a rather 
confusing situation. Overall, the command and control structures remained too unwieldy, 
they needed further change, particularly as violence continued to increase. 
 While the Bush administration was conducting its review, General McKiernan 
requested additional forces – three combat brigades and an aviation brigade – totaling some 
20,000 troops. The President supported the increase in forces, but since the troop 
deployments would not occur until 2009, the administration decided to quietly pass its 
support for the review’s recommendations and the troop increase to the incoming Obama 
administration for its formal decision and approval. In February and March 2009, President 
Obama approved an increase of over 21,000 troops as he simultaneously announced his 
strategy for Afghanistan, after an initial strategic review.
8
 The administration’s assessing 
and reviews continued the rest of the year and senior officials, the vice president, secretary 
of state, and defense secretary, consulted with and kept NATO allies and partners informed 
throughout the year.
9
 Both Defense Secretary Gates and Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen also tasked General Stanley McChrystal to conduct a comprehensive review at 
the operational level when he assumed command of ISAF in June 2009.
10
 General 
McChrystal concluded the security situation was serious and deteriorating
11
 and he 
requested another large troop increase, an additional 40,000 troops. After extensive and 
contentious deliberation, the President announced in December 2009 that the United States 
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would send an additional 30,000 troops in the next year.
12
 The surges in U.S. forces meant 
the American commitment to ISAF increased from about 15,000 troops (before President 
Bush’s silent surge) to 90,000 by October 2010.13 The United States therefore clearly 
communicated its concern about the seriousness of the security situation and it increased its 
commitment to Afghanistan to try to make ISAF operations more effective. 
 While President Obama’s surge announcement in December 2009 reflected a 
significant change in direction, which was welcomed by the allies, it also created some 
uncertainty. It meant the United States would assume a leadership role as ISAF transformed 
its command and control configuration and modified its operational approach once again. 
The president’s remark that the U.S. commitment was not open-ended, that forces would 
begin withdrawing in July 2011, and combat operations would end by 2014 opened the door 
for the allies and partners to start overtly thinking about and planning for the ISAF transition 
and withdrawal. However, the July 2011 date was widely misinterpreted by many Afghans 
who feared international abandonment once again, so to affect some damage control 
Secretary Gates bluntly stated at the June 2010 NATO defense ministerial that the July 2011 
date was the start of a process. Any transition to ANSF and coalition withdrawal would 
depend on the recommendations of the ISAF commander, the SCR, and the Afghan 
government based on security conditions on the ground. He also repeatedly reassured the 
Afghans the drawdown would be gradual.
14
 In the end, the United States did not withdraw 
surge forces until 2012. Secretary of State Clinton also assured the Karzai government that 
the U.S. commitment would endure “long after the combat troops have left.”15 
 As the U.S. administration increased troops it also pressed the allies and partners to 
increase troop levels. Secretary General Rasmussen echoed the requests: “At every bilateral 
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meeting he has banged the drum for more.”16 SHAPE formalized the process by adding the 
need for additional troops to its statement of requirements for ISAF.
17
 With the significant 
increases in military forces, it became more important for operations and training to be 
better coordinated and implemented and the existing command and control configuration 
was wholly inadequate. In fact, it actually worked against the synchronization of activities. 
An officer who was involved in the creation of USFOR-A and then served as the advisor for 
Afghan Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak described the situation, “There was an 
awful lot of confusion and lack of coordination that were going on because of separate 
mandates and chains of command.”18 Furthermore, as ISAF’s activities and span of control 
increased, the ISAF commander was forced to balance strategic, diplomatic, and political 
responsibilities with the operational responsibilities of a fighting commander and it did not 
work well. When he and the ISAF staff should have been focusing on the big picture and 
coordinating at the national level with the Karzai government, UNAMA, allied and partner 
ambassadors, and the multitude of international organizations engaged in the country, he 
was constantly pulled down to focus on the operational and tactical levels, especially as the 
conflict escalated.
19
 The surge in resources put further pressure on the command. 
 Leaders at the national, strategic (NATO), and coalition levels knew the command 
and control configuration needed to change. At the same time, consensus was emerging 
within NATO and the coalition partners “that we need to step up our support for Afghan 
National Security Forces” in the areas of training, equipping, and mentoring20 because it 
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would ultimately be the vehicle for the security transition and the coalition’s withdrawal. As 
a consequence, and after a series of discussions and consultations, political authorities 
agreed on a major organizational change: the coalition would establish two intermediate 
commands between the ISAF headquarters and the regional commands. The decision 
allowed a significant adaptation that improved the coalition’s operational effectiveness. 
 The genesis for the first of the commands, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan 
(NTM-A), included discussions at the informal Defense Ministerial in Krakow, Poland in 
February 2009 and the subsequent Foreign Ministerial in Brussels in March. The allies 
formally announced their decision to create NTM-A at the April 2009 NATO Summit at 
Strasbourg-Kehl.
21
 The command would concentrate on the higher level training and 
mentoring of the ANA and ANP. The CSTC-A command with its ongoing activities would 
merge into it, bringing all ANSF training and mentoring activities and ministerial 
development and mentoring programs into one unified command.
22
 The merging was not 
inconsequential, for by 2009 CSTC-A was a huge organization with some 15,000 civilian 
and military personnel spread around the country in the headquarters staff and the regional 
support elements, in the basic training institutions in Kabul, in the army and police regional 
training facilities, in the hundreds of ETT/PMT and OMLT/POMLT teams, and in the 
ministries as mentors. CSTC-A was also not de-activated as NTM-A stood up due to U.S. 
national caveats. The United States provided the vast preponderance of funding for the 
ANSF which was used to: generate and integrate the Afghan forces; train, develop, equip, 
and sustain the forces; build and maintain infrastructure; and build ministerial capacity. By 
2012, this was almost $12 billion a year, therefore annual funding laws authorized by the 
U.S. Congress required that U.S. commanders maintain control and fiduciary responsibility, 
and this included management, oversight, and auditing of expenditures.
23
 As such, NTM-A 
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and CSTC-A had to merge and its commander had to be a U.S. officer. This U.S. 
law/national caveat also meant the ISAF command structures remained complex. 
 The genesis of IJC followed a similar sequential process. Secretary Gates stated in 
his memoir that leaders in the Defense Department began considering the idea of creating a 
deputy ISAF commander with some sort of operational headquarters that would be in charge 
of the day-to-day fight in the spring of 2009.
24
 The idea was discussed in Alliance forums 
and the defense ministers agreed in principle to create a new headquarters during a 
ministerial meeting in Brussels on June 12, 2009.
25
 General McChrystal fleshed out the 
concept for the major change to the ISAF command structure in his comprehensive review. 
The new command, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), would give the coalition an operational 
planning, command, and management capability it had previously lacked. Its focus on 
coordinating day-to-day combat operations and the civil-military activities of the PRTs 
would enable a more effective implementation of the comprehensive approach. The NAC 
approved the proposal on August 4, 2009.
26
 With the decisions and command restructuring, 
OEF and ISAF operations almost completely merged together (special operations were still 
partially separate), however, as this chapter will later discuss, the IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A 
overlapped in multiple ways. 
 Once overarching decisions were announced in NATO forums, the coalition staff 
had to figure out the nuts and bolts of implementation, which would include identifying the 
functions and compositions of the new commands, building infrastructure to support and 
house them, and moving people and equipment (the organizational changes required some 
re-shuffling of billets, that is, some ISAF headquarters billets were moved to IJC as the 
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command stood up). Overall, the organizational changes required a methodical planning and 
execution process by the coalition staff and it lasted some six months.
27
 It was also a 
complex, time-consuming process because as with the other NATO multinational 
headquarters, there was a bidding and negotiation process at planning conferences at 
SHAPE to determine which nations would fill which positions.
28
 IJC was activated on 
November 12, 2009 and NTM-A/CSTC-A was activated on November 21, 2009. The 
creation of the two intermediate commands marked the conclusion of a significant 
transformation in ISAF’s operational-level command and control structures. From the 
humble beginnings of a 240-man ISAF headquarters in August 2003, the C2 structure was 
enormous by 2009: the ISAF headquarters staff had expanded to 2,200 billets,
29
 IJC had 873 
billets, and NTM-A had 1,028 billets.
30
 
 The IJC and NTM-A activations included the implementation of one further change. 
Once the new commands were established, command and control of the ANA and ANP 
mentoring teams moved from CSTC-A into IJC.
31
 With this change, all forces deployed 
within the battle space of the regional commands came under the same chain of command. 
As a consequence, the combat operations, stability and reconstruction, and advising and 
mentoring activities could be better coordinated and executed. Previously the battle groups, 
PRTs, and advisers/mentors (ETT/PMT and OMLT/POMLT) had operated under separate 
chains of command. It was up to the individual leaders of the elements in the districts and 
provinces to coordinate amongst themselves to generate operational coherence. Sometimes 
they worked well together, but not infrequently they did not because their commanders were 
focused on different priorities and objectives.
32
 There were cases when the battle groups 
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were not even aware they had PRTs or mentoring teams operating in their areas.
33
 This had 
degraded the coalition’s ability to achieve its security, development, and governance goals 
and it meant personalities were extremely important. More seriously, the re-alignment 
resulted from learning the hard way. One of the officers interviewed witnessed the 
frustration of the ISAF and IJC commanders after an ETT was ambushed with its kandak in 
RC-East, an event that was not unprecedented as the violence increased. The coalition’s 
battle space owner had not been aware of the Afghan operation and the question was asked 
“How the heck does this happen?” The generals were adamant that “We’ve got to clean this 
battlefield up . . . we’ve got to get everybody nested. We’ve got to have some unity of 
command here, so if you live and work and operate in this battle space, you answer to that 
battle space owner, you work for him.” Once the ANSF mentoring teams moved, CJTF 
Phoenix and CJTF Police de-activated.
34
 As OEF and ISAF more fully merged in November 
2009, there was little drama because, despite assertions for years that the missions were 
separate and distinct, they had been slowly converging since 2003. At this point, there was 
more complete unity of command and much better unity of effort. 
 The major organizational changes and command re-alignment were accompanied by 
four complementary surges. The surges came in waves: U.S. forces substantially increased 
(2009-2010); forty of the allies and partners committed to increase their forces by 9,700 (the 
increases arrived 2010-2012),
35
 the Pakistani government substantially increased the scale 
and scope of military operations in the NWFP and FATA, putting pressure on the insurgent 
sanctuaries (2009-2014), and ISAF greatly increased the scale and scope of ANSF 
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development (2010-2013). Furthermore, ISAF’s main effort shifted from combat and COIN 
operations (which were the focus through 2010) to NTM-A’s training, mentoring, and 
advising mission, which became ISAF’s main effort in 2011. The four surges were mutually 
dependent and they built on each other. In effect, the massive increases in coalition military 
forces were only temporary and were meant to beat back the Taliban momentum and reduce 
the insurgency as much as possible in order to create time and space for the surge in ANSF 
training and development. As the surge forces started drawing down, between 2012 and 
2013, the idea was ANSF would step into the gap and take over security responsibility. As 
the ANSF increasingly took over security, ISAF could gradually withdraw.  
 President Obama had called for a “dramatic increase in the U.S. civilian effort” in 
his Afghan strategy speech in March 2009, but this civilian surge never materialized. Even 
though commanders in the field “pleaded” for more civilian expertise, the State Department 
and other federal agencies were incapable of fielding more than a trickle of civilian experts. 
While the administration examined every military move under a microscope, “no 
comparable attention was paid to the civilian side,”36 which allowed the non-defense 
agencies to shirk their responsibilities in the governance and economic areas. By November 
2010, the number of non-defense department civilians deployed in Afghanistan topped out 
at about 1,100, equating to 1% of the U.S. military commitment.
37
 This also ensured 
continued military involvement in the non-military lines of effort. 
 General McChrystal’s comments on the dire situation were not under-statements 
and ISAF assessed there was a new insurgent strategy by 2009-2010. Based on the loose 
structure of the QST and the regional shuras, and the autonomy given to the various 
insurgent elements, the Taliban coalition initiated a loosely coordinated two-pronged 
approach. Forces comprised primarily of the Taliban pushed from the south towards 
Kandahar, while primarily Haqqani and Hekmatyar forces pushed from the east towards 
Kabul. Both groups concentrated on attacking coalition and ANSF forces. Their goal was 
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“to inflict enough pain on the coalition to force public opinion in Europe and North America 
to demand a withdrawal. Once the coalition [was] gone, they figure[d] the government of 
Afghanistan [would] fall like rotten fruit.”38 The coalition faced a determined opponent. 
 Due to General McChrystal’s assessment of the deteriorating situation, he modified 
ISAF’s operational approach. The organizational changes and command re-alignment 
improved the coalition’s operational capabilities and gave it, for the first time, the 
organizational capacity to develop and implement a truly coordinated and adequately 
resourced comprehensive approach. The newly established IJC developed an overarching 
national civil-military campaign plan, called Operation Omid (Dari for “hope”), that was 
developed and executed in partnership with relevant ministries in the Afghan government 
(the security, governance, and development ministries). It was approved by JFC Brunssum 
and updated annually.
39
 While the RC commanders still prepared and executed operations 
within their regions, they had to be approved by IJC and in accordance with the overall 
campaign plan. Consequently, the entire ISAF coalition could finally prosecute more 
effective COIN operations in partnership with the ANSF and the Afghan government. In 
reality, ISAF implemented the clear-hold-build approach (modified in each region to 
account for local conditions) that had been attempted in previous years, but this time it 
finally had sufficient forces (both coalition and ANSF) to clear and hold terrain, and thus 
secure the population, which established a more stable foundation for governance and 
economic development activities. It also minimized the Taliban coalition’s ability to exploit 
the seams between the regional commands. 
 The coalition also implemented across the regional commands an operating 
procedure that had been pioneered in 2007 in RC-East. That year, the battle group 
commander in Khowst had dispersed his troops in small outposts, called Force Protection 
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Facilities, throughout the province and in each of the district centers where they lived 
among the people. This enabled them to easily and directly mentor and protect local 
officials and the ANP, operate with the ANA, and coordinate PRT activities. The approach 
was very effective. The enduring presence created a sense of security among the population 
that “fostered commerce and civil society,” and in that year districts that were pro-
government increased from 22 to 58 (out of a total of 86).
40
 General McChrystal called it 
“embedded partnering.” Not only were ISAF forces dispersed among the population in key 
areas, but coalition and ANSF forces were also co-located and they operated in partnership. 
According to General McChrystal, the intent was they “would train, eat, bunk, plan, patrol, 
fight, celebrate, and mourn together.”41 This approach produced a sense of security among 
communities that had not existed previously.  
 In addition, General McChrystal resuscitated the ink-spot approach that General 
Richards had pioneered in 2006. The IJC identified 80 “key terrain” districts which were 
focal points for concentrated security, development, and governance activities. They 
included all the major population centers, major transit areas, and key roads. Security 
operations in the districts were followed by a new initiative, the District Delivery Program. 
Coalition forces coordinated with the district leaders, provincial governors, and relevant 
government ministers to establish government services and launch development projects.
42
 
 Coalition operations were supported by more strategic enablers. The increased 
material resources improved operational capability. During the height of the conflict in Iraq, 
the United States had moved strategic assets, such as intelligence capabilities and 
helicopters, out of Afghanistan to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
43
  With the 
success of the U.S. surge in Iraq in 2007, and subsequent withdrawal of forces from Iraq 
under Presidents Bush and Obama, the U.S. not only had more military forces available for 
                                                 
40
 Ann Marlowe, “A Counterinsurgency Grows in Khost: An unheralded U.S. success in 
Afghanistan,” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 13, No. 34 (May 19, 2008): 19-21.  
41
 McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 347, 376; and Gates, Duty, 355. 
42
 Colonel (retired) Richard Lacquement, U.S. Army. 
43
 Author interview at Carlisle Barracks , PA with Officer D (who served in special operations in 
Afghanistan), November 6, 2013; and Colonel (retired) George Woods, U.S. Army. 
188 
 
its troop surges in Afghanistan, but it also moved strategic assets back, in particular 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and rotary aircraft.
44
 Defense 
Secretary Gates had become concerned about the situation in Afghanistan in 2007 and he 
not only directed the Department of Defense and Combatant Commands to shift critical ISR 
assets, particularly drones, to CENTCOM, but he also succeeded in acquiring new funding 
(some $2.6 billion) to increase desperately needed additional capabilities, such as: 
information processing hardware, linguists and analysts, ground sensors, and reconnaissance 
aircraft.
45
 The additional capabilities started arriving by 2008. They gave the coalition the 
intelligence enablers it needed to implement more effective COIN operations and reduce 
civilian casualties. 
 In 2009, the most volatile regions continued to be the south and east. Even though 
insurgent attacks generally increased across the country, particularly in the run up to the 
August presidential election, the north, center, and west remained relatively more secure.
46
 
The forces in RC-East had also produced some counter-insurgency successes in 2007 and 
2008, making the region relatively more stable than the south. For example, by 2009, 
Jalalabad, in Nangarhar Province, was booming economically and violence levels were low 
enough for the ANSF to assume responsibility for security.
47
 Due to this “permissive 
environment” the PRT surged its development activities and by 2010 it was managing $60 
million in projects.
48
 Khowst Province had also seen improvement. U.S. Ambassador 
Neumann observed when he visited Khowst in 2005 that it was regularly rocketed.
49
 
Secretary Gates noted improvements when he visited the area in December 2007, calling the 
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civilian-military efforts “a model” of genuinely comprehensive counter-insurgency.50 By the 
end of 2008, Khowst was so secure and had made such economic and civil progress that 
conditions were better than the neighboring FATA regions and refugees were leaving 
Pakistan to take advantage of the new opportunities in Afghanistan.
51
 One of the officers 
interviewed described in overall terms the difference between RC-South and RC-East in 
2009, he said, “For us, RC-South as it was named was much more kinetic than any of the 
RC’s. RC-East was second, but there was a significant difference in the level.”52 
 General McChrystal, and his successor General David Petraeus, therefore 
concentrated ISAF’s main effort towards operations in the south – first in Helmand, then in 
Kandahar. Operationally, this meant RC-South was the priority for theatre-level resources, 
including intelligence, ISR, and lethal and non-lethal fire support.
53
 As U.S. surge forces 
arrived in country in 2009, British and Canadian-led forces conducted a series of operations 
in Helmand and Kandahar to prepare the ground.
54
 However, the new coordinated civilian-
military campaign approach was not initiated until RC-South launched Operation 
Moshtarak (Dari for “together”) which focused on the region around Marjah and Nad Ali in 
Helmand.
55
 The operation was significant orders of magnitude larger then every previous 
ISAF effort; it included 15,000 forces, with the ANA and ANP integrated as full partners, as 
well as British, Canadian, Danish, Estonian, and U.S. troops.
56
 Innovations in operating 
procedures included an initial “shaping” phase (late 2009-February 2010) when shuras were 
held to inform the population and local leaders about the upcoming operation and assure 
them the coalition would stay in the area to consolidate security. When combat operations, 
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the “clearing” phase, began in February 2010, supporting fires were strictly controlled to 
avoid damaging civilian infrastructure and killing civilians.
57
 Once the major population 
centers were largely secured, in the spring, the District Delivery Program (DDP) was 
launched.
58
 ISAF understood consolidating successes would take time, and its increased 
resources meant it was ready for the Taliban resistance it encountered. Over the rest of the 
year, and through a series of complex engagements, it slowly achieved substantial results.
59
 
For example, clearing Marjah meant it could no longer serve as “a Taliban sanctuary, 
command-and-control node, and staging area.”60 By December, Marjah was “transformed . . 
. with new schools and a bustling market.”61 The “dramatic security progress” increased in 
2011 as “COIN operations expanded gains in central and southern Helmand Province.”62 
One observer remarked in October, “Marjah, once the epicenter of violence in Afghanistan, 
had turned remarkably peaceful.”63 Lashkar Gar and Nad Ali underwent a similar 
transformation; an officer who deployed there in 2009-2010 noted the dramatic 
improvement in economic activity in Laskar Gar. He stated when his unit first arrived “the 
streets were empty” but by the time it left, 18 months later, in November 2010, “the market 
was 4,000-5,000 people every day . . . the police wanted to be in Laskar Gar because they 
had everything they needed. You could buy anything you want . . . It’s an urban area and it’s 
growing and it was secure.”64 As a consequence, President Karzai announced in November 
2011 that the area would transition to Afghan security responsibility during the second 
transition phase
65
 which occurred in 2012 as the U.S. Marine surge forces withdrew. 
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 The surge in forces and material resources meant the coalition could turn to 
Kandahar, even as Operation Moshtarak continued, which was a vast improvement in the 
coalition’s organizational capacity. However the huge scale and complexity of operations 
also generated an additional organizational change. The span of control for the RC-South 
commander had become huge by early June 2010; he commanded some 65,000 troops 
whereas RC-East had 32,000 troops, RC-North had 8,000 troops, RC-West had 6,000 troops 
and RC-Capital had 5,000.
66
 Therefore, after receiving NAC approval on May 21, 2010, 
ISAF created RC-Southwest in June.
67
 It split Helmand Province and Nimroz Province from 
RC-South to create the new RC and it also incorporated three districts from RC-West’s 
Farah Province into it.
68
 The new regional command took over Moshtarak operations, 
allowing RC-South to concentrate on Operation Hamkari (Dari for “cooperation”) which it 
had initiated in April 2010. 
 The new operation was in effect an application of the ink-spot concept for it focused 
on securing Kandahar City and its environs and it was intended to connect the key districts 
and major population centers of Helmand to Kandahar, which lay along the ring road, 
Highway 1.
69
 The “shaping” phase of the operation, April-August 2010, was a little longer 
than Moshtarak had been, because RC-South applied a number of lessons learned from the 
earlier operation
70
 and it invested more time in building support for the operation among 
local leaders and the population.
71
 The “clearing” phase of Operation Hamkari began in 
September, and it involved some 7,000 troops. More significantly, for the first time Afghan 
forces outnumbered ISAF forces. Afghans also took the lead in some areas, which focused 
on Kandahar City and the districts to its west, Zhari, Panjawyi, and Arghandab.
72
 By 
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December 2010, an anonymous Taliban commander admitted, “the [Afghan] government 
has the upper had now” in Kandahar and “the local people are not willingly cooperating 
with us.”73 A year later, the coalition continued to solidify its gains. The Taliban’s campaign 
in 2011 to regain lost safe havens in Helmand and Kandahar and reassert dominance in 
Khowst, Paktika, and Paktia failed. Furthermore, RC-South noted improvements in Afghan 
governance capacity at district and provincial levels and as a result there was “increased 
overt popular support” for the government across Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul.74 Through 
2012, despite Taliban efforts to regain their lost territories, the security gains achieved in the 
Helmand and Kandahar provinces were sustained. The security situation in the other 
regional commands also improved, in some cases dramatically, as they also implemented 
more fully coordinated civilian-military operations.
75
 In fact, by mid-2012, large portions of 
RC-North, RC-West, and RC-Southwest had transitioned to the ANSF’s security 
responsibility, about half of RC-East was in transition, and in RC-South the entire Uruzgan 
Province and portions of Zabul and Kandahar were in transition. 
 To complement the coordinated civil-military campaign, ISAF increased special 
forces operations across the country, 2009-2011, as it reorganized their command and 
control structures. Most importantly, the ISAF commander was finally given operational 
control of CJSOTF-A in the spring of 2010 (up until that point, CENTCOM had retained 
operational control).
76
 General McChrystal also concurrently stood up a new organizational 
element, ISAF SOF. The creation of this staff element formalized what had previously been 
an informal coordination link between liaison officers from NATO SOF task forces in the 
regions and the ISAF command group.
77
 ISAF SOF was a command, control, and 
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coordination element for the NATO and partner SOF forces who had long been operating in 
the country but were not part of CJSOTF-A. It was supported by the NATO Special 
Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) at SHAPE, which provided SOF policy, doctrine, 
capabilities, standards, training, and education support for all NATO SOF operations.
 78
 This 
operational consolidation meant all military operations and missions were finally folded into 
ISAF control and it greatly enhanced the coalition’s unity of effort. 
 ISAF’s surge in special operations included precision strikes against insurgent 
leadership. It was assessed this would unbalance the insurgent coalition, degrade its 
capabilities, and undermine the enemy’s confidence, particularly as the coalition got ready 
to launch Moshtarak and Hamkari. General McChrystal then expanded the special operation 
missions by initiating village stability operations in the spring of 2010. This bottom-up 
initiative embedded 12-man teams into remote rural villages where the ANSF and ISAF 
presence was limited. They were a mechanism to connect district and provincial leaders, as 
well as the PRTs, to remote areas. The initiative started with five teams and it expanded 
quickly. By October 2011, the initiative had 6,000 troops engaged in 103 locations across 
the country. The initiative was considered highly effective.
79
 The precision strike operations 
were also successful in eroding the insurgent leadership. By early 2011, General Petraeus 
noted the “enormous losses” suffered among Taliban and Haqqani mid-level leaders which 
appeared to generate “unprecedented discord among members of the Quetta Shura.”80 
Intelligence sources also found some Taliban commanders were afraid to keep fighting.
81
 
Later in the year, ISAF commanders assessed the insurgents could no longer “mount co-
ordinated or complex attacks,” so they resorted to horrific high profile attacks, such as the 
September Haqqani attack in Kabul, when the group rocketed ISAF headquarters, the U.S. 
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Embassy, and Afghan government buildings.
82
 However, General Petraeus’ successor, 
General John Allen, noted that every one of the high profile attacks that year were handled 
by an increasingly capable ANSF “which responded promptly and courageously and 
effectively.”83 
 Finally, the operational-level organizational changes and re-structuring, and the 
shift in operational approach, generated organizational changes and new operating 
procedures within the regional command headquarters. According to an officer deployed in 
RC-North, after the IJC creation, “a complete new structure [was] established in all the 
regional commands . . . the staff were completely newly arranged, in order to integrate 
better the coordination with IJC.” The reorganization included the establishment of new 
staff elements, the most significant of which was the Forward Planning Cell which was a 
sub-division of the Operations Department. The staff element’s primary responsibility 
reflected the coalition’s increasing emphasis on partnership with Afghan forces with a view 
to eventually putting Afghans in the lead of security operations. The cell acted as a bridge 
that linked the operational planning efforts of the RC staff with the ANSF; it coordinated 
directly with ANA corps and brigade commanders, as well as ANP elements, to ensure the 
development of combined operational plans that synchronized ANSF activities with 
coalition battle groups and PRTs operating on the ground.
84
 This staff element facilitated the 
development and execution of combined Afghan-coalition operations and then pushed the 
Afghans into the lead. 
 Another regional command innovation was less effective. In addition to the 
traditional departments found in an operational headquarters – personnel, intelligence, 
operations, logistics, communications – a new department was created in 2011, the Stability 
Department. Its mission and function was to coordinate with all the civil partners operating 
in the region – UNAMA and other UN organizations, USAID and other national foreign aid 
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organizations, the Red Cross and other NGOs, etc. The idea was to better synchronize the 
RC’s COIN operations with the development activities of civil partners, because coalition 
forces assessed the center of gravity for operational success in Afghanistan was civil 
development.
85
 Better RC coordination would also facilitate the security transition process 
and coalition withdrawal. However, the Stability Departments were never adequately 
resourced. According to the officer who led this department in RC-North, he had a staff of 
20 multinational personnel, none of whom were “specialists in civil affairs,” while the 
Operations Department had 200 staff assigned.
86
 Furthermore, many NGOs were extremely 
wary of contact with coalition forces which meant coordination was always inconsistent and 
haphazard. 
 Sufficient security gains had been achieved by November 2010 that the allies 
announced at the NATO Lisbon Summit their decision “to stay the course” with their 
comprehensive approach and they announced their intention to transition security 
responsibility to the ANSF and conclude the ISAF mission by December 2014.
87
 In 
addition, they announced NATO would remain engaged in Afghanistan after 2014, and as 
such signed a “Declaration on an Enduring Partnership” with the Afghan government.88 The 
allies also announced a new strategic concept for NATO, which acknowledged that counter-
insurgency, along with stabilization and reconstruction, were enduring missions.
89
 This was 
a validation of the Alliance’s expanded strategic culture for it formally incorporated and 
institutionalized what ISAF had been doing for more than four years. Overall, it seemed the 
increase in resources, organizational changes, and revised operational approach had 
produced sufficient operational gains to sustain national political will and thus operational 
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commitment. This in turn enabled the start of the security transition in 2011 as well as the 
shift in ISAF’s main effort from combat operations to NTM-A’s training and mentoring 
initiatives. 
 The high point of the violence was the summer of 2010. It was not clear to the 
coalition at the time, but that year was also a tipping point in the conflict, when the 
correlation of forces began to shift to the side of ISAF. In any event, 2008-2010 was a very 
tough period, when coalition fighting and fatalities greatly increased. The pressure of the 
conflict could have frayed cohesion but the allies and partners stay engaged, even though it 
was “a time of tumbling European defence spending” due to the global financial crisis.90 
More surprisingly, the ISAF coalition increased from 40 members to 48. The interaction of 
the analytical framework’s two drivers continued to produce cohesion. Political will 
provided resources and substantial organizational changes and adaptations in operating 
procedures generated concrete operational successes. 
 The clearest demonstrations of the intent to stay engaged, and thus enduring 
political will, were the decisions to surge military forces and material resources. The 
American troop increase, in particular, and the U.S. assumption of a leadership role helped 
hold the coalition together at a critical time. In effect, continued U.S. engagement in 
Afghanistan and the massive American troop increase “pulled along” the other members and 
influenced the decisions of allies to stay and to increase their forces. Secretary Gates’ 
recounting of the Obama administration’s deliberations suggests there was no distinction 
between domestic and alliance politics for the administration. While the president and his 
advisors framed their decisions within a domestic politics context, and within the context of 
a struggle between the military bureaucracy (which was distrusted) and the new 
administration, once their decisions were made they informed NATO and assumed the 
Alliance would go along with any shift in approach.
91
 The allies did. Furthermore, the U.S. 
position influenced the non-NATO partners, which numbered 15 by 2010 but later 
                                                 
90
 “Fewer dragons, more snakes.” 
91
 Gates, Duty, 337, 338, 349, 350. 
197 
 
increased. For example, Bosnia-Herzegovina and El Salvador joined the coalition in 2011; 
they respectively provided troops to guard a base in Helmand and trainers for NTM-A.  
 Political will among the allies and partners was based on the belief that an ISAF 
failure or precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan would be catastrophic for the Alliance. 
It would be taken by al Qaeda and other jihadist groups as a strategic victory on par with the 
Soviet-Afghan war because it would be not only another defeat of a superpower, but of the 
entire international community. There was also a belief it would result in a surge of terrorist 
camps and training in the region, which would destabilize Afghanistan and undermine 
Pakistan.
92
 But this was only one strategic reason for the enduring political will. For some 
countries, joining and staying was simple, for example, according to a Hungarian officer 
deployed in RC-North, for Hungary it was all about Alliance solidarity - literally “together 
in and together out.”93 For other countries, over time the national reasons for staying became 
multiple and layered over each other. New Zealand joined the coalition in 2001 out of 
solidarity with the United States after 9/11 and in the face of a shared jihadist threat. Its 
commitment then endured for humanitarian reasons; the reconstruction efforts of its PRT in 
Bamiyan helped the Afghan people. A desire to strengthen the New Zealand-U.S. 
relationship became the third reason for the country’s contribution, after a change in 
government.
94
 Italian contributions were initially based on a desire to play a larger role on 
the world stage and as an unstated “pay-back” for allied assistance in stabilizing the 
Balkans.
95
 However, honoring the agreements made at NATO also mattered for Italy, 
therefore once it promised to support ISAF, the government was determined it would see it 
through until NATO decided to end the mission and withdraw.
96
 Germany initially joined 
coalition operations in Afghanistan due to sympathy for the United States and a desire to 
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 The government also invoked Alliance solidarity and loyalty to allies to justify its 
contribution. It subsequently cited moral reasons for its involvement – it was fighting for 
democracy and human rights.
98
 After the Iraq intervention, Germany increased its 
commitment to Afghanistan to repair relations with the United States and to demonstrate to 
its other allies it was still a reliable partner.
99
 As the security situation deteriorated, it stayed 
because it could not abandon a mission that was incomplete.
100
 It wanted to complete the 
mission successfully, particularly since it wanted NATO as a security institution to be 
successful. Finally, Germany remained committed to Afghanistan out of a sense of 
obligation and responsibility to the 17 contributing nations that depended on it as the lead 
nation for RC-North.
101
 National reasons for contributions seemed to develop into a 
complex mosaic based on intertwined domestic and alliance politics. 
 Collective political will was expressed in the Alliance’s Lisbon Summit declaration, 
for there was continuing consensus among the allies that ISAF needed to continue to 
fight.
102
 Non-NATO partners also continued to express their commitment, for example, 
Australia’s Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, visited Afghanistan shortly after assuming office 
and she assured President Karzai her country would continue to support the ISAF 
mission.
103
 However, the contributing nations also started to temper their statements; they 
had no desire to stay indefinitely. Danish Prime Minister Lars Rasmussen stated during a 
visit to his troops that “We are determined to end our mission . . . But we must not get so 
carried away that all will slip between our hands.”104 Secretary General Rasmussen reflected 
the allied view when he stated at a NATO press conference in the summer of 2010 that 
“Allies and partners will stay committed as long as it takes to finish the job. Obviously, that 
                                                 
97
 Colonel Uwe Hartmann, German Army.  
98
 “Merkel’s Caution: Berlin Reverts to Old Timidity on Military Missions,” Spiegel Online, March 
26, 2013. 
99
 Colonel Uwe Hartmann, German Army. 
100
 Lieutenant Colonel Jürgen Prandtner, German Army (served as the commander of battle group 
battalion in Regional Command-Capital, ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, June-December 2007), interview 
with author at Carlisle Barracks, PA, January 14, 2014. 
101
 Colonel Uwe Hartmann, German Army. 
102
 “NATO after the summit: Harmony – for now.” 
103
 “Australian PM Visits Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, October 3, 2010. 
104




does not mean forever.”105 The allies and partners were starting to think about withdrawal, 
but they did not want to throw away the hard won gains. The transition plan gave them a 
roadmap for ending the mission. 
 National political will was reinforced by organizational capacity changes within 
NATO, ISAF, and national militaries. The hard fighting was taken as an opportunity for 
learning and adjustment – in organizational structures which affected the command and 
control of ISAF forces, in mission execution and operating procedures, in doctrine and 
training, and in national force structures. For example, at the strategic level NATO finally 
published a COIN doctrine in February 2011
106
 and incorporated COIN operations into its 
training institutions and programs, such as the mission rehearsal exercises at the NATO 
training facilities in Stavanger, Norway and Bydgoszcz, Poland.
107
 The Alliance also refined 
the forums that allowed non-NATO contributing nations to share information, be more 
involved in “policy-shaping,” and have their voices heard in decision-making.108 At the 
operational level, ISAF commanders continually assessed and tinkered with the command 
structures. They never stopped trying to create a more functional command and control 
configuration, but the evolutions literally took months and years because major changes 
required NATO and national government approval. There was also a down side to the 
constant changes: it meant constant disruption.  
 In general, ISAF’s operational expansion impelled many allies and partners to 
adjust their equipment and training programs and as such it accelerated the reform of Cold 
War legacy forces into expeditionary formations.
109
 For a number of countries, reform was 
slow and it occurred in the face of a difficult fiscal environment. For example, Italy 
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developed a more capable and professional military only by reducing its size and slowing 
modernization.
110
 Canada wasted no time after 2006 in gathering lessons learned from 
Kandahar and making adjustments in training and operational practices. It published its own 
COIN manual in 2008 and implemented a reformed COIN approach in 2009.
111
 German 
reform efforts were slower because of the more stable conditions in RC-North, however 
repeated attacks by insurgents in Kunduz after 2006 induced change. As one officer stated, 
“We recognized that we had a lot of deficiencies in terms of capabilities and some doctrinal 
elements . . . the overall question was really how to improve.” The German army not only 
updated officer training but in 2010 it also deployed two full battle groups to Mazar-e-Sharif 
and Kunduz. Their offensive operations against insurgents were supported by about 5,000 
U.S. surge forces and additional enablers (intelligence capabilities, MEDEVAC, and combat 
air support).
112
 German forces later expanded their offensive operations to Feyzabad and 
Baghlan.
113
 For historical reasons, the German Army was hesitant to publicly utilize the 
term “counter-insurgency operations,” preferring the more neutral term “networked 
security.” It also heavily emphasized the civilian and reconstruction aspects of its 
operations.
114
 The UK was also slow to apply and update COIN doctrine and reform 
training. Despite suffering “painful lessons” in Basra, Iraq and years of “mowing the grass” 
in Helmand, it did not open a COIN Centre to train units deploying to Afghanistan until 
June 2009.
115
 National reform efforts were therefore uneven and often lagging. 
 The repeated public statements of national and NATO commitment and the 
significant efforts to improve organizational capacities occurred during the most violent 
phase of the conflict in Afghanistan. As mentioned, the fraying pressures of combat 
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continued. It can be inferred the U.S. assumption of a leadership role provided the top-down 
cohesion needed to sustain collective political will. By the time all its surge forces arrived in 
country in 2010, the United States had more than 100,000 troops committed, which meant it 
carried the vast preponderance of the operational burden. U.S. leadership was accompanied 
by unilateral behaviors, some of which the allies tolerated. Despite the SACEUR having 
originally been given the official role of selecting the ISAF commanders, the Obama 
administration repeatedly made unilateral decisions and did not consult with NATO about 
the command position before making official announcements. This was a change from the 
Bush administration. President Bush had nominated Generals Dan McNeill and David 




 ISAF commanders to the NATO Secretary General and 
SACEUR. He left it to the SACEUR to make the formal selection. The succession of U.S. 
leaders was not the result of a formal decision by the Alliance to henceforth have the 
mission led by an American. At the time it was taken by NATO as a logical proposal given 
the fact the U.S. was by far the largest contributor to ISAF and the effort in Afghanistan.
116
  
However, the precedent of U.S. leadership was taken as a given by the Obama 
administration and it brushed aside the SACEUR’s role in the process. The president 
relieved General McKiernan in May 2009 because he was resistant to shifting to a more 
aggressive approach. General McChrystal was relieved on June 23, 2010 after the 
publication of an article in Rolling Stone magazine that was politically damaging to the 
administration and the president informed his National Security Council of his decision to 
replace him with General Petraeus before informing the Alliance.
117
 The McKiernan relief 
came as a surprise to NATO officials and the SACEUR, General John Craddock, in 
particular was “shocked and upset” with the way the replacement was done.118 However, 
Alliance officials accommodated the decision to maintain the image of allied unity and 
Secretary General Rasmussen publicly validated the change in procedure a year later after 
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the McChrystal relief when he congratulated General Petreaus in July 2010, upon his initial 
visit as ISAF commander to Brussels, on his appointment and unanimous U.S. Senate 
confirmation.
119
 The allies arguably accepted this unilateral behavior because the United 
States had not only solved the burden-sharing problem, but also opened the door to the 
withdrawal process. The initiation of the transition plan meant national governments could 
soon end the annual process of gaining parliamentary approval to extend the mandates for 
their troop deployments.  
However, other unilateral behavior was not accepted. The initial CENTCOM 
planning, in late 2008-early 2009, for the deployment of U.S. surge forces unilaterally 
changed operational boundaries in RC-South and moved some allies to different operational 
areas. This was an extremely sensitive issue for the contributing nations who had “put a lot 
of money” and expended “in some cases a lot of bloodshed” during the previous three years 
and they were “not willing to change responsibilities in an instant,” particularly when they 
were not consulted. The RC-South commander, Lieutenant General Mart de Kruif, and his 
senior staff interjected themselves into the planning process and persuaded the CENTCOM 
staff to change the plan. In the end, together, they “came up with the best possible plan that 
accommodated all participating parties the best.”120 General McChrystal’s arrival at ISAF 
headquarters also made waves. For a number of years, he maintained a trusted circle of staff 
officers who travelled with him from assignment to assignment. Upon his arrival in Kabul, 
he tried to replace the allies who were filling senior staff positions with his team, but he 
officially could not because they had been negotiated at SHAPE planning conferences. 
Instead, he excluded them from his planning efforts, which included primarily U.S. officers 
and a few British officers. The behavior set a damaging tone which was not overcome until 
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 Despite the disturbances created by successive ISAF commander changes, the surge 
in troop numbers, material resources and operational enablers, in combination with the 
change in operational approach, the execution of operations that were significant orders of 
magnitude larger than all previous coalition operations, the command structure adjustments, 
and the doctrinal and training reforms had an impact on the coalition’s ability to conduct 
both combat and non-combat operations. Canadian-led COIN operations in Kandahar were 
successful in securing the city in 2009 even before the U.S. surge forces arrived or ISAF 
initiated its reformed civilian-military approach.
122
 Overall, coalition forces prevailed in 
every direct engagement with insurgent forces and usually inflicted “devastating losses” on 
the attackers. Even the ANA showed “itself superior to the enemy in every major 
firefight.”123 The commanders on the ground were confident they could beat back the 
insurgency as troop numbers surged, and many of the officers interviewed noted they had an 
increasingly capable Afghan partner to assist them. As the transition began in 2011, the 
coalition formally assessed the intensive partnering efforts were translating into “a more 
capable and effective ANSF.”124 It expressed confidence the ANSF was “capable of 
assuming the lead for security responsibility throughout Afghanistan” in the spring of 
2012.
125
 The positive Afghan public perception that the ANSF and security ministries were 
“capable and legitimate security providers for Afghanistan” was supported by their 
increasing operational sophistication. By 2012, in the most contested regions of RC-South 
and RC-East, the ANSF was able to plan and conduct “large-scale, multi-day operations” 
which integrated military and police forces.
126
 The troops on the ground, both Afghan and 
international, therefore, continued to generate bottom-up cohesion. The improvements in 
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organizational capacity and operational performance sustained political will. The combat 
and stabilization operations of the troops on the ground were not the only activities ISAF 
conducted, however. 
ISAF’s Other Warfare 
 The apogee of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan was 2011 when the coalition 
reached 50 members and troop numbers topped out at over 132,000.
127
 While the combat 
activity encompassed in the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations received 
the most attention, the less visible activities were the most important for the long-term 
security of the Afghan state and ISAF’s ability to withdraw on time. By 2011, the 
coalition’s non-combat activities were wide ranging, they included new and expanded 
missions and activities, and ANSF development and ministerial mentoring had become the 
main effort. As such, when ISAF and NATO leaders pressed for additional troop 
contributions after 2010, they were not looking for more combat forces, but for more 
trainers and advisors. 
 Lieutenant General William Caldwell, the first commander of NTM-A/CSTC-A, 
oversaw a substantial organizational adaptation effort within his command in 2010 which 
was oriented on increasing and expanding NTM-A’s training, advising, and mentoring 
activities to support the Afghan surge. This surge encompassed a push to increase both the 
quantity and the quality of the ANSF; this in turn required more coalition trainers and 
mentors. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the target goals for the ANA and ANP had 
increased between 2002 and 2008. They increased again in 2010 and 2011. Since the 
international community provided all of the funds for ANSF forces,
128
 decisions on end-
strength goals for the ANA and ANP had to be negotiated among the donor countries, key 
international organizations (NATO, UN, and EU), and the Afghan government. The Joint 
Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), which included representatives from all these 
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entities, was set up in 2006 to oversee, coordinate, and make decisions related to the 
benchmarks in the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS).
129
 The ANSF was a key element of the security benchmarks. Due to the 
increasing violence in the conflict, and the clear intent of the coalition to withdraw within a 
few years, the JCMB decided in January 2010 to increase the end-strength goal for the ANA 
to 171,600 and the goal for the ANP to 134,00 (by October 2011).
130
 In June 2011, they 
increased the goals again: to 195,000 for the ANA and 157,000 for the ANP (by October 
2012).
131
 To accommodate the expanded ANA force structure, the Ministry of Defense 
activated a sixth Afghan corps, the 215
th
 Corps, in 2010 as RC-Southwest stood up.
132
 As a 
consequence, Lieutenant General Caldwell assessed he had a requirement for 5,200 trainers 
and he attended his first force generation conference at NATO in February 2010 with a 
request for the allies and partners to fill his 1,200 trainer shortfall as quickly as possible.
133
 
Secretary General Rasmussen encapsulated why the trainers were so important: “No 
trainers, no transition.”134 
 NTM-A’s collective focus was to help the MOD and MOI build professional, self-
sustaining forces. Besides increasing the through-put capacity of ANSF training at the 70 
ANA and ANP training centers scattered across the country,
135
 Lieutenant General Caldwell 
led an effort to reform existing training programs and initiate new ones. Leader development 
training was improved in the basic army and police courses and NTM-A developed new 
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courses for mid-grade and senior level leaders.
136
 It expanded the specialty schools and 
courses from eight to twelve and they included intelligence, legal, military police, logistics, 
transportation, medical, finance, artillery, signal/communications, and personnel/human 
resources.
137
 It also reformed the police training programs. It instituted “internationally 
recognized and certified programs of instruction” that were also implemented by EUPOL, 
the German Police Project Team, and the other bilateral police training efforts. Not only did 
the new AUP recruits attend an eight-week training course before assignment to their police 
districts, but the programs shifted the focus of training from paramilitary tasks which 
supported COIN operations to traditional civilian law enforcement functions. As such they 
included human rights training, rule of law training, and investigative techniques.
138
 As the 
reformed programs were implemented, the FDD program was formally ended in February 
2012.
139
 ISAF and NTM-A also supported the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program which 
had been initiated by the Afghan government and MOI. The ALP served as “neighborhood 
watch” elements to improve local security, especially in rural areas. They were trained by 
the AUP and coalition forces conducting village stability operations and NTM-A provided 
weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment.
140
 
 NTM-A also undertook activities that were unexpected and unprecedented. It 
assessed that low literacy levels was an area it could not ignore. A functional level of 
literacy was necessary for the long-term viability of the ANSF. So NTM-A adapted to the 
conditions of the environment it found itself in and initiated an extremely ambitious literacy 
and numeracy education program. While OMC-A had started literacy training years before, 
it had not been mandatory. In 2010, NTM-A assessed that about 14% of incoming recruits 
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were literate and among current ANSF members the literacy rate for officers was about 
93%, for NCOs it was about 35%, and for enlisted about 11%. Lieutenant General Caldwell 
therefore decided to make literacy training (in Dari and Pashto) mandatory for all military 
and police and embedded educational programs in all the training courses. The goal was to 
ensure members of the ANSF had functional levels of literacy. This would mean all soldiers 
and police could perform such tasks as read a basic maintenance manual, submit a supply 
requisition, read their weapon’s serial number, write a simple report, and verify they had 
received the correct pay. Increased literacy would also enable the establishment of durable 
accountability and logistics programs, and serve as the foundation for specialist skills, all of 
which were critical for self-sustaining security forces over the long term.
141
 To support the 
requirement, NTM-A hired over 3,000 Afghan teachers.
142
 It also found the literacy 
programs were hugely popular among young Afghans.
143
 
 The expanded and reformed training efforts resulted in a number of tangible 
improvements in recruitment and retention. The ANSF met their recruiting goals in 2010 
and 2011 and reduced attrition levels, even as it expanded its ANA and ANP end-strength 
goals. By 2011, so many young Afghans were volunteering to serve that NTM-A literally 
had to turn away more than a thousand of them each month because the number of 
volunteers exceeded the recruiting requirements. As a result, the ANSF met the target of 
352,000 ANA and ANP forces by October 2012. In addition, since the beginning of the 
effort to build the ANSF in 2002, the coalition had been acutely conscious of the ethnic 
composition of the forces. In particular, it had worked hard to build an ANA that reflected 
Afghan society and the relative percentages of the main ethnic groups, Pashtun, Tajik, 
Hazara, and Uzbek, but for years southern Pashtuns did not volunteer. This changed in 
2011, likely as a result of intensive recruiting efforts as well as the operational security gains 
achieved in the south. That year, NTM-A noted an increasing trend in southern Pashtun 
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 It had set the goal of 4% of new recruits from this demographic, but it 
exceeded it - with 10.9%.
145
 
 Finally, since NTM-A ultimately wanted to work itself out of its job, it instituted a 
train-the-trainer program to prepare and certify Afghans who would step into the role of 
trainers.
146
 It began to formally turn over responsibility for training to Afghans at ANA and 
ANP training centers in late 2011.
147
 The turn-over included subsequent evaluation of 
Afghan instructors and recommendations for improvements.
148
 By the end of 2013, Afghans 
were conducting more than 90% of the training and NTM-A was reducing its trainers.
149
 In 
2014, it turned over the training facilities themselves to the Afghans.
150
 
 Competent and professional security forces needed competent ministerial oversight 
and leadership. While ministerial development and mentoring efforts had begun years 
before by OMC-A, CSTC-A, and the ISAF headquarters, NTM-A expanded the MOD and 
MOI mentoring programs. In particular, it significantly increased the number of full-time 
military advisors/mentors assigned to key personnel in both ministries.
151
 Prior to NTM-A’s 
creation there were eight full-time advisors in the MOD and a handful in the MOI (a small 
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number of contractors also worked as full-time advisors). NTM-A increased the MOD 
advisors to over 100.
152
 The MOI full-time advisors increased to over 200 (this included 
bilateral contributions from EUPOL, the French Gendarmerie, the Italian Carabinieri, the 
Dutch Marechaussee, and German Grenz Polizei).
153
 NTM-A also implemented a new 
training initiative to improve the quality of the military advisors. It created an Advisors 
Course, since the military officers assigned as advisors received no preparatory training 
before their deployments to Afghanistan. It identified specific fields of expertise and 
experiences needed for specific positions, for example the Advisor to the Minister of 
Interior had to be a military police officer, but it also took into account personalities. Final 
decisions for the key advisors were based on an assessment of whether they would be a 
personality fit with the Afghan they would be advising.
154
 Finally, since NTM-A focused the 
advising/mentoring effort on developing and assessing the strategic level institutional 
functions of the ministries, it initiated the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program 
in the summer of 2010.
155
 This program brought in senior level U.S. Department of Defense 
civilians with unique skills “to improve Afghan institutional-level competencies in strategic 
planning, policy analysis and development, installation management, budget, finance, 
logistics, personnel and education, legal systems, and accountability.” These advisors 
received six weeks of special training before their deployment, they were assigned within 
the MOD, MOI, and Afghan General Staff, and they numbered almost 90 by late 2011.
156
 
 The ISAF headquarters and IJC were not involved in the ministerial 
advisor/mentoring efforts, but they did assign coalition officers as liaisons to a wide variety 
of Afghan ministries. They called this “ministerial outreach.” The liaisons served multiple 
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purposes. They were information conduits between ISAF and the ministries and they helped 
each side understand the intentions and actions of the other. They assisted the capacity 
building of the ministries because they gained insights into areas where the ministries 
needed help. For example, liaison activities included coordinating ISAF airlift to fly 
ministers out to the provinces and districts, and finding funding sources to equip ministries 
with computer systems and to make civil servant pay more comparable with the pay 
received by Afghans working for the international community.
157
 Their most important role 
was facilitating the integration of the Afghan ministries into the governance and economic 
development lines of effort of the ISAF operations across the country. One liaison was 
assigned to a ministry cluster – the Ministry of Mines, Ministry of Urban Development, 
Ministry of Public Works, and Ministry of Energy and Water – and he stated to the author 
he was explicitly given the mission of “connecting” the central government via his ministers 
to the provinces and districts – so they could listen to villagers, coordinate economic 
projects, and make the Afghan governmental processes and systems work.
158
 Another 
liaison was assigned to the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) and he 
helped integrate it into IJC’s operational planning effort as it updated Operation Omid in 
2010. He also facilitated the IDLG’s governance role in the COIN operations in 
Kandahar.
159
 The emphasis on ministerial development and outreach in 2009 and later was 
part of ISAF trying to work itself out of a job. Enabling the relevant Afghan ministries to 
execute the security, governance, and economic development lines of effort on their own, or 
with minimal international assistance, would facilitate the transition and ISAF’s withdrawal. 
 The overlap of IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A was not limited to the assignment of 
coalition officers to the Afghan ministries. Even though IJC took over control of the ANA 
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and ANP training/mentoring teams, NTM-A still played a support role, because it provided 
funding to them.
160
 It also funded and ran the ANA and ANP regional training centers, it 
funded and coordinated the building of new infrastructure (bases and barracks) to support 
the new Afghan units being created to support the Afghan surge, and it provided logistical 
and training support to the Afghan formations once they were assigned to the ANA Corps 
(this included such activities as fielding new equipment, paying for fuel, and providing 
literacy and driver’s training). This NTM-A support was provided through Regional Support 
Commands (RSC) that it established in the five regions (north, west, south, east, and 
capital); they mirrored ISAF’s regional command structure.161  
 While ETT/OMLTs and PMT/POMLTs had been embedded in ANA and ANP 
units since 2003, their roles and functions adapted over time as their assigned Afghan units 
became more operationally competent. They essentially went from being trainers, coaches, 
and mentors, to being combat advisors and partners. They also served as liaison elements to 
ISAF forces to coordinate the provision of coalition combat air support, artillery support, or 
MEDEVAC support to ANSF formations engaged in combat operations. The 
OMLT/POMLT mission surged after 2009 to keep pace with the increase in ANSF end-
strength and ISAF set the hugely ambitious goal of embedding mentoring teams throughout 
the army and police formations. For the ANA, it wanted a team in every kandak, brigade, 
and corps, as well as at garrison-level, and for the ANP it wanted teams in every district and 
province police station, and in the ANCOP and border police kandaks. This generated a 
huge need from the contributing nations. According to the officer who coordinated the 
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assignment of all army and police mentoring teams, 2009-2010, at any one time he was 
tracking some 13,000 coalition troops. It was a hugely complex task, since most teams 
deployed for only six months, they varied in size (from a dozen to 40 members) and nations 
set caveats on the types of units (such as infantry, artillery, or logistics units) their troops 
could train/mentor, or where their teams could operate.
162
 Despite constant calls by NATO 
leaders for more national contributions, there were chronic shortfalls in fielded teams.
163
 
ISAF never met its goals. 
 The teams were also trying to work themselves out of their job, and as such they 
submitted unit assessment reports to IJC every six to eight weeks.
164
 The idea was to bring 
the units to “Capability Milestone 1”165 at which point they could plan, coordinate, and 
execute operations independently. Once a unit reached this level, the OMLT/POMLT would 
be removed. However, ISAF still assigned a small liaison element at brigade level to 
coordinate ISAF enablers when necessary (close air support, medical support).
166
 ISAF 
initially called these elements Military Advisory Teams (MAT) and Police Advisory Teams 
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 but shifted to the generic term of Security Force Assistance Teams 
(SFAT) by the end of the year.
168
 While there were still shortfalls in SFAT teams as ISAF 
was withdrawing, there were also a large number of ANSF units that did not need them. For 
example, ISAF assessed there were 90 ANA and 356 ANP units (kandaks, police stations, 




 The non-combat activities of training, advising, and mentoring were complemented 
by the activities of the PRTs, the initiation of counter-narcotics operations, and coordination 
with a surge in Pakistani Army operations in the FATA and NWFP. Like the training and 
advising missions, the PRT mission expanded over time. By 2010, there were 28 PRTs 
spread across the country (see Appendix 5), their size varied from 80 to 600 members, and 
they engaged in a wide range of activities since they responded to the conditions within their 
provinces. The focus of the PRTs also shifted over time since they also wanted to work 
themselves out of a job.  
 As previously noted, the PRTs were the primary element in the coalition’s 
economic development line of effort. They also complemented the ministerial mentoring 
efforts by their bottom-up mentoring and facilitation of local governance. They were 
initially oriented on “quick wins” and “quick impact” projects in a variety of areas: 
education (building and supplying schools), health (building clinics and hospitals), power 
generation (micro-hydro and micro-solar projects), agriculture (irrigation and canal projects, 
assistance to farmers), and rural development (digging wells, building roads and bridges, 
building police stations and other local administrative buildings). These projects were 
coordinated and prioritized in consultation with the local Afghans (provincial and district 
leadership, and the local representatives from the ministries of education, health, agriculture, 
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rural development, public works, etc.). They tried to synchronize these short term 
development projects with the longer term view and efforts of UNAMA, USAID, and other 
national and international development agencies. They supported the security operations of 
the battle groups in their areas by providing humanitarian relief, and conducting medical and 
veterinary assistance activities. Many were involved in police training, some interacted and 
negotiated with the leaders of rival groups to reduce ethnic and tribal tensions, and they 
provided election assistance, when necessary. Over time, especially as the coalition started 
to think about withdrawal, the PRTs realized they needed to spend far more time on 
developing Afghan capacities. They shifted from coordinating and managing development 
projects themselves to facilitating the various Afghan players’ ability to do it. As such, they 
worked to connect the villages, districts, and provinces to the agencies of the central 
government. They also mentored district and provincial Afghan officials on how to create 
and manage a provincial development plan, build and manage a budget, identify and 
prioritize projects, solicit funding, and then execute projects.
170
 They essentially played a 
key role in developing local governance – showing Afghans how provincial and district 
level governance should work. 
 Since Afghanistan was essentially an agrarian society with a massive need for 
development assistance and there were so few civilian agricultural experts in the PRTs (in 
most cases this was represented by one USAID officer), the United States augmented the 
capacities of the PRTs operating in RC-South and RC-East, 2008-2012, by deploying 15 
Agri-business Development Teams (ADT). These small teams included 12-15 agriculture 
subject matter experts who worked in partnership with the PRTs, USAID, and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. They primarily focused on human capital development, 
                                                 
170
 A number of the officers interviewed described PRT activities: Colonel Ivar Omsted, Norwegian 
Army; Colonel Romulusz Ruszin, Hungarian Army; Lieutenant Colonel Hugh McAslan, New 
Zealand Army; Lieutenant Colonel Mindaugas Steponvacicius, Lithuanian Army; Lieutenant Colonel 
Eric Shafa, U.S. Air Force; Lieutenant Colonel Brent Grometer, U.S. Air Force; First Sergeant 
(retired) Robert Browne, U.S. Army (served as the first sergeant of a Provincial Reconstruction 
Team, Laghman Province, Regional Command-East, ISAF, Afghanistan, April 2006-April 2007), 
interview with author at Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 20, 2012; and Officer A. 
215 
 
specifically, mentoring the agriculture extension agents in the districts and the provincial 
Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock.
171
 
 As IJC stood up and developed ISAF’s national civil-military campaign plan, it also 
administered more oversight of the PRTs by hosting periodic conferences which included 
the provincial governors. The IJC Commander communicated his overall vision for ISAF 
operations and he issued specific guidance to the PRTs. By late 2010, this guidance was 
oriented on transition and as a consequence the PRTs began submitting reports through the 
regional commands to IJC that assessed “how self-sustaining Afghans were in the area of 
security, in the area of development, and in the area of governance.” The reports were 
needed to help make transition decisions and to identify when the PRTs could close 
down.
172
 The goal was to phase out the PRTs as the security transition occurred. 
 The increased oversight and control did not inhibit innovation and flexibility among 
the regions and the PRTs, however. For example, in the west, south, and east, the battle 
space of the regions was “assigned” to specific battalion or brigade battle groups. The other 
elements operating in the space, PRTs, OMLT/POMLTs, were subordinate to these battle 
space owners and they coordinated and synchronized their activities with these combat 
forces. RC-North was different. For example, the Hungarian PRT in Baghlan Province was 
designated the battle space owner in 2011. Even though the multinational forces in the PRT 
were prohibited by national caveats from engaging in combat operations, they accompanied 
the German battle group and the ANA and ANP units in the province on partnered 
operations, and the PRT commander was responsible for coordinating the activities of all the 
coalition and ANSF elements in COIN operations.
173
 Norway took innovation one step 
further by creating a hybrid organization that combined both its battle group and its PRT in 
Faryab Province after the attack on the PRT in 2006. Due to its combined security, 
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development, governance mission, this Task Force Faryab/PRT Faryab was the largest PRT 
in Afghanistan – with 600 members.174 Germany also created combined battle group/PRT 
task forces in Kunduz and Feyzabad.
175
 As with the ministerial mentors and the 
OMLT/POMLTs, by 2010-2011, the PRTs were increasingly pushing their Afghan partners 
to take the lead role in local governance and development activities, and they began closing 
down or handing over projects.
176
 The first PRT closed in 2011 and the rest closed over the 
next three years (see Appendix 5). 
 ISAF’s involvement in counter-narcotic operations, a new mission, was slow and 
incremental because it was initially perceived as an area where civilian agencies in the 
international community, with the United Kingdom acting as lead nation, would support the 
Afghan government. A number of allies were also reluctant to get involved, for example, as 
the ISAF mission expanded across Afghanistan and Germany took responsibility for RC-
North, the German government, while acknowledging that opium poppy cultivation was a 
“major problem” in Afghanistan, insisted it was “a matter for the Afghans.” It therefore 
limited German military support to “logistical assistance.”177  
 The Afghan government recognized the narcotics industry threatened the country 
and as early as 2002 the Afghan Interim Administration banned opium poppy cultivation 
and began a limited eradication campaign.
178
 President Karzai’s government later took a 
number of steps to stop the illicit narcotics industry: it ratified relevant UN conventions; it 
criminalized opium cultivation, production, use, and smuggling; it created a Ministry of 
Counter-Narcotics and a special division of counter-narcotics police; and it implemented 
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 At its most fundamental, Afghanistan had to create from the ground 
up a society governed by the rule of law, with sufficient police forces, and a functioning 
justice system in order to eliminate the illicit opium economy. It also needed to deal with the 
extreme poverty of the vast majority of the Afghan population and give farmers a viable 
alternative to poppy, with an infrastructure that could support the agricultural sector – to 
include roads, markets, storage, and distribution networks. By 2008, this was all still 
nascent. In the meantime, the opium economy exploded. According to the UN, Afghanistan 
produced 90% of the world’s illegal opium by the end of 2007. It represented over half of 
the country’s GDP. The export value of the opiates produced was estimated to be some $4 
billion, about three-quarters of which went to the insurgent coalition, drug traffickers, and 
“warlords.”180 The Taliban coalition also became much more deeply involved. It not only 
taxed drug shipments, and collaborated with traffickers to provide protection to the 
shipments and heroin refining facilities in the areas it controlled, but it also began running 
its own refineries and created opium storage and distribution networks to support local 
insurgent commanders.
181
 The illicit narcotics industry therefore became an incubator of 
insurgency, criminal activity, and corruption (that affected all levels of Afghan society and 
its government), and as such it threatened every element of ISAF’s comprehensive 
approach. 
 Essentially, ISAF could not avoid becoming involved in counter-narcotics, 
especially since the Afghan government repeatedly asked it to do more to help. By early 
2008, it was providing indirect support by training and equipping the various police forces, 
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and providing intelligence and logistics assistance. It also helped the government explain its 
counter-narcotics policy to the Afghan people, by, for example, explicitly stating that ISAF 
was not involved in eradication.
182
 At the April 2008 Summit in Bucharest, the allies 
declared they would “support Afghan-led efforts to tackle the narcotics problem.”183 
According to the SACEUR, General Craddock, the summit was a pivotal moment when the 
Alliance “resolved to play a heightened role in the counter-narcotics effort.”184 The decision 
legitimized counter-narcotics operations as a valid military mission and ISAF activity 
subsequently expanded.  
 In September 2008, the NAC discussed how NATO could maximize its efforts to 
support the Afghan government,
185
 and in October allied leaders agreed to allow ISAF to 
conduct interdiction operations against facilitators (insurgents and traffickers) and facilities 
(drug processing labs), in accordance with the law of armed conflict. The SACEUR 
followed up the decision by encouraging all contributing nations “to play a part in this 
essential task.”186 ISAF wasted no time implementing this new NATO mandate and by the 
summer of 2009 it had made a dent in the illicit narcotics economy by destroying 43 drug 
labs, capturing a number of drug traffickers, and seizing 34 tons of opium, seven tons of 
hashish, and 58 tons of precursor chemicals.
187
 As with all things ISAF, the governments of 
contributing nations decided the degree to which their militaries’ could participate in 
counter-narcotics operations, but even Germany loosened its caveats and by 2008 the 
Bundeswehr was interdicting opium trade routes to the north.
188
 In addition, ISAF 
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headquarters created a new organizational element, the Combined Joint Interagency Task 
Force-Nexus (CJIATF-Nexus), to support the regional commands and to facilitate 
coordination with the Afghan government and the international civilian agencies involved in 
counter-narcotics operations as they worked to “dismantle narcotics trafficking 
networks.”189 Overall, achieving progress in combating the narcotics industry was 
exceedingly difficult and despite successes in improving Afghan policing capabilities and 
interdicting and eradicating opium production in some regions, by 2014, as ISAF was 
drawing down, “the narcotics trade in Afghanistan [remained] large, and insurgent 
penetration of that market [was] extensive and expanding.”190 This new operational mission 
was a strategic failure for the Alliance. 
 As ISAF surged troops and expanded operations and training, it continued to 
coordinate with the Pakistani military through multiple venues, such as the Tripartite 
Commission and its sub-committees, the border coordination centers, and senior leader 
visits. In December 2009, it also created a new organization, the ISAF Coordination 
Element in Pakistan (ICE-PAK), located in Islamabad, to enable continuous liaison and 
coordination at the operational level with the Pakistan Army headquarters. The ICE-PAK 
consolidated a variety of coalition liaison officers from ISAF headquarters, USFOR-A, RC-
South, and RC-East into one office. The element provided information about ISAF 
operations along the border and it monitored and shared information about cross border 
activity in an effort to prevent or de-escalate any ISAF-Pakistan military fratricidal 
incidents.
191
 The continuous military coordination became more necessary as Pakistan 
increased operations on its side of the border after 2008. 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the TTP and TNSM revolted in 2007, causing 
the Pakistan army to shift to COIN operations and significantly increase the commitment of 
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army forces into the FATA and NWFP. The post-Musharraf government of Prime Minister 
Yousaf Gilani initially tried to deal with the conflict by negotiating peace settlements with 
insurgent groups in the spring of 2008,
192
 but the effort failed because the peace agreements 
were viewed “as a display of weakness” by the government.193 The insurgents exploited the 
safe havens that were granted to them to step up attacks against military and civilian targets 
in Pakistan. By early 2014, the toll was catastrophic: over 50,000 soldiers and civilians had 
been killed or injured in insurgent terrorist attacks. As a consequence, Pakistan surged 
COIN operations, 2009-2014, and ramped up the scale of its operations. Most notably it 
conducted 251 brigade-level operations and two corps-level operations, and deployed and 
maintained some 150,000 troops along the border.
194
 Many of the operations were 
complementary of ISAF operations. To assist coordination, collaboration, and planning for 
operations on both sides of the border, the IJC hosted periodic Campaign Planning 
Conferences, beginning in early 2010, that included ISAF, ANSF, and Pakistan military 
representatives.
195
 The new organizations, new operating procedures, and new relationships 
facilitated operational successes. By early 2014, the Pakistani government controlled 87% 
of the territory of the FATA and NWFP and the final remaining insurgent sanctuary and 
redoubt (for Pakistani insurgent groups, al Qaeda, and Afghan insurgent groups) was North 
Waziristan.
196
 The army launched an offensive called Operation Zarb-e-Azb (loosely 
translated as “strike of the Prophet’s sword”) into this tribal agency on June 15, 2014. By 
the end of the year, the army had regained control of key towns, to include the agency 
capital of Miranshah, terrorist attacks across Pakistan had dropped 30%, it appeared the 
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various insurgent groups had lost their sanctuary, and the TTP had “all but fallen apart.”197 
Overall, these Pakistani operations and the pressure on the insurgent sanctuaries supported 
the ISAF transition. 
 All of the non-combat activities were oriented on trying to work the coalition out of 
a job. The shift in emphasis to the non-combat efforts in 2011 also manifested the 
recognition by ISAF, which could be considered learning, that it could not achieve success 
through fighting. The character of this conflict was not one that international forces could 
win. An honorable withdrawal in 2014 depended on generating acceptable levels of 
competence in the ANA, ANP, and ministries, and among key local officials in the districts 
and provinces. The incremental shifts in the emphasis and activities of NTM-A, the PRTs, 
and OMLT/POMLTs indicated they were constantly learning and adapting (organizational 
capacity) as they never gave up trying to achieve coalition objectives. Some efforts were 
unsuccessful - the narcotics problem was unsolvable for the allies and coordination efforts 
with the Pakistani army did not eliminate periodic severely acrimonious strategic and 
political-level relations – but taken together they contributed to maintaining coalition 
cohesion during the transition and withdrawal. 
The Transition 
 As previously mentioned, by the end of 2009, the allies were starting to think about 
withdrawal, the Alliance formally announced its transition plan in 2010, and in 2011 there 
were a number of public statements by contributing nations about their proposed timelines 
for drawing down forces, but ISAF’s general draw-down did not start until 2012. In the 
meantime, the surge in combat operations between 2009 and 2010 stopped the Taliban 
momentum
198
 and provided the opportunity for the shift in the coalition’s main effort and 
the subsequent transition. During General McChrystal’s command of ISAF, he emphasized 
the need to fully partner with the ANSF. He believed the ANSF had to start standing on its 
own two feet, and stop being dependent on the coalition, if it was to assume responsibility 
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for security in the country.
199
 Building competent security forces cannot be done overnight, 
however, and although the decisions to increase the end-strength of the ANA and ANP in 
2010 and 2011 helped to ensure a positive correlation of forces against the insurgents during 
the transition, the most consequential phase of ANSF development had occurred 2003-2008, 
for this was when the entire training infrastructure was created and when the training, 
equipping, and integration of the ANSF forces that fought with the ISAF coalition in 2009-
2010 occurred. General McChrystal and his successors were able to capitalize on the efforts 
of their predecessors when they implemented the shift in operational approach. They had 
increasingly competent Afghan forces which were ready to start becoming full partners and 
then leading because they had been repeatedly tested and blooded for years before 2009. 
 The security transition plan, called Inteqal (Dari and Pashtu for “transition”), 
depended on these competent ANSF forces. As with all other major decisions and actions 
related to Afghanistan, the various NATO bodies followed a deliberate decision and 
planning process for the security transition which was followed by ISAF operational action. 
In October 2009, the NATO defense ministers issued guidance and set planning criteria for 
subsequent detailed military planning. The idea was that the transition would be gradual and 
conditions based, and as it occurred ISAF would assume a supporting role and then 
progressively thin out its presence.
200
 It was also assumed that violence would endure 
throughout the process; the key was whether ISAF assessed the ANSF could handle the 
violence levels.
201
 During the winter of 2010, NATO military authorities and the ISAF SCR 
provided advice on what the security, governance, and economic conditions should be. In 
April 2010, after consultation with the Afghan government, the NATO foreign ministers, at 
a ministerial in Tallinn, endorsed the proposed criteria and conditions.
202
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 There were four general areas to be assessed as decisions were made on which 
cities, districts, and provinces were ready for transition: level of violence (can citizens 
conduct their routine daily activities?); level of development of local governance (does the 
rule of law exist and can local officials manage public administration?); level of socio-
economic development (is it self-sustaining?); and the level of ANSF capabilities.
203
 
Sources for the required data would be UNAMA, ISAF, the Afghan government, and other 
key civilian experts and stakeholders.
204
 The information was fed to the Joint Afghan NATO 
Inteqal Board (JANIB), which was established in July 2010. This body was tasked to make 
assessments and provide recommendations to President Karzai and his cabinet which would 
make the final decisions and announcements.
205
 
 In November 2010, the allies announced they were ready to enter the security 
transition phase at the NATO Summit in Lisbon. The implementation of the transition 
would be in phases, called tranches, which would occur between 2011 and 2014.
206
 In 
reality, the transition had already quietly begun when NATO announced the Inteqal plan, 
because the ANSF had taken over full responsibility for Kabul City in August 2008
207
 and a 




 ISAF was involved in assessing all of the areas. It was a complex endeavor that 
required gathering and compiling a wide range of data. Information and reports flowed 
upwards from the battle groups, PRTs, and OMLT/POMLTs to the RCs, which incorporated 
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relevant civil information (status of rule of law, governance, etc.) from local UNAMA and 
USAID representatives and NGOs, and then provided a regional assessment of which 
provinces, districts, and cities were ready to transition to IJC.
209
 A special department in 
IJC, called the “Campaign and Transition Assessment Group,” then worked with NTM-A to 
create three inter-related reports on a quarterly basis that they submitted to the ISAF 
Commander: a campaign assessment, a “Transition and Provincial Outlook Report,” and an 
assessment of ANSF development.
210
 In effect, a durable security transition depended on 
positive developments in the three areas of the reports. A successful civilian-military 
operational campaign (in which Afghans were increasingly in the lead and operating 
unilaterally) would create the security conditions needed for sustainable governance and 
economic development in the districts and provinces, which would be supported over the 
long term by security forces that were institutionally self-sustaining. 
 President Karzai announced the first transition tranche March 22, 2011. It was 
expected the actual transition process for each tranche would play out over 12-18 months, 
but it could go faster based on specific conditions. For example, Bamiyan Province and the 
city of Mazar-e-Sharif came entirely under Afghan responsibility in July 2011. Karzai 
announced the second tranche November 27, 2011.
211
 To an extent the transition plan was 
tested by domestic events in the contributing nations. An attack on French forces that killed 
four and wounded 15 soldiers in January 2012 became a presidential election campaign 
issue and the French government indicated it would withdraw its combat forces before 2014. 
President Nicolas Sarkozy also proposed that NATO withdraw in 2013.
212
 The issue was 
addressed at the May 2012 Chicago Summit. In the end, the allies agreed they would stick 
with the overall transition plan and end the ISAF mission in December 2014 as originally 
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planned, but they would also accommodate national troop withdrawal decisions and re-
position the remaining forces as needed.
213
 For the ISAF coalition, this generated the 
creation of new coordination processes to accommodate national withdrawal decisions. The 
withdrawal process required detailed logistical planning and intensive coordination among 
the ISAF headquarters, IJC, and the regional commands to ensure redeploying forces had 
the resources and logistical support they needed,
214
 but also to ensure that ongoing 
operational activities were not impeded. 
 As Inteqal got underway, and individual nations began indicating their intention to 
withdraw their combat forces, the ISAF headquarters began to think about the coalition’s 
overall withdrawal. Like the higher level NATO bodies, the ISAF commander and his staff 
also followed a deliberate decision and planning process for the draw-down and withdrawal, 
for it is no easy task to gradually reduce and move some 130,000 troops and their associated 
equipment out of a remote mountainous country. The ISAF commander hosted the first of a 
series of political-military planning conferences in early 2012 to begin discussing what 
ISAF and the coalition should look like in 2014. It included the regional commanders as 
well as senior leaders from ISAF headquarters, IJC, and NTM-A, and political 
representatives from the embassies of the contributing nations.
215
 Once consensus was 
established on the “vision” for 2014, deliberate planning began for an organized, systematic 
build down.  
 The coalition’s plans were submitted to JFC Brunssum for approval by the NAC. As 
combat forces thinned out in the regions and the command transitioned to a training and 
advisory posture, the staff structures also progressively thinned out and the ISAF 
headquarters, NTM-A, and IJC folded in on themselves. The major restructuring in 2013 
included: moving command authority for the Regional Support Commands from NTM-A to 
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the Regional Commands; splitting NTM-A and CSTC-A in September and making NTM-A 
a subordinate command of IJC while integrating CSTC-A into the ISAF headquarters staff. 
In July 2014, NTM-A was reduced to a staff directorate within IJC and then in November it 
was moved into the ISAF headquarters as a training department. In the fall of 2014, 
Regional Command-Southwest was subsumed back into Regional Command-South and all 
of the RCs were renamed “Train, Advise, and Assist Commands” (TAAC) (this was in 
preparation for the follow-on NATO mission). In December 2014, IJC was in-activated 
shortly before the ISAF mission was formally ended.
216
 The remaining elements of the ISAF 




 Throughout the security transition process and ISAF’s draw-down, the coalition 
maintained its cohesion. The mutual trust and confidence generated among the forces during 
the earlier phases of fighting endured, and in some cases expanded to include the Afghan 
partners.
218
 The forces deployed to Afghanistan were proud of their mission.
219
 The troops 
also understood COIN and stability operations take time. They displayed a level of patience 
and a sense of the long view that national governments often did not share.
220
 They could 
also see that over time progress was being made; they could see the results of the intensive 
training, mentoring, and partnering efforts in the increasingly competent ANSF. They 
believed the improvement would continue if they stuck at it.
221
 By late 2012, one officer 
operating in the Spin Boldak region along the border with Pakistan referred to the Afghan 
kandaks as “true partners” and stated their COIN operations were “really just combined 
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operations” in which the Afghans led the operations and did all the talking at the local 
shuras.
222
 At one point, Secretary Gates commented, that paradoxically, “The closer you get 
to the fight, the better it looks.”223 
 The confidence and security gains achieved by the troops influenced the 
commanders and other senior leaders, such as Secretary Gates and General Petreaus, who 
asked political leaders for time and patience.
224
 This in turn influenced political will. For 
example, General Petraeus convinced President Obama to give the COIN operations a little 
more time to produce results and not to withdraw the U.S. surge forces in the summer of 
2011, as he had originally planned when he announced his surge in December 2009. As a 
result, the U.S. Marine surge forces withdrew from RC-Southwest in the summer of 2012. 
More importantly, the evolving security situation and the transition process also influenced 
political will. As previously mentioned, insurgent violence/attacks peaked in 2010. It then 
leveled off and slowly started to decrease. It dropped substantially in 2014; see Figure 3 
below.  
 
Figure 3: Weekly Reported Security Incidents, December 2011-May 2015 (source: Report 
on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015). 
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 At the same time, the ANSF was increasingly integrated into ISAF operationally 
and then took over. Through 2008 they had participated with the coalition. By 2009, they 
were becoming full partners, but ISAF was still in the lead for operational planning and 
execution. In 2010, ANSF started leading some operations and General Petreaus reported in 
his “review of progress” to the White House in October that the on-going operations in 
Kandahar were Afghan-led and some 60% of the forces were ANSF.
225
 By 2011, Afghans 
started to take responsibility for some operational planning, and with Inteqal the ANSF 
began taking full responsibility for security, to include operating unilaterally and 
independently in some areas. In 2012, the center of gravity for security shifted from ISAF to 
the ANSF. By the end of that year, ANSF was unilaterally conducting 80% of operations 
and it was leading 85% of total operations.
226
 As ANSF assumed security responsibility, IJC 
relinquished its operational planning role. Operation Omid was superseded by an Afghan 
campaign plan, published in January 2012, called Operation Naweed (Dari for “good 
news”) which integrated the Afghan army, police, and intelligence services in operations in 
all the regional commands “to protect the population and defeat the insurgency” over the 
course of 2012 and into 2013.
227
 Operation Naweed was further superseded by Operation 
Oqab (Dari for “eagle”) in 2013 as the ANSF shifted to a layered security approach.228 
The center of gravity shift coincided with Karzai’s announcements of the third and 
fourth transition tranches in May and December 2012 (with these two phases, 23 of the 34 
provinces entered transition and 87% of the population was secured by the ANSF).
229
 ISAF 
forces assumed an enabling role as Afghan forces assumed primary responsibility for 
security, and as a consequence the coalition members were much less involved in fighting 
the insurgents. As a result, coalition casualty rates dropped precipitously in 2013 and 2014; 
see Figures 4 and 5 below.  
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Figure 4: Percentage of Enemy-Initiated Attacks Involving ANSF and ISAF, January 2011-




Figure 5: U.S. and Coalition Troop Fatalities, October 2001-June 2015 (note: arrows 
indicate the start of a new calendar year) (source: Afghanistan Index: Also including 
selected data on Pakistan, July 31, 2015). 
 
 The Taliban coalition was aware of the transition plan and it could be argued the 
insurgents intentionally reduced their violent activities as they waited for ISAF to withdraw. 





the coalition continued to assess the insurgent coalition as resilient, although it shifted its 
tactics. It tried to avoid direct confrontation with the ANSF, relying instead on more IED 
use, high profile attacks, and soft target attacks (assassinations and kidnappings). 
Furthermore, it launched annual campaigns, 2011-2013, to regain territory and influence but 
they failed. ISAF attributed the declining violence and diminishing Taliban operational 
capabilities to ANSF capabilities and a continued high operational tempo (major operations 
actually increased 21% in 2012). As the ANSF took over security responsibility it focused 
on pushing insurgents out of densely populated areas and it demonstrated the ability to plan 
and carry out high-level kinetic operations. Operation Kalak Hode V in September 2012 
exemplified the capability. The ANA’s 205th Corps led this three-week operation comprised 
of 11,000 army and police forces in Zabul province. More importantly, the operation was 
logistically supported through Afghan supply channels. The 205
th
 Corps repeated the large 
scale operation in Kalak Hode VI in 2013, but in Uruzgan. Afghan-led operations in key 
provinces in all the regions (including Paktia, Paktika, Ghazni, Khowst, Uruzgan, Kandahar, 
Helmand, Badghis, Faryab, Balkh, Kunduz, and Baghlan) over the years not only ensured 
the ANSF maintained security in the areas that transitioned, but also substantially improved 
the security of the large population centers (Kabul became one of the least violent areas of 
the country). ISAF noted that enemy attacks disproportionately occurred in rural areas.
230
 
Regardless of the reason for declining insurgent violence, as ISAF involvement in 
operations and casualty rates decreased, it became politically easier for nations to stick to 
the transition plan announced at Lisbon in 2010 and reiterated in Chicago in 2012 and 
sustain their overall commitment into 2014. In the meantime, troop numbers decreased. In 
December 2012, ISAF forces numbered 102,011. In December 2013, they numbered 
84,271, and by the end of 2014, they numbered 28,360.
231
 Even casualty averse nations did 
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not have to worry about low public support because it was no longer a hot topic in the 
media. In many countries, Afghanistan fell out of the news headlines as coalition casualty 
rates dropped.
232
 Singapore was the first country to completely withdraw its forces from 
Afghanistan in June 2013, which was the same month President Karzai announced the 
initiation of the fifth and final transition tranche.
233
 Canada was the second country to 
completely withdraw in March 2014. The remaining 48 participating nations continued to 
contribute some level of forces until December.
234
 
 National political will was sustained by the Alliance’s and ISAF’s organizational 
capacities and the coalition’s operational achievements. The practices of consultation and 
cooperation at the higher strategic and political levels (at the NAC, SHAPE, and JFC 
Brunssum) provided top-down cohesion and they reflected the norm that had emerged at the 
tactical level on the battlefield that partners do not and should not precipitously abandon 
each other. Even when coalition members decided to withdraw forces (from either a specific 
region or Afghanistan altogether), they announced it in advance and they engaged with 
NATO’s consultation processes and bodies. This strategic level activity generated 
subsequent operational level activity. ISAF was able to conduct deliberate multinational 
planning to shift other forces to fill the new gaps, when necessary. For example, the British 
re-positioning of forces in Helmand was conducted in coordination with the deployment of 
U.S surge forces.
235
 The collapse of the Dutch coalition government in February 2010 
ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of Dutch forces from Uruzgan in RC-South in August 
that year. However, the ensuing gap was filled by U.S., Australian, Slovak, and Singaporian 
forces, to include Australia taking over the PRT in Tarin Kowt.
236
 The ANSF took over 
security responsibility for Uruzgan Province in 2012 as part of Tranche 3. The Canadian 
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defense minister announced at a security forum in November 2010 that his government was 
considering whether to extend the combat mission of Canadian forces in Kandahar past 
2011.
237
 It decided to end the mission in the summer of 2011, but U.S. forces stepped into 
the combat mission and also took over the PRT in Kandahar.
238
 Both the Dutch and 
Canadian combat forces ultimately stayed longer in Uruzgan and Kandahar than initially 
intended when they deployed in 2006. The original Dutch mandate was two years, but it was 
extended an additional two years “after fierce political debates”239 and the one-year 
Canadian mandate ultimately turned into five years.
240
 The Dutch and Canadian combat unit 
withdrawals did not mean the countries left Afghanistan. They both shifted their 
contributions to the training/advising missions. The Dutch contribution ranged between 500 




 NATO continued to support ISAF in multiple ways. In June 2009, the foreign 
ministers agreed to deploy AWACS to Afghanistan to provide air traffic control support to 
the coalition. The skies of Afghanistan had become increasingly full of civilian and military 
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, commonly called drones), and the country did 
not have a network of ground-based radars to track them or coordinate their activities. The 
AWACS did it from the air. This helped ISAF with command and control of a critical 
area.
242
 In addition, to keep up with the demands of the operational and training surges, 
SHAPE began holding force generation conferences every six months. It also convened 
special Afghanistan conferences, chaired by the Deputy SACEUR, to focus specifically on 
meeting the manning requirements for ISAF. The need for NTM-A trainers and OMLT and 
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POMLT teams was so huge and coordinating deployment rotations was so complex that 
special staff elements in NTM-A and IJC created matrices to literally track at the individual 
level what the manning requirements were, which requirements were the most important 
(which allowed the creation of prioritized lists), which countries were best suited to fill the 
requirements (which allowed informal discussions and negotiations before and on the 
sidelines of the conferences), which countries had committed to filling them, and whether, 
and when, the countries fulfilled the commitments. The staff elements worked very closely, 
almost on a daily basis, with SHAPE to ensure the “picture was the same” for leaders at the 
operational, strategic, and national levels.
243
 NATO continued to convene annual PRT 
conferences to harmonize activities and improve civil-military cooperation on the ground. In 
addition, it introduced special courses at the NATO School Oberammergau to help prepare 
deploying PRT members.
244
 SHAPE also published an “OMLT Concept of Operations” 
which standardized the tasks and functions of the teams and specified how they were to be 
organized, trained, and equipped.
245
 Finally, the Alliance’s training and education 
institutions capitalized on the knowledge and experience gained by officers on their 
deployments to Afghanistan. It became a normal operating procedure for redeployed 
officers to prepare and teach courses at the NATO SHAPE School in Oberammergau, or to 
provide training to the units undergoing mission rehearsal training at Stavanger, Norway or 
Bydgoszcz, Poland.
246
 Furthermore, the training centers in Norway and Poland had constant 
communication with the forces in Afghanistan which enabled them to provide “real world” 
information on the conditions in the country to deploying forces during their mission 
rehearsal and other training exercises.
247
 Alliance institutions essentially created a 
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continuous feed-back loop to the ISAF coalition to facilitate learning, improve training and 
educational programs, and develop doctrine or standards. 
 At the operational level, the ISAF commanders continued their efforts to improve 
ISAF’s structural configuration and streamline command and control after 2010. For years, 
the activities of special forces had remained outside the operational control of OEF and 
ISAF commanders. Allied and U.S. special forces had what were called “tactical control” 
relationships with OEF and ISAF which meant CENTCOM and national governments 
retained overall decision authority over what the forces did. This was mainly due to the 
sensitive nature of direct action operations (which meant high level national government 
interest) but it also meant the battle space owners in the regions often did not know what 
they were doing. The decision to give the ISAF commander operational control of CJSOTF-
A in 2010 improved the situation because special operations were then better coordinated 
with the ISAF and regional headquarters, as well as the battle space owners.
248
 However, the 
creation of ISAF SOF meant SF activities remained disjointed. Ultimately, the elements 
were incrementally merged together as ISAF’s combat operations wound down and the 
transition began. In 2011, ISAF created the Deputy Commanding General-SOF position. 
This one-star general coordinated and synchronized the activities of the two SOF 
elements.
249
 In 2012, the elements and all SOF forces were merged into a new element, the 
NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan/Special Operations Joint 
Task Force-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A)
250
 (see Appendix 2). This final 
consolidation occurred as Afghan special forces took over the execution of SOF operations 
and the allied special forces stepped back into an advise and assist role.
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The ISAF commanders also continued to have the leeway to institute new programs 
and initiatives. General McChrystal implemented an innovative program called the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program in 2009. The concept was to develop a cadre of 
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several hundred U.S. officers who were trained in language (Dari, Pashto, or Urdu), culture, 
and history and then served in repetitive assignments in either Afghanistan or Pakistan, and 
in the Pentagon. It was thought they would develop and maintain personal relationships with 
the Afghans and Pakistanis they worked with, and that their deeper understanding of the 
politics and the people of the two countries would improve the coalition’s execution of the 
comprehensive approach, as well as provide insights into the region that would be useful in 
the political-military policy-making processes in the United States. ISAF made good use of 
the officers as they started arriving in country in 2010, by assigning them to the ISAF 
headquarters, IJC, and NTM-A (where many worked ministerial outreach), in the regional 
commands, in PRTs, and in special forces teams, as well as embedding them into the local 
governance structures of the districts and provinces, however the U.S. military services did 
not establish assignment policies that utilized the officers in follow-on tours where their 
skills and knowledge could be used.
252
 Thus, the American military bureaucracy limited the 
long-term benefits of a coalition initiative. 
 Despite ISAF’s almost continual efforts to adjust organizational structures and 
operating procedures in order to improve its operational capabilities, it could not solve all of 
its problems and inefficiencies. One area in particular that could never be solved was 
intelligence. Many of the contributing nations established their own national intelligence 
centers in the country and they were often reluctant to share intelligence with others.
253
 In 
addition, due to issues related to the classification levels of intelligence (confidential, secret, 
and top secret), and release-ability (that is, some intelligence was U.S. only, some was 
release-able to NATO countries, and some to non-NATO countries), it was not possible for 
ISAF to establish one all-encompassing intelligence system/network that included all the 
contributing nations and linked together the regional commands, IJC, and the ISAF 
headquarters. As a result, a patchwork of parallel intelligence networks emerged across the 
country and intelligence officers had to develop ad hoc and innovative ways to ensure 
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critical intelligence was provided to the people who needed it, such as operational forces in 
the field, colleagues in neighboring regional commands, and across the staffs.
254
 The 
coalition therefore had to learn to cope with a less than ideal situation in what could be 
considered a critical area, for good intelligence was necessary for effective operations and to 
minimize civilian casualties. 
 Despite persistent problems and inefficiencies from the strategic to the tactical 
levels, the coalition maintained its cohesion over time, due to the interaction of the two 
drivers of the analytical framework. Political will among the contributing nations not only 
endured for a variety of reasons derived from alliance and domestic politics, but also 
because the ISAF coalition’s ability to deliver operational achievements sustained political 
confidence. The years of experience gained from operating together under difficult 
conditions and the ability to learn from mistakes generated a multitude of military changes 
and adaptations which incrementally improved the coalition’s organizational capacity to 
achieve its objectives. The capacity for change and adaptation received a boost from the 
United States in 2009-2010 with the massive increase in troops and material resources. The 
surge in resources gave the coalition the means to create new organizational structures (IJC, 
NTM-A, and RC-Southwest), which facilitated realignments in the command and control 
configuration (ISAF commander could concentrate on strategic issues while IJC commander 
concentrated on operational activities; shift in C2 of OMLT/POMLTs and special forces 
improved coordination among the security, development, and governance lines of effort 
within the regions). The surge also enabled new operating procedures (embedded 
partnering, development of civilian-military campaign plan coordinated with the Afghans), 
new training initiative (such as NTM-A’s literacy training), and new missions and programs 
(counter-narcotic operations, village stability operations, District Delivery Program, MoDA 
program, and ministry outreach). They also enabled a massive expansion in the scale of 
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operations and training. Taken together they improved the coalition’s operational 
performance enough to beat back the insurgency and create the time and space necessary to 
develop Afghan capabilities. The incremental improvement in ANSF abilities meant they 
were ready to take the lead for security responsibility as the transition unfolded and the 
coalition could conduct an organized draw-down. 
 During the last few years of ISAF’s existence, there were few forces fraying 
cohesion. British, Dutch, and French decisions to withdraw combat forces before 2014 
could have opened the door to a general unraveling of the entire coalition, but they did not. 
The shift in emphasis to non-combat operations, the progressive assumption of security 
responsibility by the Afghans, and ISAF’s shift to an enabling and support role meant the 
combat pressures were removed and the coalition could conduct an organized withdrawal. 
In the end, the Taliban coalition did not succeed in either forcing the withdrawal of 
international forces or overthrowing the Afghan government. Overall, one could say NATO 
achieved its objective of preventing Afghanistan from regressing back to becoming a safe 
haven for terrorism while it was engaged in ISAF.  
 By the time the ISAF mission was winding down in 2013, there were some 
impressive positive achievements: five million refugees returned to Afghanistan, more than 
eight million children were in school (more than a third of them girls), one in two Afghans 
had a cell phone, almost all Afghans had access to healthcare, the Taliban had less than 10% 
support, the majority of Afghans told pollsters they thought their country was on the right 
track, and Kabul was “bedlam of traffic” and “thriving small businesses.”255 Furthermore, in 
2012 a new phenomenon emerged in the rural areas of the east and northeast: independent 
uprisings of local tribes against the Taliban. It was called the “Andar Awakening” and it 
spread to the south, to include Kandahar, in 2013.
256
 Political, economic, and security 
conditions seemed to be on a positive trend. 
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 But will this situation continue over the long term? It is an open question whether 
ISAF built enough ANSF capacity to hold off and ultimately defeat the Taliban coalition, 
while the international community assists the Afghan state to continue economic 
development and improve governance. It will only be continued security, economic, and 
governance improvements that will prevent regression in the future. As ANSF assumed 
responsibility for security during the transition, it could be argued that it was able to hold its 
own against the insurgent coalition only because it still received assistance from ISAF via 
the coalition’s strategic enablers – particularly intelligence, close air support, transportation, 
and medical support. However, by 2014, the Afghan Air Force demonstrated a capacity to 
plan and execute “air operations including emergency extraction, emergency casualty 
evacuation, air reconnaissance and troop transport airlift with limited ISAF support.”257 The 
ANSF was on its way to developing some of its own enabler capabilities and it was striving 
to wean itself off ISAF dependence 
 As of 2014, Afghanistan still had major problems and challenges to overcome, 
ranging from institutional corruption, a lack of human capital and thus weak administrative 
capacity from district to province to capital level, endemic criminal activity (such as the 
narcotics trade) supported by robust illicit networks, and enduring tribal conflicts and 
tensions. Economic development needs were still massive. Government authority outside 
Kabul was still weak and regional “warlords” still too strong. But the peaceful transition of 
political power in 2014 with the election of President Ashraf Ghani was a positive 
development, even though the election process was a long, drawn-out affair.
258
 By 2014 and 
into 2015, there were still problems with attrition rates in the ANA and ANP but they 
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showed “resilience” and generally fought well against the insurgent coalition,259 so the 
ANSF seemed to have become a stable national institution. Furthermore, NATO members 
and partners recognized the ANSF remained dependent on international assistance and so 
the Alliance agreed to continue its support after 2014. At the Wales Summit in September 
2014, the allies pledged three inter-related lines of engagement: the NATO-led Resolute 
Support mission to train, advise, and assist the ANSF; the provision of financial assistance 
to the ANSF through the ANA Trust Fund; and continuing consultation and cooperation 
through the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership.
260
 The Alliance’s involvement in 
Afghanistan would therefore continue for some years after the completion of the ISAF 
mission. 
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 In March 2014, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen stated to a forum at the 
Brookings Institution that the Alliance’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan was “the biggest and 
most effective coalition in recent history.” Bringing together a quarter of the world’s 
countries in the 50-member coalition, it was “a coalition that only NATO could have 
gathered and commanded.”1 However, building such a large coalition was not the Alliance’s 
original intention and its ultimate activities were dramatically more ambitious and wide-
ranging than the initial limited efforts to secure Kabul and assist the transitional Afghan 
government. Explaining how this happened brings this thesis back to its research question: 
NATO was not initially involved in military operations in Afghanistan, but this changed 
slowly over time. First, it decided to take over ISAF in Kabul, and then it expanded ISAF, 
both geographically and operationally. ISAF then surged, followed by an organized 
withdrawal. Why did this happen and how did ISAF maintain coalition cohesion throughout 
the campaign in Afghanistan? 
 While NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan was ultimately precipitated by the 
September 11th terrorist attacks, it was not preordained or guaranteed. The Alliance had to 
deal with a new and complicated situation in 2001 and it took time to adjust to the new 
strategic environment. In fact, the initial default position for the allies was not to turn to the 
Alliance for operations in Afghanistan. A number of factors militated against action. Neither 
the Taliban government nor the al Qaeda terrorist organization presented a survival threat to 
the Alliance and its members. NATO’s strategic culture at the time did not envision action 
so far from NATO territory (as its out-of-area remit was peripheral to Alliance territory) or 
the execution of such an ambitious regime-change mission. The conception of NATO’s 
security role (when, how, and where the organization would employ military force) as 
expressed in its strategic culture meant the Alliance’s organizational capacities were limited 
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– there had been no prior contingency planning to deal with a problem like transnational 
terrorism and the organization lacked the collective military resources to deploy and sustain 
combat forces far from allied territory. These organizational capacity limitations influenced 
national policy positions. In effect, the Alliance members lacked the collective political will 
to generate a decision to undertake combined action within NATO in the fall of 2001.  
 However, the dramatic shift in the strategic environment induced the allies to 
reconsider NATO’s role and purpose and as such the Alliance gradually began to change as 
it incrementally involved itself in the multinational ISAF coalition. This thesis proposes that 
the factors, or drivers, of political will and organizational capacity, which derive from the 
social science literature on alliances, security organizations, and military change and 
adaptation, can be utilized to explain NATO’s initial lack of involvement in Afghanistan, its 
decision to take over command of ISAF, and the coalition’s dramatic transformation over 
time. More importantly, they can provide an explanation for the coalition’s ability to 
generate and sustain cohesion in the midst of a conflict that escalated in violence and in the 
face of multiple forces that frayed cohesion.   
 In effect, NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan and ISAF’s transformation was a 
case of multinational military adaptation. However, developments were not as straight-
forward as this statement seems to suggest. As Theo Farrell has argued, “there is nothing 
natural or easy about military adaptation.” War is a complex phenomenon and history has 
shown it is well nigh impossible for the combatants “to anticipate all of the problems they 
will face in the war.” It is not unusual for them to misunderstand the challenges they face or 
underestimate the amount of resources needed. They can also learn the wrong lessons. 
Furthermore, since strategic culture frames how a military organization sees itself and sees 
the world and as such prescribes its range of legitimate actions, it can shape learning and 
“make some options for military change possible, and others impossible.”2 Nevertheless, the 
allies made the decision to undertake the ISAF mission in April 2003, after a significant 
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shift in the Alliance’s strategic culture – the first major adaptation after 9/11. It was an 
open-ended, out-of area decision that was unprecedented in the organization’s history. 
 As chapter 3 argued, the decision was based on a perception of the character of the 
conflict that turned out to be flawed, and as the conflict changed ISAF struggled to find the 
right way to fight it. The coalition had to repeatedly reconsider what it was doing and how it 
was doing it. In the end, ISAF seemed to demonstrate it was a multinational coalition 
capable of learning as it successively changed and adapted its organizational structures and 
operations and incrementally expanded its activities. Furthermore, all of the NATO allies 
stayed engaged throughout the campaign (cohesion endured) and 22 partner nations joined 
the coalition even as ISAF eventually engaged in a wide range of unanticipated activities 
that included counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and counter-narcotics operations, as 
well as training and mentoring activities. This process of change and adaptation was 
persistently challenged by a multitude of fraying forces that worked to undermine cohesion.  
 That fact that cohesion endured was surprising. As chapter 1 stated, given the 
negative historical experiences of alliances and coalitions, the low stakes involved in the 
war for the allies and partners, the inconclusive nature of the conflict against the Taliban, 
the fact that today for many European countries war is considered an illegitimate means for 
resolving international differences, one could argue the ISAF coalition should have fallen 
apart. The forces fraying cohesion included: intra-alliance tensions over burden-sharing; 
disagreements about what ISAF should do; concerns about U.S. unilateralism; reluctance to 
get involved in combat operations or remain engaged over the long term; and operational 
inefficiencies from restrictive national caveats and resource, training, and doctrinal 
shortfalls that led to inconclusive tactical operations which produced a widespread 
perception the international effort was a failure. However, unexpectedly, the coalition did 
not fracture and cohesion endured under adversity. The drivers and influences in the 
proposed analytical framework can provide an explanation for why and how this happened. 
 Since NATO is not an autonomous security organization, there must be a 
convergence in political will among the members in order for action to occur. In this case, 
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the allies eventually reached consensus on the proposal for NATO to take over the ISAF 
mission. As chapter 3 noted, finding volunteers for the first three ISAF rotations was not 
easy or straightforward and by the spring of 2003 nations were not eagerly lining up to lead 
a rotation. However, the allies shared a view of the dangers posed by transnational Islamic 
terrorism. The sanctuary provided by Afghanistan to Islamic terrorists had facilitated a 
multitude of attacks in Europe and around the world by al Qaeda and its affiliates. 
Combined with the large number of foiled plots, and the extensive, interconnected terrorist 
networks uncovered by European police and security services in almost every country in 
Western Europe, allied governments understandably assessed they were under attack. The 
security threat was potentially real and this was a major influence in generating the Alliance 
decision. Preventing Afghanistan from reverting back to becoming a safe haven for 
transnational Islamic terrorists was an objective the allies agreed with, but this would 
require nation-building, of which ISAF was a key part. Engaging NATO solved the problem 
of ISAF and it meant the coalition’s mission became a collective effort rather than an 
individual effort. 
 However, political will was not only based on the assessment of the jihadist threat. 
Ultimately, political will was derived from a variety of influences, and in fact national 
reasons to contribute to the coalition, and stay engaged, eventually seemed to develop into a 
complex mosaic based on intertwined domestic and alliance politics. Many countries had 
more than one reason to contribute. While the mission was seen as legitimate from a moral 
and humanitarian perspective – it was the right thing to do especially since the country had 
been abandoned after the Soviet-Afghan war - participation in the coalition was also a 
means to achieve other objectives, for both allies and partner nations. For many countries, 
their reputation in NATO mattered. So they joined the ISAF coalition and then stayed 
through the tough period because they wanted to be seen as reliable allies. They did not 
want to be seen as quitters or shirkers. For example, the reasoning for Canada’s decision to 
deploy into Kandahar was articulated by a senior Canadian foreign affairs official who 
stated, “The decision to go to Kandahar was a collective one . . . We didn’t do it because 
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someone in NATO wanted us to do it, or because the Americans made us do it . . . We did it 
because Afghanistan was a serious issue, we were a serious country . . . and we were 
determined to behave accordingly.”3 Countries like Canada, Italy, and Spain wanted to be 
taken seriously as top tier nations in the international community. NATO aspirants wanted 
to show their value to the Alliance in order to improve their chances of membership and 
new members wanted to fulfill the obligations of membership and show they would not be 
free-riders. Some countries joined or stayed out of a desire to improve their relations with 
the United States or just out of loyalty to the United States. Loyalty to NATO and loyalty to 
the allies and partners operating together in Afghanistan was widespread. Members of the 
coalition wanted ISAF to succeed and, more importantly, they came to believe that ISAF 
could not afford to be defeated by the insurgent coalition. The credibility of the Alliance 
was on the line, especially after tens of thousands of troops had been committed and after 
ISAF had demonstrated it could defeat large, organized Taliban attacks in 2006. Premature 
withdrawal and defeat after the investment of so much blood and treasure would be taken by 
the jihadists as a strategic victory against the international community on par with the 
Soviet-Afghan war, and it would lead to worsening instability in the region. The mutually 
reinforcing reasons for enduring political will, in the face of often acrimonious tensions 
among the allies and partners, provided a degree of top-down cohesion to the coalition, but 
they did not prevent many countries from skimping on resourcing. Most of the countries 
were reluctant, or were unable, to increase troops and material capabilities as the conflict 
escalated, which made it much more difficult for the coalition to achieve its operational 
objectives. 
 Political will, and national commitment, was sustained by organizational capacity. 
The ISAF coalition was deeply multinational with most units and all major operations 
comprised of multiple nations. The inter-weaving of units and specialist capabilities forced 
the allies to rely on each other. Over time, as the forces gained experience from training and 
operating together, familiarity, mutual trust, and confidence increased amongst the coalition 
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partners. This tactical and operational-level bonding generated the norms and practices that 
partners do not abandon each other, especially in adversity. As stated in chapter 4, “the heat 
of battle” acted as an incubator of cohesion. In addition, NATO’s strategic-level 
consultation and planning bodies developed forums and processes for multinational 
coordination that reinforced the norm against abandonment. National decisions, to increase, 
withdraw, or reposition forces were announced in advance which allowed deliberate 
planning within ISAF to position forces where they were most needed, or to fill gaps, when 
necessary. In addition, the coalition experiences on the ground facilitated its learning. 
 In general, learning occurred within the coalition, at NATO, and within national 
militaries as the character of the conflict shifted. Some nations learned faster than others 
which ensured wide gaps in capabilities endured among the partners and allies – this 
contributed to the persistent tensions over burden-sharing. Nevertheless, as noted in chapters 
3-5, military change and adaptation efforts from learning and experience generated new 
operating procedures and new organizational structures as the coalition slowly expanded its 
operations from the initial limited stabilization and reconstruction activities centered in 
Kabul and the PRTs. As the coalition recognized it had a real fight on its hands in 2006, it 
undertook counter-insurgency operations, and expanded its training and advising activities. 
It also eventually undertook unexpected missions, such as counter-narcotics operations. The 
change and adaptation efforts produced operational results. As noted in chapters 4 and 5, 
ISAF forces were successful in every engagement against the Taliban coalition, which 
helped to sustain political-level confidence in the deployed forces. However, force levels 
were often only just sufficient in the years between 2006 and 2008 to combat the insurgency 
and commanders were forced to rely extensively on overwhelming direct and indirect fire 
support. This resulted in levels of collateral damage that eroded Afghan support. This in turn 
led senior level commanders to press for more resources and more forces, in order to sustain 
the hard worn gains achieved by the troops, but also to build on them. This bottom-up 
pressure sustained cohesion and ultimately influenced national policy, the most visible 
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decision being the U.S. surge which carried the coalition through the transition and 
withdrawal. 
 It can be argued the interaction of political will and organizational capacity went 
through three phases between 2003 and 2014. The first phase was 2003-2005. The 
convergent political will that generated the allied decision to take over ISAF and then 
expand its footprint around the country was based on a set of perceptions and assumptions 
about the conflict. Because violence levels were generally low, the allies perceived the 
conflict was largely over. Most of the existing violence and combat activity was in the east, 
but the U.S.-led OEF operation was taking care of it. The ISAF coalition therefore assumed 
all it had to do was help the Afghans get on their feet and it could do it through stabilization 
and reconstruction activities that would include securing Kabul, assisting security sector 
reform activities, and taking over and expanding the number of PRTs in the regions. The 
mission, therefore, was similar to the peace operations the Alliance had undertaken in SFOR 
and KFOR in that military efforts were meant to provide a safe and secure environment so 
that political, civil, economic, and reconstructions activities could proceed. What came to be 
called ISAF’s comprehensive approach at the Riga Summit in 2006 had long been practiced 
in NATO operations in the Balkans where civil and military authorities endeavored to 
coordinate security, economic, and governance lines of effort, as noted in chapter 2. 
However, despite the massive involvement of governmental and non-governmental 
organizations in Afghanistan, the ISAF coalition found it had to engage in the non-military 
lines of effort. This led to an expansion in ISAF’s activities that ultimately went far beyond 
what SFOR and KFOR had done. In addition, the successive SFOR and KFOR command 
headquarter rotations gave the Alliance’s standing military formations operational 
experience that was useful for, and was repeated in, ISAF. For ISAF and Afghanistan, 
therefore, the Alliance seemed to have a well-developed organizational capacity, based on 
its prior experiences and operations in the Balkans, to take over what seemed to be a 
relatively straightforward mission. This organizational capacity gave the coalition 
confidence it could execute the mission and it reinforced political will and commitment, 
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thus generating cohesion. However, the perception of the conflict was wrong. Violence 
levels were low during this period because the Taliban coalition was reconstituting itself in 
Pakistan. Coalition force levels, in both ISAF and OEF, were insufficient to secure the 
population and the generation of ANSF forces, army and police, was also not sufficient to 
provide security. The ensuing security vacuum throughout the country proved beneficial to 
the Taliban coalition as it executed its own campaign to return to Afghanistan. Its ability to 
launch offensive operations in 2006 changed entirely the character of the conflict and put 
tremendous pressure on the ISAF coalition. 
 The second phase for the coalition, 2006-2008, was thus driven by the Taliban. The 
uncontested and methodical nature of ISAF’s expansion into RC-North and RC-West, in 
2004 and 2005, was nothing like what the coalition encountered as it expanded around the 
rest of the country in 2006. Contrary to coalition expectations that it would carry on with 
stabilization, reconstruction, and development activities, the allies and partners that 
deployed into RC-South in 2006 found themselves facing a full-blown, well-established 
insurgency which meant they could not avoid combat operations as the Taliban coalition 
launched a number of large organized attacks. The shock of combat shattered the 
perceptions and assumptions of the coalition. A number of potentially destructive fraying 
forces severely tested the strength of political will and the coalition’s capacity to learn and 
adapt to the changed character of the conflict. They included the pressure of high-intensity 
combat operations and intense intra-alliance acrimony about burden-sharing due to the 
unwillingness of major allies to deploy into the south and engage in combat. However, 
rather than fracturing, the coalition held together and fought back. The primary strategic 
driver sustaining collective political will and thus cohesion was fear of the consequences of 
failure. ISAF could not afford to be defeated by the insurgent coalition because of the 
repercussions such a major operational failure would have on the Alliance as a whole. The 
political commitment was sustained by the coalition’s organizational capacity to adapt to the 
changed military conditions. ISAF shifted its operational approach as it undertook counter-
insurgency operations and expanded its training activities. It replicated its experiences in 
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SFOR and KFOR as it distributed operational forces into the regional commands as 
multinational task forces. Commanders also repeatedly pressed for more resources and to an 
extent national governments provided them. ISAF force levels increased from 9,000 in the 
spring of 2006 to 51,100 by November 2008. While the coalition demonstrated its 
operational competence because it defeated the Taliban whenever it attacked, the force 
levels were insufficient to achieve victory and the conflict settled into a stalemate by 2007-
2008. Operational effectiveness was also undermined by the resistance of some allies to 
combine OEF and ISAF. For domestic political reasons, they wanted to maintain a 
distinction between OEF (perceived as oriented on offensive combat although it also 
included CSTC-A’s training mission) and ISAF (peacekeeping), but this was increasingly 
meaningless as both coalitions undertook COIN operations, supported security sector reform 
activities, mentored and operationally partnered with the ANA, trained the ANSF, and 
conducted PRT activities. The disjointed nature of the command and control configurations 
and the overlapping OEF and ISAF operations needed to be addressed, but it took until 2009 
for further change to occur. 
 The third phase, 2009-2014, developed as the coalition recognized something 
needed to change; it was in an untenable position. In the course of intensive consultations 
and strategic reviews at the operational, strategic, and national levels in 2008-2009, the 
allies and partners thought through what organizational and operational changes needed to 
be made in order to improve ISAF’s operational effectiveness (it was evidence of the 
coalition trying to learn from experience). The change in U.S. administration and the 
drawdown of forces in Iraq generated the means for significant changes in the ISAF 
coalition. For domestic political reasons, the new U.S. administration decided to 
substantially increase its contributions, in both personnel and material resources, and take a 
leading role in the coalition. This U.S. decision to assume the preponderance of the 
operational burden held the coalition together at a critical time. The U.S. surge, which was 
accompanied by increases in allied and partner forces and a major effort to generate ANSF 
forces, facilitated significant changes in ISAF’s organizational structures, multiple 
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adaptations in its operating procedures, and an expansion in its activities as the allies and 
partners agreed to fully merge OEF and ISAF. In addition, the president’s announcement the 
surge was only temporary and that combat operations would end by 2014 opened the door 
for the allies and partners to start overtly thinking about and planning the ISAF withdrawal. 
Taken together, the national decisions to surge forces, in conjunction with the merging of 
OEF and ISAF and the creation of the intermediate commands of IJC and NTM-A, finally 
gave ISAF the capacity to develop, coordinate, and execute a comprehensive civil-military 
campaign plan that brought together the counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, stabilization 
and reconstruction, and training and mentoring efforts in a coherent way. These 
improvements in the coalition’s organizational capacities also gave it the ability to execute 
operations that were significant orders of magnitude larger than all previous operations and 
they produced operational results – the Taliban were beaten back. The surge, then shift in 
emphasis to the non-combat efforts, also created the conditions needed for the ANSF 
development and over time the coalition was aided by an increasingly competent ANSF 
which was ready to start taking over security responsibilities by 2011. The enduring political 
will reflected in the surge of resources was supported by the coalition’s capacity to deliver 
operational achievements and together they sustained cohesion. This helped carry the 
coalition through the toughest phase of the fighting, the security transition, the gradual 
drawdown of forces, and the end of the ISAF mission. 
 The decisions and changes that occurred during the third phase also meant ISAF 
had significantly transformed over time. From a small multinational coalition with a limited 
mission in 2003 that was comprised of a small headquarters (240 personnel), a multinational 
brigade in Kabul, and an airport task force, it had evolved into a massive multinational 
coalition by 2009-2010 with wide-ranging and ambitious missions. Its operational command 
and control structures included a much larger headquarters (2,200 personnel) supported by 
the IJC and NTM-A (another 1,900 personnel) in Kabul, as well as five regional commands, 
scores of multinational battle groups in the regions, hundreds of OMLT/POMLT teams, and 
28 PRTs. The military changes and adaptations undergone by the coalition and by NATO 
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had included new strategies, new organizational structures, new missions, new ways of 
fighting and operating procedures, new doctrine, and new exercise, training, and educational 
programs. 
In the end, the pressures of the conflict and the various fraying forces were not 
sufficient to fracture the coalition to the point of dissolution due to the combined interaction 
of political will and organizational capacity which generated and sustained the cohesion 
necessary to hold everyone together. While there was no overt free-riding (all the allies 
contributed), there was shirking. Many allies contributed just enough to be respectable. This 
produced the catching-up character of ISAF operations through much of the conflict and 
meant combat operations were harder for the allies. Still, the unprecedented commitment 
ultimately led to a 50-nation coalition engaged in a diverse range of missions to achieve a 
hugely ambitious objective in Afghanistan. It could even be argued that given all the 
negative pressures, the allies and partners stayed engaged much longer than anyone could 
have expected. 
 NATO’s extensive commitment in Afghanistan does not mean it will continue to 
undertake this type of mission in the future. It can be argued the exhaustive effort in 
Afghanistan was a factor in NATO not getting involved in Libya after Operation Unified 
Protector and the fall of Muammar Qadhafi’s regime, and why it has not gotten involved in 
the disintegrating Middle East to date. 
 As NATO transitioned out of Afghanistan, the international security environment 
continued to evolve. The dangers posed by non-state actors, transnational Islamic terrorists, 
failed states, and ungoverned spaces were joined by the re-emergence of Russia as a security 
threat. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted in his 2014 Annual Report that “Russia has 
used military force to annex Crimea, destabilise eastern Ukraine, and intimidate its 
neighbors.”4 Furthermore, it utilized a hybrid form of warfare in Ukraine, integrating 
proxies, the separatists in eastern Ukraine, and a sophisticated information/propaganda 
campaign with the deployments of conventional forces to achieve its security interests. This 
                                                 
4
 Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2014, 3. 
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made it harder for NATO (and the EU) to respond. So while NATO might not be willing to 
or be interested in getting involved in another state-building operation in North Africa or the 
Middle East, it cannot “revert” back to a strategy that prepares for defensive conventional 
war against its traditional enemy in the event deterrence fails. It will have to continue to 


























APPENDIX 1: ACRONYMS 
ABP: Afghan Border Police 
ACE: Allied Command Europe 
ACLANT: Allied Command Atlantic 
ACO: Allied Command Operations 
ACT: Allied Command Transformation 
ADZ: Afghan Development Zones 
ALP: Afghan Local Police 
AMF: Afghan Military Forces 
ANA: Afghan National Army 
ANAP: Afghan National Auxiliary Police 
ANCOP: Afghan National Civil Order Police 
ANDS: Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
ANP: Afghan National Police 
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces 
APPF: Afghan Public Protection Force 
ARRC: Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 
ASFF: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 
AU: African Union 
AUP: Afghan Uniformed Police 
AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System 
CENTCOM: Central Command 
CFC-A: Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan 
CFSOCC-A: Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan 
CHLC: Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell 
CIMIC: Civil-Military Coordination 
CJCMOTF: Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force 
CJSOTF-A: Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan 
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CJTF: Combined Joint Task Force 
CMOC: Civil Military Operations Center 
CNPA: Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan 
COIN: Counter-insurgency 
CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 
CTF: Combined Task Force 
CTP: Counter-Terrorism Police 
DDP: District Delivery Program 
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
DPC: Defense Planning Committee 
EAPC: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
EC: European Community 
ETT: Embedded Training Team 
EU: European Union 
EUPOL: European Union Police (training program) 
FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
FDD: Focused District Development 
FOB: forward operating base 
GIRoA: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (after 2001) 
HiG: Hizb-i-Islamic Gulbuddin (Hekmatyar’s group) 
IDLG: Independent Directorate of Local Governance 
IED: Improvised Explosive Device 
IFOR: Implementation Force 
IJC: ISAF Joint Command 
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force 
JCMB: Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 
JFC: Joint Force Command 
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JSOTF: Joint Special Operations Task Force 
KFOR: Kosovo Force 
KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army 
KMTC: Kabul Military Training Center 
LOTFA: Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan 
MAT: Military Advisory Team 
MEDEVAC: medical evacuation 
MOD: Ministry of Defense 
MoDA: Ministry of Defense Advisors (program) 
MOI: Ministry of Interior 
NAC: North Atlantic Council 
NACC: North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDS: National Directorate of Security (the Afghan domestic intelligence agency) 
NRDC: NATO Rapid Deployable Corps 
NRF: NATO Response Force 
NSOCC-A: NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan 
NTM-A: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan 
NWFP: North West Frontier Province 
OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom 
OMC-A: Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan 
OMLT: Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team 
OSC-A: Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan 
OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PAG: Policy Action Group 
PAT: Police Advisory Team 
PfP: Partnership for Peace 
PMT: Police Mentoring Team 
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POMLT: Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team 
PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team 
RC: Regional Command 
SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
SCR: Senior Civilian Representative 
SFAT: Security Force Assistance Team 
SFOR: Stabilization Force 
SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
SOF: Special Operations Forces 
SOJTF-A: Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan 
STANAG: Standardization Agreement 
STANAVFORLANT: Standing Naval Force Atlantic 
STANAVFORMED: Standing Naval Force Mediterranean 
TNSM: Tehriq-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammedi 
TTP: Tehrik-i-Taliban-i-Pakistan 
UN: United Nations 
UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
UNSCR: United National Security Council Resolution 
USAID: United States Agency for International Development 
USFOR-A: U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 
WEU: Western European Union 




























































































APPENDIX 3: ISAF ROTATIONS AND COMMANDERS 
 
ISAF I Dec 2001-Jun 2002 UK lead with 
augmentation 
Major General John 
McColl, UK 
ISAF II Jun 2002-Feb 2003 Turkey lead with 
augmentation 
Major General Hilmi 
Akin Zorlu, Turkey 
ISAF III Feb 2003-Aug 2003 1 (German/NL) Corps  Lieutenant General 
Norbert Van Heyst, 
Germany 






ISAF V Feb 2004-Aug 2004 Canada lead with 
augmentation 
Lieutenant General 
Rick Hillier, Canada 
ISAF VI Aug 2004-Feb 2005 Eurocorps General Jean-Louis Py, 
France 
ISAF VII Feb 2005-Aug 2005 NATO Rapid 
Deployable Corps-
Turkey 
General Ethem Erdagi, 
Turkey 
ISAF VIII Aug 2005-May 2006 NATO Rapid 
Deployable Corps-Italy 
General Mauro de 
Vecchio, Italy 
ISAF IX May 2006-Feb 2007 Allied Rapid Reaction 
Corps (ARRC) 
General Sir David 
Richards, UK 
ISAF X & 
ISAF XI 
Feb 2007-Jun 2008  NATO Rapid 
Deployable Corps-
Stettin (first half); Allied 
Force Command, 
Heidelberg (second half) 
General Dan McNeill, 
US 
ISAF Jun 2008-Jun 2009 Composite command 





ISAF Jun 2009-Jun 2010 Composite General Stanley 
McChrystal, US 
ISAF Jun 2010-Jul 2010 Composite Lieutenant General Sir 
Nick Parker, UK 
ISAF Jul 2010-Jul 2011 Composite General David Petreaus, 
US 
ISAF Jul 2011-Feb 2013 3 hq rotations: Allied 
Force Command, 
Heidelberg; Eurocorps; 
Allied Force Command, 
Madrid 
General John Allen, US 
ISAF Feb 2013-Aug 2014 Composite General John Dunford, 
US 









APPENDIX 4: COALITION FORCE LEVELS 
 
April 2002 
     OEF:   6,500 
     ISAF:  4,500  (18 nations) 
 February 2008 
     OEF:   17,000 
     ISAF:  43,250 (40 nations) 
October 2002 
     OEF:  14,000   
     ISAF:   5,000 (21 nations) 
 November 2008 
     OEF:  19,000 
     ISAF: 51,100 (41 nations) 
August 2003 
     OEF:  11,000 
     ISAF:   6,100 (31 nations) 
 June 2009 
     OEF:   24,000 
     ISAF:  61,130 (42 nations) 
June 2004 
     OEF:  20,000 
     ISAF:   6,500 (34 nations) 
 February 2010 
     ISAF: 85,795 (43 nations) 
*OEF and ISAF effectively merged 
June 2005 
     OEF:   20,000 
     ISAF:    8,682 (37 nations) 
 November 2010 
   
   ISAF:  130,930 (48 nations) 
December 2005 
     OEF:   18,000 
     ISAF:    9,000 (37 nations) 
 July 2011 
    
  ISAF:  132,457 (48 nations) 
Spring 2006 
     OEF:   19,000 
     ISAF:    9,000 (37 nations) 
 December 2011 
 
     ISAF:  130,408 (50 nations) 
September 2006 
     OEF:   17,000 
     ISAF:  19,500 (37 nations) 
 December 2012 
 
     ISAF:  102,011 (50 nations) 
January 2007 
     OEF:     9,000 
     ISAF:  35,460 (37 nations) 
 December 2013 
 
     ISAF:  84,271 (49 nations) 
December 2007 
     OEF:     8,000 
     ISAF:  41,741 (39 nations) 
 November 2014 
 
     ISAF:  28,360 (48 nations) 
 
 
The 50 nations in the ISAF coalition as of December 2011 were: 
Albania   El Salvador    Latvia   Romania 
Armenia  Estonia     Lithuania  Singapore 
Australia  Finland     Luxembourg  Slovakia 
Austria   France     Macedonia  Slovenia 
Azerbaijan  Georgia    Malaysia  Spain  
Bahrain   Germany    Mongolia  Sweden   
Belgium  Greece     Montenegro  Tonga  
Bosnia-Herzegovina Hungary    Netherlands  Turkey   
Bulgaria  Iceland     New Zealand  Ukraine  
Canada   Ireland     Norway         United Arab Emirates 
Croatia   Italy     Poland   United Kingdom 
Czech Republic  Jordan     Portugal  United States 






APPENDIX 5: PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 
 
PRT Province Region & 
Opening 
Date 
Lead Nation Contributing 
Nations 







U.S., then New 
Zealand 
Malaysia, U.S. 























U.S. Republic of 
Korea 
6. Herat Herat West 
Dec 2003 
U.S., then Italy France, U.S. 











9. Asadabad Kunar East  
Feb 2004 
U.S.  










12. Qalat Zabul South 
Apr 2004 
U.S. Romania 














15. Lashkar Gar Helmand South(west) 
Sep 2004 
U.S. then UK Denmark, 
Estonia, U.S. 
16. Farah Farah West 
Sep 2004 
U.S.  
17. Sharan Paktika East 
Sep 2004 
U.S.  






















































26. Pul-e-Alam Lowgar East 
Mar 2008 
Czech Republic U.S. 
27. Shibirghan Jowzjan North 
Jul 2010 
Turkey  
28. Charikar Parwan East 
Jul 2010 
South Korea  
 
In 2011, one PRT closed: Bazarak. 
 
In 2012, five PRTs closed: Bagram, Feyzabad, Jalalabad, Mehtarlam, Meymaneh. 
 
In 2013, 18 PRTs closed: Asadabad, Bamiyan, Chaghcharan, Charikar, Farah, Gardez, 
Ghazni, Kala Gush, Kandahar, Khowst, Kunduz, Pol-e-Khomri, Pul-e-Alam, Qala-i-Naw, 
Qalat, Sharan, Shibirghan, Tarin Kowt. 
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